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***Post-primary Education and Political
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Post-primary Education and Political and Economic Development

C. Arnold Anderson, L. Gray Cowan, S. N. Eisenstadt,
C. Walter Howe, Joseph LaPalombara, John P.
Powelson, Lucian W. Pye, T. H. Silcock,
M. Brewster Smith

Edited by

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Preface

Since 1957 eleven new states in Africa, Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and the Middle East have attained their political independence within the Commonwealth of Nations and have assumed the task of building viable and responsible states. Their future political and economic development as well as that of other new states in Asia and Africa has aroused increasing interest among Western social scientists who, from a variety of perspectives, are studying them and assessing their chances of survival. Despite this diversity of approach and analysis, most agree that the road to modernization and development, however it may be defined, has not been accurately mapped and is at best still under construction and beset with detours and rough spots. The new states appear to depart on the road to modernization as confused travelers, knowing the general destination, but not the direction to take.

One fact of life in the new states is the demand for immediate expansion of the educational program. In many quarters there is the belief that political power and position and economic well-being accrue automatically and by right to the educated. This view is of course wishful thinking, but widespread belief in its validity increases the demand for more education and for the benefits that education is supposed to bring. A more cautious and even pessimistic view is held by many social scientists who agree that post-primary education can be a source of innovation and growth in the political and economic spheres, but who warn that unless it is carefully integrated into the local context, it may retard or misdirect political and economic development. Education may produce an enlightened and responsible citizenry committed to the ideals of a democratic political system and trained to perform the myriad functions of a complex economic system; but in an

underdeveloped state with limited resources and technically trained manpower, it may produce a citizenry frustrated and angry because their rising expectations of the benefits of education have not been met and willing to adopt extremist solutions for the political, social, and economic malaise.

The 1963 Commonwealth-Studies Center Joint Seminar, held at Duke University, related to the impact of post-primary education on the political and economic growth of developing countries, with primary attention given to the new members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Previous joint seminars have related to the problems of traditions, values, and socio-economic development,¹ the transfer of institutions from the mother country to the overseas members,² the problems of administration and economic development in India,³ and the political development of Nigeria.⁴ The essays included in this volume were read at the 1963 Joint Seminar and are directed specifically to the impact of post-primary education on both the political and economic development of the new members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Most of the essays were revised in the light of comments and questions by faculty and students at Duke University during the session. The authors are drawn from the disciplines of sociology, economics, social psychology, and political science, with each essay reflecting their particular approach and research interests. It will be seen that the authors differ among themselves in certain respects, which in itself illustrates the difficulties involved in assessing the political and economic development of the new states. The editors believe that these differences are useful and have made no attempt to disguise them.

The essays fall into three general categories. The first four essays are concerned with postulating some theoretical handles for an understanding of the impact of post-primary education on political

1. Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), *Tradition, Values, and Socio-Economic Development* (Durham, N.C., 1961).

2. William B. Hamilton (ed.), *Transfer of Institutions* (to be published by the Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., in 1964).

3. Ralph Braibanti and Joseph J. Spengler (eds.), *Administration and Economic Development in India* (Durham, N.C., 1963).

4. Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (eds.), *The Nigerian Political Scene* (Durham, N.C., 1962).

and economic development. The next two examine the contributions that American institutions of higher education and United States foreign policy should make in developing the educational institutions of the new states and the roles these institutions should play in the developmental process. The last three essays examine the role of education in specific areas of the Commonwealth: Africa and Asia. In the first essay, C. Arnold Anderson⁵ examines the impact of education on political development and urges a cautious view of the benefits of education. He argues that the number of schools in the society and their curriculum is of minor importance; rather it is the total context of the school system that determines its impact upon society. New states must face the fact that investment in formal educational institutions has less short-run economic payoff because the complementary and on-the-job-training opportunities lag behind school expansion. Moreover, more schooling is necessary to get the same economic payoff that Western states were able to obtain with less educational investment.

S. N. Eisenstadt⁶ discusses education and political modernization and the complex interrelation between the two. He enumerates several factors that he associates with political modernization and warns us that the impact of education on these factors may be detrimental as well as beneficial. Because of the imbalances that develop in the educational systems of new states, the system is both an initiator of change and development as well as a major block along the path of growth and development.

M. Brewster Smith⁷ considers the problem of foreign and indigenous education and reminds us that with regard to Africa, indigenous education is foreign in content since it is a copy of the educational system of the former colonial power. He points out that one of the basic problems following study abroad is integrating the returning student to his local society and providing him with the opportunity and incentive to use his new talents. It is

5. Mr. Anderson is Director of the Comparative Education Center, University of Chicago.

6. Mr. Eisenstadt is Rose Isaacs Professor of Sociology, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and in 1962-1963 was Carnegie Visiting Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

7. Mr. Smith is Professor of Psychology and Associate Director of the Institute of Human Development, University of California, Berkeley.

his suggestion that the balanced uses of foreign study supplement indigenous education and thus serve as a catalyst to bring about modifications in local practices and traditions.

Lucian Pye⁸ considers the contribution that the military can make to the political and economic development of the new states. He points out that our knowledge of the relationship between military institutions and national development is still incomplete, but that in many countries the military are involved in governmental activities that often include the management of educational and training programs. The military also play an important psychological role in giving the people a sense of dignity, national identity, and loyalty. Although they can make an important contribution to national development, Mr. Pye reminds us that too often the military have been a powerful force preventing development and modernization. One of the contributions that social scientists can make, he suggests, is to discover the ways in which the military can facilitate rather than impede national development.

Joseph LaPalombara⁹ discusses the role of American universities in developmental projects. He believes that the political development of the new nations cannot be regarded as merely a by-product of economic transformation and progress but must be regarded as a positive goal deliberately sought. Although this is a difficult, sensitive, and abused task, he asserts that American universities have a basic responsibility to participate in the political development of the new states, because they have the skills and training to assist in the building of institutional and behavioral structures that support the democratic polity.

The educational assistance policies of the United States are surveyed by John Powelson.¹⁰ Like Joseph LaPalombara, he asserts that American academics should play a significant role in educating others to the problems and complexities of economic growth and development. American educational assistance to the developing countries must take into account the current trends in eco-

8. Mr. Pye is Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

9. Mr. LaPalombara is Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

10. Mr. Powelson is Professor of Economic Development, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University.

conomic developmental theory, but this training must be related to the local situation and not to the situation in the developed country. Furthermore, it should concentrate on the development of inquisitive minds and the establishment of incentives. He illustrates the complexity of the educational assistance programs by sketching those of the Department of State, AID, the Peace Corps, and USIA.

In the essay by C. Walter Howe,¹¹ we begin our consideration of the educational policies in specific areas of the Commonwealth. Mr. Howe reports on his survey of African academics in the English-speaking countries regarding their views of some of the recommendations of the UNESCO Conference in 1962 at Tananarive on the Development of Higher Education in Africa. He believes that the views of African academics are important and have not been taken sufficiently into account. His respondents in the survey considered staffing to be the most critical problem facing higher education, especially that of training African staff abroad. He also notes that the respondents' views regarding entrance levels and requirements and the length of university curriculum were correlated with their British or American training.

L. Gray Cowan¹² analyzes the British and French educational systems in Africa and points out that at the secondary and higher educational level the educational systems in both the French-speaking and English-speaking areas are replicas of the metropolitan institutions. He draws our attention to the fact that the British educational goals were mutually inconsistent, while the French policy was fixed and unswerving. In both systems emphasis was placed on the literary and humanistic content of the curriculum rather than on its technical and vocational aspects; this failure to create a respect within the local community for technical and vocational training, he contends, was the most serious shortcoming of the colonial educational systems. The colonial system created an educated elite that was able to replace the former administrators upon independence, but it did not lay the foundation for the

11. Mr. Howe is Staff Associate of the Africa Liaison Committee, American Council on Education.

12. Mr. Cowan is Director of the Program of Studies on Africa, Columbia University.

economic structure into which mass education could be integrated.

In the final essay, T. H. Silcock¹³ discusses the role of education in the political and economic development of Southeast Asia, with primary reference to Malayasia. He emphasizes particularly the impact of the medium of education on the political and economic development of a multiracial and multicultural society and describes the specialized educational structure that has developed in Malayasia because of its cultural and racial diversity. It is too late, he concludes, to establish English as the national language of Malayasia and as a unifying force for the country.

The Commonwealth-Studies Center, under whose auspices the seminar was held, was established at Duke University in 1955 following a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Although the support of that corporation has made possible the preparation and publication of the Commonwealth-Studies Series, neither the Carnegie Corporation nor the Commonwealth-Studies Center is responsible for the views expressed by the individual contributors to the volumes.

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15. Mr. Cole is James B. Duke Professor of Political Science and Provost of Duke University.

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*Post-primary Education and Political
and Economic Development*

Economic Development and Post-primary Education

C. Arnold Anderson

I. Introduction

Any country that tries to carry through a program of modernization must create an appropriate educational system. But schools, however excellent or numerous, will not alone enable a poor country to enter the select circle of progressive and prosperous nations. The quantity of formal education has only a moderate statistical association with economic development when we look at the whole panorama of the world's nations.

The advanced economies certainly would collapse without their hosts of highly educated technicians, managers, and political leaders. These cadres expanded along with the economies, and it is only recently that they have attained impressive numbers. Some underdeveloped nations, on the other hand, have their first generation of university graduates. It is a misleading simplification to stereotype these extreme contrasts and imagine the scattergram of per capita national incomes and levels of schooling to form a neat pattern. The correlation (r^2) of post-primary enrolments and per capita incomes for all countries is .48. For the majority of countries (omitting those having almost universal literacy) this correlation is only .28 as contrasted to .43 for adult literacy levels.¹

1. C. A. Anderson and M. J. Bowman, "Concerning the Role of Education in Development," in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Peoples, New Nations* (New York, 1963), pp. 247-279. Unfortunately, data for post-secondary schooling alone are not available. By way of explanation, the symbol r stands for the correlation between two sets of quantities; positive unity means that the two variables are completely correlated; negative unity means they are inverse to each other. In practice, it is

The percentages of national populations enrolled in post-primary schools range from virtually zero to only seven, even among countries with incomes of \$300 or more per capita. For nations with incomes above \$500 per capita the range is almost as great. To be sure, where 5 per cent or more attend post-primary schools incomes are usually above \$500 per capita (except in Japan), but some of these high-income countries have less than 2 per cent enrolled in post-primary schools.

Different educational indexes are by no means closely associated with each other, and they show diverse relations with income levels. Which aspect of education is essential for development? Although adult literacy and post-primary enrolments are correlated, there are countries with low literacy and comparatively high post-primary attendance, but with low incomes: Egypt, Jordan, India, and Taiwan. Perhaps a high rate of secondary and university attendance is even dysfunctional in some settings. There is wide latitude for substitution between various sorts or levels of schooling as contributors to development.

If we use primary enrolment as an intermediate index, its correlation (r^2) with per capita income for all countries is .69, and for those with adult literacy below 90 per cent it is .59. Primary enrolments seem to be more closely and consistently associated with income levels than is adult literacy and much more closely related than is post-primary attendance.²

One's appreciation of the complexities of development is not dulled by observing that 1938 incomes predict 1955 primary enrolments more closely ($r^2 = .71$) than 1930 enrolments predict 1955 incomes ($r^2 = .59$). Excluding those countries with virtually complete literacy, we find that these coefficients are .57 and .20, respectively. Moreover, the correlation (r^2) of 1938 with 1955 incomes is .75, and the addition of 1930 primary enrolments raises it to only .77.³

common to speak of r^2 because this quantity shows what part of the variability in one item (as per capita income level) has been explained by taking account of the imputed influence of the second variable (as literacy).

2. Neither energy potentials nor cultivated land per capita affects these correlations markedly.

3. One can estimate the joint influence of more than one variable upon the one whose variability we are seeking to explain. Thus, we can "add in" the effect of

These primitive statistical explorations confirm what we have learned on other grounds: individual countries follow different patterns in weaving together educational programs with economic improvement. For Western and Far Eastern countries 1930 primary attendance seems to be the best of these three educational predictors of 1955 incomes; for Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa adult literacy best predicts subsequent incomes. Levels of schooling often seem to be as much by-products of development as sources of it. These ambiguities raise questions about the economic roles played by the educated men in different societies. Subtle cultural factors no doubt influence the ways education affects economic behavior. These data mentioned above appear to imply that education of the populace is more important than education of elites, though it can hardly be a question of exclusive choice.

Only special circumstances, such as receipt of oil royalties, bring high incomes to a really poorly trained population. Yet numerous countries provide schooling generously without much present economic return. It is useful to remember that Tsarist Russia was a high-income country by comparison with most of today's underdeveloped world and that it enjoyed rapid gains in production. It should be no surprise then to learn that the 1897 Russian census reported that 44 per cent of the 30- to 39-year-old males were able to read. In the cities the percentage was 69 with 60 per cent of the urban working class claiming literacy. The rural rate was 39 per cent.⁴

II. The Limited Usefulness of Western Experience for New Nations

Projections of Western experience as a basis for setting educational targets in underdeveloped countries today must be very tentative. I would suggest that we might set critical thresholds at

successive influencing factors in order to see if they contribute explanatory power, or to see which of them does.

4. See C. A. Anderson, "Footnote to the Social History of Modern Russia: the Literacy and Educational Census of 1897," *Genus*, XII (1956), 1-18.

40 per cent adult literacy, 30 per cent of the children in primary schools, and 2 per cent of the total population in post-primary schools. Attainment of these targets, however, would give only tenuous promise of economic advance.⁵

In actuality, the countries now striving to achieve development will, and probably must, reach higher levels of educational performance than their European predecessors. More schooling will be required to get the same economic pay-off that Western countries obtained with less educational investment. There are several bases for this conclusion.

1. The technology being imported by developing countries is more complex than that formerly used in Europe. If they choose to skip over simpler procedures, the newer economies must produce the trained men to handle complex machines and organizations. The whole array of electronic occupations is new, and machine maintenance must be more precise and more dependable. Cost competition demands stricter grading of export crops. Furthermore, there are more varieties of record keepers who must respond to more sensitive communication networks.

2. The new nations must work out their economy and their polity simultaneously. Even some old but underdeveloped nations, especially those in Latin America, lack a suitable polity. In the contemporary nations with universal suffrage, a broader distribution of schooling seems called for than was necessary for Western countries at a corresponding political stage. The ordinary man now is being asked or even prodded to react to both more distant and more complex events; his early Western counterpart believed public decisions were the duty of his betters.

3. Education has become a widely sought good in modernizing nations. Although choices may be rationalized in economic terms, a better-schooled population is desired for its own sake. Educational opportunities are conceived of as inherent rights of citizens, and diffusion of education has come to be a national status symbol.

5. Assorted historical data are summarized in C. A. Anderson, "Equity, Efficiency, and Education for Development" (mimeographed essay prepared for the conference on education and development sponsored by the Comparative Education Center and the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council, April, 1963).

In one or two African countries, for example, the proportions of youth completing elementary and secondary school match those of European countries less than a generation ago. This goal of universal education has indeed been brought closer to fulfillment than it was in the Western past by the expenditures and assistance from, or through the agency of, Western churches and governments.

It is being realized belatedly that those developing societies showing the most impressive accomplishments in education are also the ones experiencing growing mass unemployment among school leavers. That the decision to utilize advanced production methods may bring even more staggering unemployment than in Elizabethan England, for example, is seldom realized. In the countries joining the world economy today, schooling and unemployment may be obstinately complementary. This outcome does not so much suggest that schooling has been inappropriate as it does that creation of jobs cannot keep up with the expansion of schools. In part, the problem may reflect a concentration of too large a part of education and training resources in conventional schools. In saying this, I am not referring to the outmoded notion that there is something basically wrong with school curricula; rather, it is clear that investment in formal schooling has less short-run economic pay-off in underdeveloped than in developed economies, so long as complementary and on-the-job training opportunities lag behind school expansion.

A particularly excruciating dilemma, therefore, faces the developing countries; they must choose between traditional general or humanistic education—however vocational that actually may have been—and a more technocratic pattern. Western nations also had their technocratic vogues in conceiving human resources. The mercantilist view of labor, together with its later crude wage-fund variants, thought of labor as fuel for the economy. The more rarefied monetary conception of Keynesianism sees men primarily as spenders. Today, particularly in the Common Market countries, an obsession with raising productivity is again giving an economic cast to European educational philosophy.

Contemporary economic development around the world is en-

meshed in a more complex social setting than that of earlier periods. The human factor has a more central place, even when human beings are treated mainly as carriers of skills needed to run the economic system. Men today may be conceived as more individualized, but they are held to be duty-bound to serve national economic plans. Manpower planning, especially in centrally managed economies, favors viewing men as interchangeable parts, shaped to prescribed specifications for inserting into authoritative production organizations. The true heir of the exploiting capitalist, the iron master, is the forced-draft central planner. Though these ideologies stimulate education and training, they encourage narrow views of talent and lead to essentially military approaches to training. Large manpower decisions often mean large errors, sometimes partly hidden, but not diminished, by equally large coercive and make-work programs.⁶

In most developing countries, bookish practices still prevail in schools, even in the teaching of science. The European products of the educational system provided the models of leadership, and for decades the local graduates of such schools enjoyed excellent job opportunities. There is deep respect for humanistic education. Sentimental ties to overseas universities and a desire to stand well in the world of learning strengthen the determination to preserve this respected system. Isolation from the Western academic world would be a cruel fate for many leaders in developing countries.

But the increase in unemployed school leavers and the slow rise of real incomes arouses skepticism about this academic education. A more mundane approach is being sought. Technocratic philosophies of education are on the rise, but the balance of humanistic and technocratic elements takes a different form at each level of the school system. Education becomes vocationalized, and educational opportunities are rationed by manpower tables. As impatience for economic development grows, we should not expect new nations to copy the relaxed and fuzzy mixture of general and practical education that Americans enjoy.

During earlier generations in the West, formal schooling beyond

6. This theme is elaborated in C. A. Anderson, "Dilemmas of Talent-Centered Educational Programs," *Year Book of Education*, 1962, pp. 445-457.

primary years could be regarded placidly by ordinary families as beyond the reach of, or irrelevant to, their children. Apart from a few clever boys aspiring to become clerks, those hoping to be something better than casual laborers made use of familiar opportunities outside the schools—family training or apprenticeship. The economy and much of professional work rested on traditional crafts whose slow proliferation and refinement *were* the changes we call the commercial and early industrial revolutions. Moreover, unlike much of the underdeveloped world today, traditional ways of living *were* the stuff of economic activity, the modifications of which entailed adoption of only a partially new civilization. Formal instruction in structurally separate organizations was little needed.

A major task for new national leaders is to design an economically effective plan of education (in the broad sense).⁷ Here the tests of prudent investment are easier to meet than in the system of formal schools. In this design a major part should comprise on-the-job training.⁸ Innumerable forms of that training emerge spontaneously and can be encouraged by various subventions. A greater difficulty will be to resist proposals to develop formal in-school substitutes for on-the-job programs, since there seems to be so natural a connection between the demand for technicians and the establishment of technical schools. But lack of a direct link to jobs is a serious limitation in the task of developing effective individual and team-working habits and pragmatic, adaptive know-how. Devoting a major part of educational resources to such job-linked training may also more surely bring about the desirable non-economic gains of mass schooling. However, the money is no more easily found than for other types of education, and the public may display a distinct lack of enthusiasm for these less conventional programs, no matter how impressive their merits may appear to detached observers.

7. C. A. Anderson, "Some Hard Choices in the Creation of Educational Policy for Economic Development," *Social Sciences Information*, II (1963), 7-19.

8. F. H. Harbison, "Human Resources Development Planning in Modernizing Economies," *International Labour Review*, LXXXV (1962), 435-458; and the author's chapter on education in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Kenya* (Baltimore, 1963).

III. Encouragement of Initiative: The Prime Need of Developing Nations

In almost every aspect of their social structures, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a "gap." It is the gap between the few, very rich and the mass of the poor, between the educated and the uneducated, between the townsman and the villager, between the cosmopolitan or national and the local, between the modern and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled. It is the "gap" between a small group of active, aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and influential persons in the big towns and an inert or indifferent, impoverished, uneducated and relatively powerless peasantry.

The overcoming of the gap requires the dispersion of initiative and interest more widely throughout the society.⁹

Economic development, to the degree it occurs, involves some closing of this gap in a mutual cause and effect process. For economic development—however we unfold its implications in other aspects of life—rests upon a people's capability to invest productively. Such investment must be on a broad human base. Each year we become more impressed with this requisite as we contrast meager gains in output against huge injections of material capital into societies with little comprehension of a complex economy. This discouragement has generated the hope that human capital will do what physical capital has not. Yet it is not easy to be confident that prodigious expansion of conventional schools will generate the missing attitude dimensions of human capital.

A system of physical capital is like an iceberg—the steel mills and other impressive embodiments of technology are only the peaks on a foundation of simpler activities. Each sector needs a host of committed laborers as well as managers; it also needs foremen, service men, distributors and expeditors, suppliers of credit, and organizers of training. It needs research to adapt new techniques and to relate new practices to the inchoate strivings of uprooted peoples. Each of these functions takes place on two or more

9. E. Shils, "Political Development in the New States," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II (1960), 281-282.

of the levels corresponding to elementary, secondary, and higher education. The outcome of a decision by a key man can be dramatic in its impact on foreign exchange reserves, for example. But the aggregate impact on productivity from adoption of a marketable crop by many farmers is just as great.

The big technology is important, but its productivity depends upon an array of allied activities of diminishing scale. We know literacy fosters general alertness, but we are less knowledgeable about how far routine formal schooling will foster those widespread activities of production. One does not revolutionize agriculture with vocational schools, but new patterns of farming will not take root among apathetic peasants. Innovations in production depend on local climates of readiness for change, alertness to markets, access to practical instruction, and appreciation of schools.

Men with different levels of training complement each other and in part substitute for each other. But schedules of manpower needs are often illusory and their translation into school programs essentially guesses. The pace of development sets the need for trained men. It is not uncommon for a country to exceed its target for university graduates; however, often middle-skill output falls far short of the rule-of-thumb goal of three to five middle-skill men for each high-level man. The quality of the top men is more important than their number; their support of constructive change is vital. Even more important is their preparation to relate themselves to the middle-skill men and to instruct hordes of on-the-job trainees. Efficiency is more a matter of management than of having specifically trained workers at entry to jobs, and managerial skill in industrial relations is crucial.

We commonly underrate the importance of having innovative and flexible enterprisers, whether they are in private business or are managers of collective enterprises. Educational systems frequently tend to dampen such propensities rather than to nourish them. (How to train potential entrepreneurs is not part of pedagogical training.) This is especially true in elitist societies and ex-colonies that pattern schools on elitist patterns already outmoded in the metropole. Discouragement of enterprise is in fact one of the outcomes of undue anxiety about standards in the schools. The

lack of such constraints has been one of the most important contributions of the American land-grant colleges; their very "inefficiency may have been the most efficient conceivable way for them to form human resources for economic growth."¹⁰ But favorable conditions in the social milieu doubtless played an equal part. Whether schools ever can contribute significantly to the forming of such men in an environment that discourages their emergence is another question.

Finally, mention should be made of the possibility that schools can help to generate a "Protestant ethic" or "achievement motivation." This cluster of traits would include a high value on the future or deferred gratification, stress on the importance of sustained work, and readiness to cope with mundane problems and to get one's hands dirty. We hope that the totality of school life can foster these values; hoeing and digging in school gardens, however, is likely to have the opposite effect. The success of secondary schools at this task may grow as training focuses more upon science and as their graduates find careers in related occupations rather than shifting to the first office job offered. The extra-school environment is critical, especially the political environment, insofar as it facilitates long-time horizons.

IV. Educational Implications of the Demand for Rapid Development¹¹

In formulating educational policy, every society must compromise among three goals: (1) efficiency in allocating training to individuals most likely to profit from it; (2) equity in opening opportunities for education impartially to various groups; and (3) free choice of educational careers to maximize motivation and flexibility.

To the degree that desire for economic development becomes

10. M. J. Bowman, "The Land-Grant Colleges and Universities in Human-Resource Development," *Journal of Economic History*, XXII (1962), 546.

11. See above, note 7.

paramount, the criterion of efficiency moves into the foreground, while equity and especially freedom of choice are downgraded.¹² To the degree that leaders of new nations respond to populist pressures, entry to schools may remain quite open. The goal of efficiency may be stressed (either correctly or mistakenly) in talk about standards that leads to limiting entry, but equality of opportunity often emerges as surprisingly prevalent.¹³ Children of humble people in some new nations make up a larger share of secondary or university enrolments than did children of like origins in Western countries until recently. Inequalities among regions nevertheless may be very large due to local differentials in development. Increasing politicization and populist demands for continuous expansion of schools can be expected to threaten any explicitly economic criteria of economic policy.

Giving heed to criteria of free choice and equity is one of the main reasons that school outputs exceed available jobs in so many countries. School systems can be expanded quickly after the initial stages with comparative ease. The beliefs that schools are a right of citizens and that they are the magic key to development foster that expansion. An educational program suitable for undergirding ambitious long-run economic plans could easily absorb 10 per cent of gross domestic product, calling for half of government expenditure or necessitating much larger tax yields, but such a program usually will mean gross overspending on formal schooling as judged by short-run economic criteria.

Leaders in the new nations must then make some hard choices if maximizing the economic relevance of their educational program is to be taken seriously. The tests of prudent investment are easier to satisfy for extramural types of education such as business,

12. Equality of educational opportunity among individuals or strata is more a result than a cause of economic development; it is certainly not a prerequisite. Notice, incidentally, the variation in the ratios of actual to parity university enrolment of farmers' and laborers' children in European countries in the 1930's: Yugoslavia .25, Germany .11, Italy .09, Sweden .29, Hungary .24, Finland .44, Denmark .22, Greece .29. See C. A. Anderson, "Access to Higher Education and Economic Development," in A. H. Halsey, J. Floud, and C. A. Anderson, *Education, Economy, and Society* (New York, 1961), pp. 252-267.

13. Especially in Africa and in some Far Eastern countries in the nineteenth century; Latin American education is generally "exclusive."

agricultural extension, or on-the-job training. These programs also may contribute more in the way of non-economic benefits from their less academic approach. Such programs are not less expensive than conventional ones, however, and they lack the shining appeal that often marks the traditional schools.

How useful the graduates of schools will be to their nation depends in the last resort upon the readiness of other agencies to make effective use of them and to motivate them to seek the more venturesome roles. The number of schools or what they teach has minor influence, except in the all-or-none sense; it is the context of schools that determines their impact upon society. This is perhaps least true for university graduates who may have observed their opposite numbers abroad or who can observe instructors brought from abroad. The societal context is particularly vital for persons with elementary education only; their schooling is useful primarily to the degree that it enables them to respond to others with more education, whether the latter be extension agents or advertisers. How middle-skill men function depends upon direct guidance by employers; individually, their potential may be large but they must be made members of effective teams. Once more, then, we see that the balance between humanistic and technocratic training has different implications for each level of the scale of skill. Allocation of trained men to suitable jobs is almost as difficult as creating the jobs. Whether this sorting is brought about by self choice or by authority, it is affected strongly by policies respecting educational standards.

School places may be restricted by shortage of funds. But restriction also can result from anxiety of schoolteachers or prospective graduates about standards. Entry to the more academic schools is often tied to metropolitan certificates. Standards not infrequently become an end in themselves, having little to do with social or economic effectiveness. Admirable as this may be in many ways, it can be economically dysfunctional by constraining allocation of manpower in four ways:

1. It is doubtful whether academic examinations are very good predictors of productive capacity except under close supervision, and of course in "clerkly" jobs. School certificates had little to do

with recruiting the enterprisers and artisans that built Western economies.¹⁴

2. Selective or external examinations tend to become stereotyped and discourage experimentation by schools. Lest the rate of examination passes drop, schools shy away from allowing pupils to explore their individual interests or to discover how to enjoy learning as an end in itself.

3. Preoccupation with standards encourages prolongation of conventional schooling and levels of vocational preparation that are too high.

4. Focus upon the internal operations of the schools and preservation of academic orderliness by discouraging irregular training or unusual interests decreases the elasticity of supply of various kinds of skill. Academics usually have little sympathy for the seeming disorderliness of economic behavior.

Insistence upon maximizing the rate of economic growth introduces major distortions into the educational system, distortions that can sometimes be self-defeating and often will shape the goals of economic activity itself. Reference already has been made to the resulting emphasis upon technocratic education, the Soviet Union being the best example. In other countries it may be preferable to enlarge the conventional academic school and pay little attention to the assimilation of graduates into the job world.

Whichever choice is made, the balance among levels of the system may be defective. For reasons already discussed, primary schools can be spread too evenly over the territory. This generates virtually irresistible demands for enlargement of secondary and university systems, particularly when job opportunities are scarce or unattractive. Secondary schools are least likely to be overexpanded; they have neither the mass support of primary schools nor the elite backing of the universities.

As has been implied at several points, there is a common overestimation of the importance of formal versus other types of education, particularly at the secondary level. To overcome the alleged

14. But examinations do supply a much-needed universalistic element in societies bedeviled by tribalistic and other hindrances to selection of the competent. The task is to widen the coverage of examinations to include more relevant topics.

deficiencies of academic secondary schools and increase the supply of technicians, establishment of numerous technical schools may be advocated. There is little evidence to support such a policy until countries have reached a relatively advanced level of technology; until then the expected benefits seldom occur unless compulsion is introduced into job choice. Ministries normally overlook the advantages of associating technical training with employment and the motivation resulting from using training as a means to advancement. The highly efficient training schools run by railroads and other enterprises, both public and private, are sometimes outside the jurisdiction of the education ministry and even little known to it. Formalizing technical education tends to encourage neglect of vital adult programs such as business or agricultural extension work. (Agricultural training of youth not committed to farming is usually sterile.) The contribution of the military to technical education is usually ignored and seldom related to broader needs. Formal schooling is best handled mainly as preparation for vocational education in close association with employment.

The schools are overloaded when they are expected to prepare children for jobs instead of preparing them to be trained for a job. In developing countries, schools do well to inculcate the basic subjects. Intrusion of practical courses—assuming teachers can be found—weakens the all-too-shaky academic competence of the pupils. Moreover, separately organized technical schools often cannot recruit pupils, which is a further argument for relating such training closely to job experience.

Nearly every country fails to solve the problem of insuring a sufficient supply of teachers of the desired quality. It is conceded usually that university teachers will for decades have to be partly or mainly recruited abroad; in a good many countries home production of secondary teachers will be delayed almost as long.¹⁵ In both these sectors there are large losses of local men who take jobs in the developed countries. Unless countries acquiesce in very

15. "The Staffing of Higher Education in Africa" (mimeographed paper prepared under the direction of Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders for the UNESCO Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, Sept. 3-12, 1962), chap. viii.

low qualifications, primary teachers will become available in the number desired only after development is well under way. After all, the better trained a prospective teacher is, the more likely he is to seek and find a different occupation, particularly one that involves less isolated residence.¹⁶

Pressure for rapid development encourages the substitution of incentives for motives. Under favorable conditions, creation of a dependable labor force takes many decades; pressed by a sense of urgency, reliance will be put on coercion and labor assignment replaces labor commitment.

Three conditions favor the emergence of a flexible and competent labor supply:

1. Occupational opportunities must be highly visible and widely known.

2. These jobs must carry enticing financial and other inducements to forsake non-market activities. Wage incentives should vary in order to increase or decrease particular employments.¹⁷

3. Sufficient educational opportunities must be available to turn out the kinds and numbers of skilled men needed. In many developing countries, the problem is no longer that of supplying sufficient education but of insuring that it is relevant to needs.

Fulfilling these conditions, however, will not insure the supply of jobs needed for rapid economic expansion. Hence, governments today are attracted to the coercive features of the Soviet model. Labor could be assigned to jobs and assembled for disciplined work on government projects. Manipulated wages could be supplemented or replaced by food rationing and criminal penalties for work derelictions. Schooling could be rationed in accord with manpower estimates. It is difficult to determine the net gain from this coercion, but zeal for quick results produces many changes in educational systems.

16. The best attack on this problem is to step up education of girls drastically.

17. The strongly entrenched civil service rules and proprieties in many new nations inhibit these adjustments.

V. The Uneasy Position of Intellectuals in Developing Nations

The birth of many of the newly independent nations must be attributed to leadership by intellectuals. This is particularly true in the ex-colonies where intellectuals were deliberately, if belatedly, brought forward by the colonial rulers. These first Westernized men were the only group able to formulate claims to independence and organize the maneuvers that made holding on to the territories not worth the cost.¹⁸

In these new countries mass politics was fostered by ideologies of resentment and populist democracy. Intellectuals both before and after independence strove to focus the emerging political consciousness of the populace and harness it to the building of a nation. Xenophobia, in these circumstances, proved too useful a weapon to leave aside, despite its slight positive contribution to national unity. The knitting together of new nations could have proceeded more slowly and on a more solid foundation if aspirations for rapid rise in incomes had not become so widely accepted. Although the backgrounds and initiating circumstances are different, similar conditions have been arising in other developing nations that are not new.

Leaders have formulated their demands for independence and their goals for development in Western terms. The more "modern" the leaders, the more they think in borrowed ideas. The drive for nationhood amidst the welter of tribes and regions relies upon Western philosophies of nationalism, but at the same time threatens to cut off contact with the ideas needed to organize a viable state and establish a productive economy. Even in countries without recent colonial experience, and in those where military men replace intellectuals as nation builders, the same ambivalence flourishes. As Balandier says,

18. J. H. Kautsky (ed.), *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1962). See the summary chapter by Kautsky, the sections by Kling on Latin America, Coleman on Africa, and the two general chapters by Shils and Benda.

In order to generate an impetus favorable to modernization and to the introduction of industrial civilization, the leaders of the so-called underdeveloped countries have been motivated to make use of a dynamism that arouses the hostility of their people to the nations that were the creators, the first beneficiaries, for a long time exclusively and abusively, of that same civilization.¹⁹

Becoming entangled in the concrete tasks of governing and of guiding economic development, intellectuals and other highly educated men find that there is some alteration in their position. The spread of literacy and the opportunity to vote encourages citizens to concern themselves with public affairs, and these populist forces tend always to get out of hand; being able to understand the leaders' pronouncements, citizens feel encouraged to criticize them. Political arousal runs ahead of institutional structures that can channel this interest into more realistic political life. The first generation of leaders is challenged by newly educated men who come out of the schools in greater numbers than can be taken into government and who perpetuate the tradition of opposition to the government. These successive cohorts of educated men lack the broadening influence the early leaders experienced from study abroad or from rubbing shoulders with colonial officials. The nation is the outer boundary of their horizon, not, as with the first leaders, a line between a known larger world and the would-be nation. In the absence of vigorous economic development, this rivalry tends to become a mere struggle for office, with neither party representing distinct *economic* interests or policies. Meanwhile, when the task of negotiating with colonial officials is completed, the traditional and less Westernized elites may begin to regain influence. The military come into the picture at this stage in some countries, if they were not the actual leaders in organizing the nation. In particular, men with a gift for the organization and manipulation of power push ahead. Their grip on the country is strengthened both by the traditions of colonial rule and by contemporary philosophies of managed economies. All these factors

19. G. Balandier, "Le Contexte Socio-Culturel et le Coût Social du Progrès," in A. Sauvy (ed.), *Le "Tiers-Monde": Sous-Développement et Développement* (Paris, 1961), p. 294. See also P. Caprassé, *Leaders Africains en Milieu Urbain (Elizabethville)* (Louvain, 1959), pp. 137-140.

encourage a shift from responsible government to plebiscite government.²⁰

Modernization supplants independence as the rallying cry. While these new aspirations are also ably espoused by intellectuals, the new tasks are much more intricate than those for which the leaders were prepared. They nevertheless resist devolving authority upon enterprisers or upon the new cadres of technical men. The instrumental nature of military training and discontent with the wrangling of fledgling politicians are reasons why officers step in at this stage. Alternatively, a party takes a hand and is brought under the discipline of organizers, however many intellectuals flock to it. Populist sentiments become redefined, for modernization requires discipline: in our day the discipline of government or party is more acceptable than that of the private employers. The technocratic view of human resources becomes more attractive, one by-product of which is the political neutralization of those intellectuals who do not become party theorists. This is one aspect of the much discussed alienation of the intellectuals, although that is a broader problem.

Much of the discussion about alienation of the educated class is pointless, for such men are in many ways alienated from their backgrounds and from popular culture in any society. Early leaders of some new nations commonly retain memories of traditional life and may relish escape into traditional rituals, even though they were the first venturers into the developed world. Later leaders have also come through Westernized schools—it is difficult to imagine any other acceptable kind of school—but they often enjoyed less personal relations with Western men. They lack the former's deep roots in tradition from which they can appreciate the wider horizons. These successive waves of educated men are subjected increasingly to the depersonalizing processes that mold men to operate a productive economy. As Dwaine Marvick shows for students at Fourah Bay, many have lost all knowledge of the life of their own society.²¹ Some of these more recent stu-

20. On all these topics see various writings of E. Shils and the discussions in Kautsky, *op. cit.*

21. Dwaine Marvick, "Higher Education in the Development of Future West African Leaders: A Survey of the Perspectives of Students at Fourah Bay College,

dents, especially those in the sciences, seem also to be less interested in political affairs, more pragmatically oriented, and perhaps therefore more ready to be brought under the discipline entailed in rapid development.²²

VI. Schools and the Pattern of Elite Recruitment

The relationships between elites and access to schools reflect mainly extra-school influences and are little affected by the operations of the schools themselves. In large measure a social group—apart from the lowest stratum—gets the sort of schools it wants to protect or to strengthen its position. The persistence, then, of a conventional European type of school system in a developing country testifies to the absence of any strong group pressure for its modification.

There are three broad patterns of relationship between elites and schools:

1. The schools constitute the sole source of candidates for top positions; the positions are defined in terms of educational qualifications and few people can obtain that education. This has been the situation in many developing nations, especially in Asia and Africa.

2. Schools give the cachet of excellence to individuals who are predestined by virtue of their family status to step into leading places. Their formal education, indeed, may have little tangible connection with their tasks. The accepted, but not wholly accurate, conception of nineteenth-century English universities and public schools illustrates this situation, but the clearest examples today are found in Latin America.

3. Schools supply part of the training for some of the men who

Freetown, Sierra Leone" (mimeographed essay prepared for the Conference on Education and Political Development sponsored by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics, June 25-29, 1962).

22. In some countries, particularly in Latin America, intellectuals have been less prominent as leaders. Their fate more commonly has been to become ornamental. See J. Friedmann, "Intellectuals in Developing Countries," *Kyklos*, XIII (1960), 513-541.

achieve elite status, but individuals reach those posts by many routes and with quite diverse sorts and levels of educational preparation. This pattern has prevailed during much of the existence of the Soviet Union, and did so generally in our Western states and in public office and business throughout the United States.

The connection of schools with elites is in turn affected by the prevailing mechanisms for allocating individuals to or within the elite. In many, or perhaps most, developing countries, the elite determines the basic choices for itself and for others. The persisting white-collar predilection in so many countries, for example, reflects the real income and status advantages of graduates holding good certificates from elite schools. The propensity for such persons to favor their kind for public employment, even to stressing mannerisms and dialect, precludes any objective assessment of the educational system. There are clearly negative effects—up to a breakthrough point—of expanding an educational elite when jobs are sinecures.

The way in which the graduates of various schools relate themselves to various kinds of occupations is affected also by the prevailing climate for enterprise and initiative. If business opportunities are scarce and public-service places are at a premium (whether due to government policy or economic sluggishness), the third of the above-mentioned patterns will take root only belatedly, if at all. If government places for graduates are assured while entry into business is discouraged (by shortages of credit, low profits, high taxes, or socially scorned status), the preferable choice is not hard for an individual to discern. In the absence of economic momentum and of vigorous entrepreneurial models, educated men will drift into politics or the less demanding public offices; their talents for other ventures atrophy. Many men potentially qualified to contribute in diverse employments become standardized products of schools. Inappropriate government salary policies also can contribute to this outcome; less attractive employment opportunities, especially away from the capital, remain short of staff.

Finally, the pattern of a country's foreign trade in skills shapes the kind of contribution that schools make to prepare leaders in

various sectors of life. One can understand why many developing nations are ambivalent about expatriates; populist politics further reinforce this tension. The new American nation once had similar though less intense difficulties. Hostility to the mother country was manipulated to solidify the nation and to foster economic independence. But the gap in economic level was small and there was no racial irritant to dampen our welcome to bearers of improved technology.

Cultural transfer is mediated mainly by men who travel or migrate as students, officials, businessmen, skilled workers, or teachers. If rapid economic development is the prime aim, this circulation of specialists must become large and flow in both directions. As the number of students in local universities grows, the number studying abroad grows also.²³ As colonial-service officials depart, new technical assistance agents must be brought in, and they will cost much more than those who were pushed out. Little physical capital can be absorbed by an underdeveloped country without accepting numerous expatriates. Know-how comes in packages: firms or projects, production teams, and expatriate experts. This necessity may be politically embarrassing for the leaders of new nations.

VII. Conclusion: The Challenge to Leaders; Education for Development ²⁴

It is modernization toward which so many nations are striving, and economic development is properly regarded as central in that effort. As Rothman has said,²⁵ modernization includes at least five principal aspects: (a) Universalistic achievement norms must become effective in many spheres of behavior. (b) The society's

23. Unfortunately, many of the trained men from the developing country choose to remain in or depart for more lucrative jobs in the advanced countries; the better-prepared men are the most likely to seek overseas jobs.

24. Since this essay relates to economic development, other criteria receive only passing attention. No suggestions are made on how to solve the priority problem of supplying jobs for school leavers.

25. K. Rothman, "Report of Lake Arrowhead Conference on Education and Political Development" (mimeographed report of the conference sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, June, 1962).

social structures must become more differentiated. (c) The members must learn to perform many new specialized functions. (d) Rationality must become the norm over many aspects of life. (e) Social participation must be diverse and widely shared. Each of these specifications has its economic implications. The educational system is expected to contribute to each of these ends. And the orientation of education will be determined by leaders, not so much in their educational policies as in the patterns laid down for other spheres of life.

Focusing upon educational issues, we may say that decisions must be made on eight basic questions.

1. Education must not be sidetracked by goals that detract from development or fritter resources. Debate about adapting the educational system to local ways of life, for example, ignores the fact that in essentials all educational systems that conduce to economic development are alike. To be sure, local geography can be taught and local folk tales used, but there is no Indonesian or Mexican chemistry.²⁶

2. A sensitive balance must be sought between discouragement of school expansion in some areas or at some levels and expansion for others. If mushrooming primary enrolments threaten to absorb most of the funds, support will have to be given mainly to localities where educational aspirations extend to post-primary attendance and where job prospects are best. There are, on the other hand, lagging areas in all countries that need incentives to get schools rooted. In some countries only a small proportion of families keep children in school after the first couple of years, and these children remain all the way into secondary school or beyond. In such circumstances programs that widen elementary attendance and encourage its persistence for enough years to become effective are needed. Each of these policies involves balancing costs of schooling against benefits; no developing country can afford to treat education as a wholly free good so far as the central budget is concerned. Thus, costs for primary schools can be shifted to local

26. If adaptation were so unambiguous, there would have been fewer reversals of Soviet educational policy.

areas in which enrolments are rising rapidly while costs for areas needing incentives can be absorbed by the central government. Once secondary and university attendance begins to take hold, attention needs to be given to substituting loans for bursaries (or rationing entry), with due attention to hardship cases. Differential fees and loans proportioned to the relative demand for different occupations often will prove feasible.

3. The internal dynamics of the educational system supply many cues for changes in policy. For example, it is important to balance manageable secondary entries against allotted elementary completion rates. Once educational pipelines are filled, pressures rise rapidly and the outflow will have to be taken care of. The variation in costs for different curricula or levels of school makes it necessary to project the different educational flows. If, for example, teaching absorbs too large a part of secondary output, elementary expansion may have to be curtailed or teacher training shortened.

4. A policy that trains people to too high a level must be avoided. Because public health improvement is regarded as essential, for example, it is often concluded that a medical school (or a second one) is needed. Apart from the possibility that doctors can be trained overseas more cheaply, the same improvement in health might be obtained by training nurses—at less cost or even more gain in health for given expenditures on training health personnel. Middle-skill training almost everywhere suffers from diversion of too much money to university study.

5. Strong efforts must be exerted to make the present school system more flexible—here is where the criterion of adaptation is pertinent. A guiding principle is that as an economy matures, the correlation between level of formal schooling and occupational position becomes looser—except for the extreme levels of the occupational scale. The examination system usually needs to be loosened: more subjects should be included, examinations should be supplemented by intelligence tests, and selection within the next higher level substituted for entry exams to that level.²⁷ This

27. This will prove difficult if government is the main employer.

will often imply, for example, moving Forms V and VI into the university. In general, science courses need to be given top prestige by every possible means.

6. A salient goal must be to link schooling to jobs. Previous comments relate to this point: agricultural and business extension work, on-the-job technical training, and preparing university people to become trainers. In the absence of the whole social milieu that is so stimulating for Western children, other methods of linking schools to the world of production must be substituted.

7. Overseas help on educational programs must be exploited skilfully and resources husbanded to avoid antagonizing donors. In general, this implies restricting universities to general and sub-professional education; overseas assistance should be relied upon to the maximum for graduate and professional training, particularly for the smaller programs. University graduates must in large part be prepared to become teachers of teachers, since overseas countries can spare only a few teachers. It is more important to import science teachers than teachers of history, and specialists in curriculum construction or teacher-training methods rather than professors of radiology.

8. Relations with expatriate personnel need to be given particular attention. Not only should such relations be as harmonious as possible; it is even more important to be sure such personnel are used effectively. The numbers of expatriates will increase.²⁸ As has been remarked, importing business know-how requires importation of technicians and managers. Specialists need to be given authority in their roles without infringing upon the dignity of local officials.

In the last analysis, success on each of the first seven tasks will be determined by appropriate use of expatriates.

28. It has been estimated, for example, that in sub-Sahara Africa university faculties cannot dispense with major reliance upon visiting professors before about 1980.

Education and Political Development

S. N. Eisenstadt

I. Introduction

The relation between educational development and political modernization is manifold and complex and entails an examination of some of the wider aspects of the sociology of education. The general societal functions of educational activities and institutions are twofold. One is the transmission of the cultural heritage of a society from generation to generation and the participation with the family in the process of the socialization of the new generations. The other is the channeling and differential placement of people to those positions in the society that are allocated on the basis of achievement.¹

Thus, the educational activities in any society are closely related both to those of the family or kinship group and to the broader field of cultural activities and organizations. The socializing functions of educational activities are distinct from those of the family in that they proceed from the general and primary socialization of the family to preparation for more specialized and specific tasks and roles and the inculcation of more general orientation to the wider central symbols of the society. The specific educational activities usually are not concerned directly with the creation and propagation of a given cultural tradition, although institutionally and organizationally they may be closely related to such activity.

1. See S. N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956); J. Floud and A. Halsey, "The Sociology of Education: A Trend Report and Bibliography," *Current Sociology*, VII (1958), 165-235.

There are few, if any, societies in which the socialization of the young takes place wholly within the family. But societies differ in the extent to which the educational activities are performed in special roles, situations, and organizations, and in the extent to which these activities constitute an organized, unified system or just a congeries of parallel situations in different sectors of the society. But even in societies in which there are few specific educational roles, special educational organizations or situations tend to develop. Thus, in many primitive societies, the age group or the bush-school is an important educational group or organization, and the initiation ceremonies are the most important dramatization of specific educational situations.²

The smooth performance and outcome of these educational activities are never guaranteed, not even in the simplest and least differentiated societies and certainly not in the more complex and differentiated ones. In addition to the possibility of failure because of inadequate manpower and techniques or because of various congenital deficiencies among the younger generation, there are certain inherent potentialities built into the very process of education and its relation with other parts of the society that make the outcome uncertain. The autonomy and distinctiveness of the educational system, even if it is limited, suggests that educational activities may create various aspirations and needs that are not necessarily identified with the demands of the political (or the economic) system.

The close relation of the educational system or activities to cultural creativity and the maintenance of cultural traditions and the important functions of educators in the field of communication may make educational activities a focus of innovation and change. The close relation of educational activities to the structuring of stratification, especially as channels of mobility, also may have a similar outcome. On the other hand, the close relation of educational activities to the family may easily result in an emphasis on the maintenance of the family as the main value and engender apathy toward the more central spheres and values of a society.

The extent to which the deviant or innovating potentialities of

2. Eisenstadt, *op. cit.*

educational institutions may develop varies between societies; on the whole, the more traditional or the less differentiated a given society is, the less likely is the possibility that the educational activities will develop such potentialities. But other variables, such as the nature of the prevalent value system, are also of great importance in this context. Whatever the extent of these potentialities, they suggest that the control of the educational system is an important problem for the political system and the authorities of any society.

The way in which these problems are dealt with varies greatly between different societies. In most of the pre-modern, large scale (feudal, patrimonial, or centralized imperial) societies, there developed certain common characteristics of educational activities.³ Such activities usually were divided into several compartmentalized parts. The central educational institutions were oriented mainly toward the education of an elite and the upper strata and the preservation and development of the central cultural traditions.

The local educational institutions, which were usually only loosely connected with the central ones, were oriented primarily toward the maintenance of some general and diffuse identification of the broader strata of society with the over-all symbols of the society without, however, permitting these strata any close participation in the central cultural or political activities, and toward the inculcation of the technical skills and knowledge to fit their position or place in society.

In addition, there were usually several educational institutions that served as channels for restricted or sponsored mobility into the central spheres of society or for some specific vocational training for a relatively small number of people from the broader social strata.

In these societies, the type of education given to the different classes was primarily, although not entirely, determined by social-economic position and not vice versa. On the whole, the educa-

3. See, among many available descriptions, R. Ulich, *The Education of Nations: A Comparison in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961); also, S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (Glencoe, Ill., 1963), chaps. vii, viii, ix.

tional system in such societies was geared to the maintenance and perpetuation of a given, relatively non-changing cultural tradition and technical knowledge, and did not serve as either a vehicle of cultural innovation or as a channel of widespread occupational and social mobility.

II. Political Modernization

These characteristics changed with the development of modern societies and with the process of modernization in general and of political modernization in particular. But before we discuss these changes, we must explain briefly what is meant by these terms.

The broad structural corollaries of modernization that developed in the major institutional spheres of society are well known. The major characteristics of modernization are the development of a very high extent of structural differentiation, of free resources that are not committed to any fixed, ascriptive groups, of specialized and diversified types of social organizations, of wide, non-traditional, national, or even supra-national group identifications, and concomitantly of special regulative-allocative mechanisms and organizations (such as market mechanisms in economic life, voting and party activities in politics, and bureaucratic organizations and mechanisms in most institutional spheres).

Karl Deutsch has coined the term "social mobilization" to describe the process of modernization, and defines it as "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour." Some of its main indices are exposure to aspects of modern life through demonstrations of machinery, buildings, consumer goods, response to mass media, change of residence, urbanization, change from agricultural occupations, literacy, growth of per capita income, and the like.⁴

Encompassing all these various characteristics, modernization

4. K. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (1961), 494.

denotes the development of a social, economic, and political system that is capable, within certain limits, both of generating and absorbing change with some degree of effectiveness. The more specific problems of political modernization can be understood within the framework of the general characteristics of modernization.⁵ Historically, political modernization can be understood by an examination of the political systems that developed in Western Europe after the seventeenth century and then spread to other European countries, to America, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to Asia and Africa. Typologically, political modernization is evidenced by the development, within a political system, of certain characteristics. The first such characteristic is the development of a highly differentiated political structure in terms of specific political roles and institutions, of the centralization of the polity, and of specific political goals and orientations. Second, it is characterized by growing extension of the scope of the central legal, administrative, and political activities, and their permeation into all spheres and regions of the society. Third, it is characterized by the continuous spreading of potential political power to more groups in the society—ultimately to all adult citizens. Fourth, it is characterized by the weakening of traditional elites and of traditional legitimation of the rulers and the establishment of some sort of ideological (and usually also institutional) accountability of the rulers to the ruled, who hold the potential political power.

All of these characteristics, of course, are closely connected with the continuous growth of substantial fluidity of political support and the absence of ascriptive political allegiance and power. This means that the rulers, in order to maintain their power and receive support for the specific goals and policies they espouse, must mobilize continuously the political support of the ruled, or at least of large or vocal parts.

The culmination of this modernization process is the participation of the ruled in the selection of the rulers, in the setting up of

5. See, in greater detail, S. N. Eisenstadt, "Political Development and Bureaucracy," in J. LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 96-119.

the major political goals, and, to a lesser extent, in the formulation of specific policies. The formal expression of this in most modern political systems is the system of elections.

These characteristics of political modernization develop within the wider framework of social, economic, and cultural modernization. The combined impact of such conditions and the basic characteristics of modern political systems give rise to the continuous generation of new political demands and organizations, which the central political institutions must absorb. At various stages in the development of modern political systems, there develop different political problems and different types of organizational frameworks through which problems are articulated.

Hence, the central problem of political modernization is the political system's ability to adapt itself to these changing demands, to absorb them in terms of policy-making, and to insure its own continuity in the face of new demands and new forms of political organization.

Modern political systems thus are faced not only with the problem of maintaining a balance between political demands and policies (which is common to all political systems) but also with the problem of maintaining such a balance by absorbing demands and patterns of political organizations which are, potentially at least, continuously changing. In other words, political modernization creates as its central problem that of sustained political growth. The ability to deal with continuous changes in political demands is the crucial test of such sustained political growth or development and is the crucial focus of modern political systems.

III. The Pattern of Demands and Supply of Educational Services

In the following pages we shall attempt to analyze, even if in a preliminary way, the extent to which the educational activities and institutions that have developed in modern societies contribute to the process of political development, i.e., to the establishment of

new, viable political activities and institutions that exhibit the characteristics outlined above and to their ability to absorb continuously new political demands and problems, or, conversely, the extent to which they impede such development and contribute to political instability, eruptions, and the blocking of further development.

Perhaps the best starting point for an analysis of the changes in the educational institutions of modern societies is to examine the changing pattern of demands for and the supply of educational services. Both the demand for and the supply of educational services have been greatly influenced by the general process of modernization, by the breakdown of traditional social units and "social mobilization," by the attempt of various groups to attain new goals in various fields of social life, and by the demands for manpower made by developing economic structures. As a result, there develops a continuous diversification and differentiation of educational activities and organizations. In the field of demand, we can distinguish between the demand for the products and for what may be called the rewards of education. Among the important products of education, the demands for which are continuously increasing with the process of modernization, two are most pertinent. One is knowledge of various skills—either general skills, such as literacy, that are necessary for a great variety of occupations, or more specific vocational skills, which are continuously increasing and diversifying with growing economic, technical, and scientific development. The second educational product for which there is a growing demand in modern societies is that of identification with various cultural, socio-political symbols and values and of relatively active commitment to various cultural, social, and political groups and organizations.

The demand for these different educational products has become diversified as a result of the growing changes in the social structure attendant on the process of modernization, the disruption of the older social and cultural order, and the development of various new elites and movements. The demand for identification with the existing order and symbols continues, but there also

emerge demands for identification with the new cultural, social, and political values that are being developed by emerging groups of elites and movements.

These demands for different products of education are developed by different groups—by economic and administrative entrepreneurs and organizations, by political, social, and cultural elites, parties, and groups, and by the more dispersed and diffuse orientations of citizens in general and parents in particular.

The demands for the different rewards of education borne by various groups and strata within every modern society vary greatly and are continuously changing. They include the demand or expectation of economic rewards, for preparation for different occupations, for occupational advancement, for social mobility and affirmation of status position, as well as for participation in the wider social, political, and cultural affairs and movements. Such demands may be oriented to the preservation of an existing order or to its change and transformation.

The supply side of educational services is also greatly diversified and differentiated. It includes on the one hand both the supply of the manpower to be educated at various levels of the system and adequate motivation and preparation for education. On the other hand, it includes the supply of educational facilities (schools at all levels, ranging from kindergartens to universities), of teaching personnel (which is greatly dependent on fluctuations in the labor market), and of the facilities necessary for the maintenance of such institutions and organizations. These facilities can be supplied by the government and by various elites and entrepreneurial groups at the center and at the local levels of society.

It is clear then that the over-all picture of the flow and organization of educational activities in modern societies is highly diversified and differentiated. One of the most important aspects of the situation is that only in very special instances (the case of the would-be learners, of course, excepted) are those who are most active in the articulation of demands for the products or rewards of education also the main suppliers of the major educational services. It is only in the case of the political and administrative elites that such an identity exists to some extent—although even they

cannot fully control the supply of teaching manpower. In almost all other cases, the groups articulating the demands for products or rewards of education cannot directly supply the facilities for educational services but must act indirectly through pressures on the political system or on the supply of free entrepreneurs in the market.

Although all these activities are varied and continuously changing, they are drawn together more and more into a common—although not necessarily homogeneous and unitary—framework and market and tend to influence one another to an increasing degree; from their interactions, there develop the basic structural characteristics of educational institutions and systems in modern societies.

The most important of these characteristics is the growing specialization of educational roles and organizations and the increasing unification and interrelation of the different educational activities within the framework of one common system. Educational activities and organizations become more widespread, and a continuous differentiation between the different levels of the educational system—between primary, secondary, vocational, adult, and higher education—takes place. Each of these systems—and even many subsystems—gradually becomes more autonomous, specialized, and organized in its own framework. On the other hand, however, these different organizations become more closely interconnected either because of some over-all educational plan, or because one is a recognized channel for advancement into the other, or because of the growing competition between them for the same manpower and resources. One of the most important and significant aspects of this process is the bringing together of the educational systems and creative activities in all of the major cultural spheres.

As a result of all these changes, there occurs a marked shift in the functions of the educational institutions in the society. The educational institutions continue, of course, to perform some of their universal functions of socialization and of differential placement of people in social positions, but the ways in which these functions are performed greatly change. In general, education be-

comes much more closely related to processes of social change, forging new national communities and their new common symbols, and scientific and technical innovations, the access to which is more widespread among the various social strata. At the same time, it serves more and more as a channel of occupational selection, social mobility, and placement.

The growing interrelationship between the educational institutions and the processes of cultural, scientific, and technological innovation and creativity usually develops on two different levels: the level of creation of new central cultural and political symbols and of new centers of scientific creativity, and the level of communication of these symbols and innovations to wider strata of society. Such educational-communicational activities can be important agents in the breakthrough to modernity of various groups and their integration into wider social and political frameworks.⁶

A similar close relation develops—although in different periods and stages of the modernization process—between educational activities and achievements and economic, occupational, and social status. Because of the continuous expansion of market economy and specialization and the growing demand for different types of skills, this development takes several directions.⁷

On the most general level, education provides a reservoir of human resources and motivation necessary for economic development.⁸ On a more specific level, educational preparation is also very important for the more specialized orientations and skills necessary for specific economic tasks and activities.

In this way, the educational institutions gradually become a main channel of placement and mobility in the society. If, in the

6. See Ulich, *op. cit.*, chaps. v and vii; also N. Hans, *The Trends in Education in the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1951).

7. A. Halsey, "A Review of the Conference," in A. Halsey (ed.), *Ability and Educational Opportunity* (Paris, 1961), pp. 15-49; Floud and Halsey, *op. cit.*; and the full collection of readings published by A. Halsey, J. Floud, and C. Anderson (eds.), *Education, Economy, and Society: A Reader in the Sociology of Education* (New York, 1961); and J. Vaizey, *The Economics of Education* (New York, 1962).

8. The fullest exposition of this view can be found in the various works of T. Schultz. See especially "Education and Economic Growth," in N. Henry (ed.), *Social Forces Influencing American Education* (the 60th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education), Pt. II (Chicago, 1961), pp. 476-489. See also *The Year Book of Education*, 1962, pp. 353-539.

first stages of modernization in Europe and the United States, economic activity and innovation were major channels of mobility and of creation of new strata and status symbols, in the later stages of modernization (those characterized by growing specialization, bureaucratization, and economic planning), the relationship between occupational placement and the educational system was much closer. Educational channels became one of the most important (if not the only or the dominant) framework of mobility, occupational placement, and creation of new status symbols and units.⁹ Even if the educational system of a society tends to reinforce the existing class divisions, the attainment of some educational level tends more and more to become an important, almost necessary, part of the reaffirmation and retention of one's status.

This bringing together of the various educational activities within one common institutional framework does not necessarily assure harmony or identity between the various aspects of the supply and demand for educational activities and products. On the contrary, the possibility of some discrepancy and lack of such harmony is inherent in the very nature of the educational situation in modern societies. The modern educational institutions can participate in the process of modernization, in the creation of new political and social frameworks and of new attitudes, in the integration of wider groups into the new political communities, and in the development of different skills and activities that contribute to the process of social and political mobilization. But they also can become stumbling blocks in the process of modernization and in the creation of a political framework capable of absorbing continuous change. In order to be able to analyze these conflicting potentials of the educational institutions in the process of modernization, we must describe briefly some of the major ways in which these institutions have developed in different modern and modernizing countries.

9. See A. Halsey, *op. cit.*; see also R. J. Havighurst, "Education, Social Mobility and Social Change in Four Societies," *International Review of Education*, IV (1958), 167-185.

IV. Differences Among Educational Systems

Whatever the common characteristics of modern educational systems—and it is, of course, obvious that these characteristics emerged only gradually and intermittently—there developed many important differences among the modern societies that we must understand in order to analyze the relation between education and modernization.

These differences among modern educational systems may be understood to some extent in terms of various constellations of the major aspects of supply and demand of educational services and products that were briefly analyzed above. While it would be beyond the scope of this essay to analyze all these variations in detail, some broad indications are useful.

We can begin with an analysis of the educational policies of the major modernizing elites¹⁰ and the policies pertaining to the creation of new political communities, of incorporating wider strata within them, and of creating some facilities for economic progress.¹¹

Political oligarchies, autocracies, or monolithic parties that are committed to modernization tend, especially in initial stages of

10. On the concept of modernizing elites, see C. Kerr, T. Dunlop, F. Harbison, and A. Myers, *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

11. The description of the different educational systems will especially take into account the following criteria, which are, as we shall see later, of special significance for the impact of the educational institutions on political modernization. One such criterion is the extent to which the education that has developed in any society is general or specialized, i.e., oriented to specific, limited occupational or vocational tasks and career patterns. The second is the extent to which there develop separate types of general or specialized types of education for different strata of society or, conversely, the extent to which the type of education provided to different strata is more or less the same.

Insofar as the last tendency develops, we have to distinguish between the extent to which such a relatively general or common educational framework is accessible to all groups or has, in fact, been limited only to some groups, and the extent to which it has served as an autonomous agent of social and occupational selection and placement.

The third criterion is the extent to which the educational system or activities that develop in any society are spontaneous, a product of the interaction of different groups and market forces, or conversely, the extent to which they are the product of what may be called "sponsored" activities by central authorities.

modernization, to develop some type of generalized vocational education—either a national system or one that is segregated for different social groups. They tend, however, to develop such a system both in order to assure the allegiance of the various groups to the new political community as well as to maintain their own control over political activities and developments. Hence, even if they establish a uniform national system of education, they also create within its framework special niches for the political and cultural elite. The special place of Tokyo University in the modern Japanese system is a good example.

The situation is quite different in those countries where the ruling groups or elites are committed in only a limited way to modernization and are concerned primarily with the maintenance of the existing social and status system, or where the elite that is committed to modernization is too weak or incapable of implementing its goals. Such situations existed in many of the colonial¹² and post-colonial countries,¹³ in various semi-colonial and/or autocratic countries set on limited technical modernization (such as the various Middle Eastern and Eastern European countries in the period between the two world wars),¹⁴ and in many Latin American countries.¹⁵

In all these cases, the educational system emphasized the particular type of generalized education that was most congenial to the specific traditions of the country, be they local traditions or ones derived from a foreign metropolis. They also had a strong elitist orientation that emphasized relatively restricted status systems and belittled technical and vocational training, although some such special training may have been developed for select

12. See J. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (Cambridge, 1948); also, W. A. Lewis, "Education and Economic Development," *Social and Economic Studies*, X (1961), 113-127; and B. B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes* (London, 1961).

13. See Lewis, *op. cit.*; also H. Kabir, "Education in India, A Bird's Eye View," *International Review of Education*, I (1955), 48-66; and A. Tibawi, "Primary Education and Social Change in Underdeveloped Areas: Some Lessons of Mandatory Palestine," *International Review of Education*, IV (1958), 503-509.

14. See M. E. Affifi and M. K. Harby, "Education in Modern Egypt," *International Review of Education*, IV (1958), 423-439.

15. See J. Roberto Moreira, *Educacao e Desenvolvimento No Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1960); and H. W. Burns, "Social Class and Education in Latin America," *Comparative Education Review*, VI (1963), 230-238.

elite groups (like the military). This usually was accompanied by a relatively low investment in technical and vocational education.¹⁶

Such systems may either be restricted to a very small elite or stratum, or may, in theory, be open to everybody. But, even when the latter is the case, it is usually a very restricted system that tends to sponsor the mobility of restricted groups and to weed out lower-class pupils, leaving them with only rudimentary education.

A different situation exists in those countries with a relative multiplicity of elites and strata who are committed in different degrees to goals of modernization with none of them enjoying a full monopoly of political power. If these elites and strata have not been mutually antagonistic, there may develop (as it did to some extent in England and particularly in the United States) a relatively differentiated educational system in which some level of general education becomes a background for different occupations and in which the educational system, although favoring some social groups, does not necessarily close its gates to others.

If the basic frameworks of many modern educational institutions are set by the political and cultural elites in terms of their conceptions of basic cultural and social values, the concrete contours of the modern educational system are shaped by the encounter between the policies of the elites and the demands for educational services and rewards. The most important demands are for skilled manpower, which arise from the economic processes and the aspirations for new types of economic and social rewards that are engendered. It is this encounter that constitutes the central focus of the dynamic developments of modern educational systems.

From such initial encounters there develop, in the first stages of modernization of various countries, several types of educational systems. One such type is characterized by the establishment of different specialized types of education for middle groups, while both the elite and the lower groups still maintain their more generalized, separate, but to some extent interconnected type of education.

The English educational system in the nineteenth century, although developed not entirely under such conditions, was similar

16. See Lewis, *op. cit.*

to this type as were other relatively homogeneous elitist educational systems, as in Sweden.¹⁷ Perhaps the most important example of such an educational system was developed in the Soviet Union during the late twenties and early thirties and has continued into the Khrushchev era.¹⁸

A somewhat different development occurred in Japan where the elite attempted to maintain a relatively uniform generalized national educational system and to develop selection for various occupations by internal grading of the different institutions within that system, a way that enabled it to incorporate various pressures stemming from needs of the expanding economy and from aspirations of new strata.¹⁹

In more pluralistic societies, insofar as the elites and wider strata are committed in a general way to modernization and participate to some extent in social and economic development, the varied economic demands for education and the supply of more varied types of educational facilities may give rise to a diversified and relatively heterogeneous educational system. Such a system developed in the United States and Western Europe and may be developing in a very embryonic fashion in some new states. In addition to a great variety of local traditions, the exact contours of such a system depend upon the continuity of economic development and upon the nature of basic social orientations of the most active groups and elites.

Insofar as development is relatively continuous and the strength of elitist orientation is relatively weak, as has been the case in the United States, there tends to develop a diversified and heterogeneous educational system as described above. On the other hand, when problems of economic and technological development con-

17. See Ulich, *op. cit.*, chap. v; see also H. C. Dent, *Education in Transition: A Sociological Study of the Impact of War on English Education 1939-1943* (London, 1944); and A. Kerr, *Schools of Europe* (Westminster, Md., 1961), chaps. v and vi.

18. See G. Z. F. Bereday, W. W. Brickman, and G. H. Read, *The Changing Soviet School: The Comparative Education Society Field Study in the U.S.S.R.* (Boston, 1960); and G. Z. F. Bereday and Jaan Pennar (eds.), *The Politics of Soviet Education* (New York, 1960).

19. On the development of Japanese education in the Meiji period, see R. S. Anderson, *Japan: Three Epochs of Modern Education*, Office of Education Bulletin No. 11 (Washington, D.C., 1959); and also R. K. Hall, *Education for the New Japan* (New Haven, 1949).

stitute major political goals and elitist orientations are prevalent within a society, there may develop the tendency to establish unified, countrywide educational systems with an emphasis on minimal generalized education for all classes and distinction between general education for the elites and more specialized vocational education for the lower and middle groups.²⁰

V. Blockages to Growth and Development

This encounter between the demands for the products of education in terms of broad political and cultural values on the one hand and skills and economic products on the other is continuously changing in every modern society. Hence, the educational system predominant at one stage of development may easily be undermined and changed during the next. It is this likelihood of constant imbalances between the various aspects of the educational process that explains the possibility of the educational system's being both an initiator of change and development as well as a major blockage to continuous growth and modernization.

Since the beneficial effects on the process of modernization of development and the spread of education have often been stressed, we shall focus our analysis here on the conditions that give rise to these blockages—keeping in mind, however, that the same elements can serve, under different conditions, as starting points of potential development.

Such blockages are usually connected with the development, through the educational systems, of aspirations and social orientations that are incapable of fulfillment or absorption within the existing frameworks. Moreover, in such cases neither the educational system nor the more active groups in the society are capable of developing new or adequate channels for their absorption.

But the exact ways in which these different blockages develop vary between different societies, and they occur at different stages of development or modernization, depending upon the exact constellation of the major aspects of supply and demand for education.

20. See the literature cited in notes 18 and 19.

On the one end of the scale, there are those societies or sectors in which there is little demand for modern education and its specific rewards. On the other end of the scale, modern educational frameworks may be completely absorbed within the traditional structure. This very often depletes the local countries of any active leadership and at the same time leaves them apathetic to any wider frameworks.²¹ But beyond such extreme, although not infrequent, cases, the most important problem is the way in which demands for education become interwoven with other types of socio-political demands and opportunities.

A high level of political demands and a general equalitarian and populist ideology may easily create pressures for the extension of general educational facilities to more groups. If such demands for general education are made in situations of high political and relatively low economic expansion, they may create pressures that tend to undermine the conditions for successful continuous modernization. In such situations, two closely interconnected processes may develop. One is the demand for generalized education, which becomes an important symbol of status. This often leads to a very strong development of primary and higher humanistic or legalistic education and the concomitant neglect of more differentiated types of education—especially on the secondary level. It is usually connected with the development of occupational aspirations that focus on white collar, professional, and civil service occupations.²²

In addition, there may easily emerge increasing unemployment of different echelons of the educated, ranging from primary school to university graduates, and also a very high level of drop-outs from the different schools, which are geared to a relatively rigid type of cultural tradition that is not very well adapted to the continuously changing conditions.²³

21. See, for instance, K. L. Neff, "Education and the Forces of Change," *International Development Review*, IV (1962), 22-25.

22. See A. Tiryakian, "Quelques aspects négatifs de l'éducation de masse dans les pays sous développés," *Tiers Monde*, I (1960), 161-173; see also A. Curle, "Some Aspects of Educational Planning in Underdeveloped Areas," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXXII (1962), 292-300.

23. See A. Callaway, "School Leavers and the Developing Economy of Nigeria," in R. O. Tilman and T. Cole (eds.), *The Nigerian Political Scene* (Durham, N. C., 1962), pp. 220-238; E. A. Tiryakian, "Occupational Stratification and Aspiration in an Underdeveloped Country: The Philippines," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII (1959), 431-444; also Vaizey, *op. cit.*, chaps. x and xi.

Needless to say, such situations are conducive to the development of various political and cultural tensions that often focus around the educational institutions themselves. The political university as it has developed in Latin America is one expression of such a situation, but many other forms of student and intellectual unrest also may develop in this context.²⁴ It is very significant that in many such cases the elite, even when it is willing to do so, may not be able to change and break through the traditional pattern of status and occupational aspirations. This is especially true if there has developed a vicious circle of economic and political demands and economic underdevelopment.

The problems and tensions outlined above tend to be of relatively less importance in those cases where economic development is continuous. In such cases other possibilities of blockages and cleavages created through the educational system may emerge. One such possibility is related to the extent of affinity or cleavage that exists between different elites, especially with regard to their attitudes toward modernization.

If different elites evince great differences and even antagonisms in terms of their commitments to modernization and to different cultural and political traditions, there may develop different types of specialized or semi-specialized educational systems leading to different professions or elite groups. Such systems may reinforce and even create social or political cleavages,²⁵ but they rarely serve as springboards for the development of new and viable modern institutional structures.

Under such conditions various extremist youth protest movements may develop, best exemplified in the movements of nineteenth-century Europe. This protest, aimed at the renovation of school and society, contributed not only to changes in pedagogical

24. See J. P. Harrison, "The Confrontation with the Political University," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCXXXIV (1961), 74-83; also, the classical study of W. M. Kotsching, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions: An International Study of Occupational and Educational Planning* (London, 1937); and B. Schlesinger, "Student Unrest in Indian Universities," *Comparative Education Review*, VI (1963), 218-224.

25. See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (London, 1940); also Ulich, *op. cit.*, chaps. vi and vii; S. Neumann, "Germany, Changing Patterns and Lasting Problems," in S. Neumann (ed.), *Modern Political Parties* (Chicago, 1956), pp. 354-393.

practice but also, directly or indirectly, to the modernization of the social structure.²⁶

In situations where there exists a greater compatibility between the different elites, social groups, and strata concerning the demands for education and aspirations engendered by the educational system, other problems, blockages, and cleavages may develop.

One such cleavage may develop because of the pressures from various lower and middle groups to enjoy the generalized educational facilities that are restricted to the elites and to encompass wider strata into all expanding educational systems. The elites, of course, may try to resist such pressures. It seems that such a situation has developed both in the Soviet Union and, in a different way, in some Western European countries.²⁷ Other cleavages or blockages may develop through the working of various forces in the free educational market—a market that exists both in countries with centralized and non-centralized educational systems.

The result of these developments is the possibility of increasing numbers of drop-outs and of inadequate utilization of existing abilities within the population. This may easily give rise to apathy and feelings of discrimination and alienation.²⁸

The data on the educational developments in the new states are, as yet, too scanty to permit a full and systematic evaluation. Perhaps the most important and most difficult problem facing these countries is that they may be caught between two extreme situations. On the one hand, in many countries broad strata of the society have not yet developed any wider aspirations or interests, and the educational system has the problem of breaking through

26. See Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation*, chap. vi; and the description in the recent book by W. Z. Laquer, *Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement* (New York, 1962).

27. See, for instance, O. Anweiler, "Probleme der Schulreformen in Osteuropa," *International Review of Education*, VI (1960), 21-35; N. K. Gontcharov, "La Réforme Scolaire en URSS," *International Review of Education*, VI (1960), 432-442; N. DeWitt, "Upheaval in Education," *Problems of Communism*, VIII (1959), 25-43; G. S. Counts, *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education* (Pittsburgh, 1959).

28. See T. Husén, "Educational Structure and the Development of Ability," in A. Halsey (ed.), *Ability and Educational Opportunity*, pp. 113-134; and also T. R. Fyvel, *The Insecure Offenders* (London, 1963).

the apathy and lack of interest. On the other hand, once a breakthrough is attained, it may easily result in intensive political demands for the general primary education that may minimize the importance of technical and vocational education, lead to a general lowering of standards, the neglect of vocational, secondary, and higher education, and create very heavy burdens on the national budgets. The problem of how to avoid such vicious circles in the sphere of educational policy is perhaps the most important one facing the leaders of these countries.²⁹

The previous discussion has sketched ways in which developments in the educational system may give rise to blockages in the process of political modernization. There are several concrete ways in which these blockages may develop. First, in some cases the educational facilities and orientations created at the center and extended to the broader strata may not stimulate a breakthrough to modernization. Education may create demands among these groups for various political rights and economic benefits without making them either more productive or more responsive to central political problems. In many such cases the educational activities can, paradoxically, give rise on the local level to stagnation that, instead of assuring the integration of such groups in the newly emerging political community, only overemphasizes their apathy and dislocation from the more central framework and deprives them of their more active leadership elements.

Second, such blockages may be manifest in growing cultural and social divisiveness and in the creation of divisive and stagnative cultural symbols. Third, they may be manifest in ossification and freezing of status symbols and systems, in growing rigidity of social aspirations, and in the consequent impediment of the development of varying new paths of social, economic, and political differentiation and activities.

Similar developments and problems may occur from the point of view of the process of scientific innovation and spread of greater knowledge and technical skills to wider groups, for within the

29. See Lewis, *op. cit.*; and also the special issue on "African Education South of the Sahara," *The Journal of Negro Education*, XXX (1961), 173-364.

educational system there may develop many obstacles to such innovations.³⁰

In the economic sphere, the most general type of blockage may become evident in the increasing lack of balance between the products of the educational system and the needs of the economic system. There may develop either a lack of adequate skilled manpower or a tendency to develop only a narrow, generalized, or specialized educational system. This, in turn, may relate to the development of shortages of professional manpower and to overdevelopment of certain occupational types that do not lead to any innovative possibilities. It also may result in the faulty functioning of the educational system as a channel of selection, and in the growing number of drop-outs at different levels, thus minimizing the utilization of possible abilities within the population.

The possibilities of such blockages exist in all educational systems, but, needless to say, such systems also contain the possibilities of promotion of some levels of development. Each system may create, both through its own internal developments as well as through the impact of broader social forces, different transformations of demands for education, through which new pressures are created—pressures that may give rise both to further development and differentiation or to different types of blockages, freezings, and eruptions.

At the present stage of research in comparative education or in sociology of education, we are uncertain which of the conditions described above create only blockages, cleavages, and stagnation and which create the possibilities for viable and flexible institutional frameworks. This problem should constitute an important focus of further research.

30. On this general problem, see the material on universities contained in Halsey, Floud, and Anderson, *op. cit.*, as well as the *European Journal of Sociology*, III (1962), 45-122, 231-293, devoted to changes in university structure.

Foreign vs. Indigenous Education¹

M. Brewster Smith

I. Introduction

The question at issue in this essay—the advantages and disadvantages of foreign vs. indigenous higher education from the standpoint of economic and political development—carries for an American social scientist involved in the surge of research interest a decade ago in foreign students and their problems a sharp reminder of the parochialism of much of our research attention to cross-cultural education.

We were startled by the rapid rise in the numbers of foreign students on American campuses, which grew from 6,000 or 8,000 in the pre-World War II years to 15,000 in 1946–1947, 30,000 in 1950–1951, and reached 58,000 a decade later.² Faced with this influx, largely unplanned but with the increasing participation of a congeries of private organizations and governmental programs, we began to scrutinize more closely our optimistic assumptions that (as John Gardner put it in an influential article in *Foreign Affairs*) “all concerned will benefit if foreign peoples get to know us [that] knowing us, they will like and respect us

1. This essay benefits from perspectives attained when I served as staff to the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council (1952–1956), which, with the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, and the Rockefeller Foundation, planned and supervised a program of research on the effects of sojourn in the United States upon foreign students. It also reflects my more recent experience with post-primary education in West Africa in connection with research for the United States Peace Corps concerning its operations in Ghana.

2. The Institute of International Education publishes an annual census of foreign students in institutions of higher education in the United States under the titles *Education for One World* (1948–1954) and *Open Doors* (1955–1963).

that, if people can be placed face-to-face, they will find a common human basis for understanding. . . . So great is our belief," he added, "that we have tended to assume that the process will inevitably be successful, no matter how haphazardly planned and carried out. This is almost certainly untrue."³

The stock-taking that ensued in research and program evaluation focused primarily on the attitudes and the problems and processes of adjustment of the foreign students during sojourn and on return. The implicit evaluative criteria underlying these emphases arose from the context of American national interests in the Cold War arena of world opinion and from the objectives of many private sponsoring organizations concerned with educational exchange as an avenue toward international understanding. Research was therefore more concerned with the impact of the educational sojourn on the foreign student, his attitudes and prospects, than with the contribution of foreign education to national development.⁴

The present topic reflects a shift in perspective, centering attention not on our "foreign student problem," but on the alternatives open to developing countries as they struggle to meet their needs for higher education as a facet of elite recruitment and socialization to man the responsible and specialized positions of a modernizing state and economy. One suspects that this shift can be understood in the context of a revised conception of American national interest, in a world in which an Afro-Asian bloc, newly arrived on the international stage, plays an increasingly important

3. John W. Gardner, "The Foreign Student in America," *Foreign Affairs*, XXX (July, 1951), 637.

4. See in particular the research sponsored by the Committee on Cross-Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council: Franklin D. Scott, *The American Experience of Swedish Students* (Minneapolis, 1956); William H. Sewell and Oluf Davidsen, *Scandinavian Students on an American Campus* (Minneapolis, 1961); Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler, *Indian Students on an American Campus* (Minneapolis, 1956); Ralph L. Beals and Norman D. Humphrey, *No Frontier to Learning: The Mexican Student in the United States* (Minneapolis, 1957); John W. Bennett, Herbert Passin, and Robert K. McKnight, *In Search of Identity: The Japanese Overseas Scholar in America and Japan* (Minneapolis, 1958); Richard T. Morris, *The Two-Way Mirror: National Status in Foreign Students' Adjustment* (Minneapolis, 1960); Claire Selltitz, June R. Christ, Joan Havel, and Stuart W. Cook, *Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States* (Minneapolis, 1963); and Cora DuBois, *Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1956).

role, and in which "international understanding" appears to depend not so much on good will and enlightenment as on security and prosperity in nationhood, in a setting where aspirations have become high and prospects are precarious. At all events, the priorities and terms of relevance are discernibly different today from what they were when much of the American research on foreign students was undertaken. In consequence, one must pick and choose and extrapolate from this research if it is to bear on present issues; large lacunae remain to be filled, and we can at present aspire only to a suggestive analysis of problems and prospects linked respectively with foreign and indigenous education.

II. The Expansion of Foreign and Indigenous Higher Education

A salient fact to be noted at the outset is the way in which the rapid expansion of both foreign and indigenous higher education has affected the developing countries in recent years. Consider first the flow of foreign students to the United States. If for purposes of crude comparison, we group the students from Europe, Oceania, Japan, and North America (apart from the United States) as coming from relatively advanced areas in contrast with other areas in varying stages of development, we find that, in 1952-1953, 58 per cent of the 33,675 foreign students on American campuses came from the less-developed regions.⁵ By 1961-1962, the corresponding percentage was 71,⁶ a proportion that holds for both undergraduate and graduate levels of instruction. In that year, 37 per cent of the students were from the Far East (including Japan), 17 per cent from Latin America, 14 per cent from the Near and Middle East, 12 per cent from Europe, 11 per cent from North America, and 7 per cent from Africa. The 3,930 African students represented a 39 per cent increase over the previous year

5. Institute of International Education, *Education for One World: Annual Census of Foreign Students in Institutions of Higher Education in the United States, 1952-1953* (New York, 1953), Table 2.

6. Institute of International Education, *Open Doors, 1962* (New York, 1962), pp. 21-23.

(which in turn showed an increase of 44 per cent over the year before) and included some 2,500 students from south of the Sahara. Europe and the Far East sent more graduate students than undergraduates (Europe: 47 per cent graduates, 42 per cent undergraduates; Far East: 56 per cent graduates, 37 per cent undergraduates). The balance for Latin America and for the Near and Middle East fell in the reverse direction (Latin America: 24 per cent graduates, 68 per cent undergraduates; Near and Middle East: 32 per cent graduates, 62 per cent undergraduates). African students were more closely divided between graduate and undergraduate study, 40 per cent being graduates and 52 per cent undergraduates.

In absolute numbers of foreign students, though not in the proportion of its total student body at the collegiate level, the United States far exceeds any other nation, playing host to about one-fourth of the world total of more than 200,000 foreign students.⁷ This figure represents about 2 per cent of the world student body of 11.5 million in institutions of higher education. (At the time of the first UNESCO survey in 1951-1952, approximately 85,000 foreign students were reported.) The other major countries with more than 10,000 foreign students (in 1959-1960 when the United States reported 48,500) were the Federal Republic of Germany (19,200), France (14,400), the United Kingdom (11,300), and the Soviet Union (11,000).

Factors of educational, linguistic, religious and cultural tradition, proximity, financial support, political ideology, and intangible prestige appear to govern the flow of foreign students from developing countries. Except for the former French colonial area where educational ties to the Métropole remain particularly strong, it is rare for a single host country to enjoy a virtual monopoly of foreign students from one particular developing nation. The United States is heavily favored as a goal of foreign students from Latin America, but appreciable numbers also go to European universities. Sampling UNESCO data for 1959-1960⁸ (which do not

7. UNESCO data for 1959-1960. See UNESCO, *Study Abroad*, XIII, 1962 (Paris, 1961), pp. 674-676.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 678-683.

include the national sources of the 11,000 reported foreign students in the Soviet Union), we find that from Burma, 74 students went to the United Kingdom, 102 to India, 196 to the United States; from India, 843 to West Germany, 1,513 to the United Kingdom, 4,835 to the United States; from Ceylon, 36 to Australia, 248 to the United Kingdom, 79 to the United States; from Indonesia, 282 to Australia, 417 to the Netherlands, 54 to the United Arab Republic, and 526 to the United States; from Iran, 622 to Austria, 549 to France, 2,507 to West Germany, 276 to Switzerland, 261 to the United Kingdom, and 2,880 to the United States; from Ethiopia, 35 to France, 23 to the United Arab Republic, 11 to the United Kingdom, and 171 to the United States; from Sierra Leone, 174 to the United Kingdom and 60 to the United States; from Ghana, 353 to the United Kingdom and 160 to the United States; from Sudan, 406 to the United Arab Republic, 109 to the United Kingdom, and 109 to the United States. This list includes only the countries receiving an appreciable proportion of the foreign students of given nationality. The United States, it is evident, draws substantially from Commonwealth countries even where the United Kingdom predominates.

Now consider how the countries of the world themselves provide for higher education. Table I selects UNESCO data for 1953-1954 and 1957-1958 to place enrolments in higher education in the various major regions in the context of the scope of the entire educational endeavor in these regions. Granted the uneven quality of these data and the fact that reported enrolments need not reflect the standards that prevail in educational facilities, curricula, and instructional staff, several obvious comments are supported by the table. The world trend over the brief period spanned by the data is toward expansion of higher education, not merely in absolute numbers of students but also in terms of the proportion of all students enrolled in institutions at the post-secondary level. Among world regions, Africa is notably deficient in enrolments. Although the absolute numbers in higher education did increase, there was such rapid expansion at the primary level that the proportion of all students enrolled in universities did not show a gain.

Within Africa, it is the tropical region where higher education

is most novel and its bearing on political and economic development most problematic. The UNESCO data permit a closer look at the development of higher education in tropical Africa—the region identified in Table I as Middle and Southern Africa, minus French Somaliland, the Portuguese colonies, the Republic of South Africa, and the High Commission territories. The thirty-two countries in this area grew in estimated population from 119,778,000 in mid-1950 to 154,454,000 in mid-1959, of which 4.3 per cent were enrolled in educational institutions in 1953–1954 and 6.4 per cent in 1957–1958. Of the population group from age five to nineteen, the enrolment ratio for primary schools was estimated at 24.9 per cent in 1957–1958; the corresponding ratio for secondary schools was 3.5 per cent. But this mean figure hides a range from 0.2 per cent for Niger to 7.2 per cent for Southern Rhodesia.⁹

There were facilities available for higher education in only thirteen of the thirty-two African countries. Table II shows the 1958–1959 enrolments in different fields of study for the ten countries for which these data are available. The approximately 8,000 students accounted for in this table were probably more than matched in numbers by students from tropical Africa enrolled in institutions outside the region.¹⁰ At this recent date, just prior to the “year of independence” for many of the states, indigenous and foreign education were in close balance numerically, with expansion in progress on both fronts.

III. Indigenous Education and Social Development

But the numbers that we have been examining only begin to set the terms of our problem. They suggest how deep is the commit-

9. The value of 29.7 per cent tabulated for Ghana is surely in error by an order of magnitude.

10. “No satisfactory figures are available on the number of students from tropical African countries studying in France, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Excluding these important host countries it appears that in 1958/59 there were some 7,000 students from the countries under review who were studying abroad, principally in the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Lebanon, Senegal, the United Arab Republic, and the United Kingdom.” UNESCO, *World Survey of Education, III, Secondary Education* (New York, 1961), p. 42.

Table I. *World Statistics on Enrolments*

<i>Continent and region</i> ^b	<i>Estimated total population in 1,000's</i>		<i>Percentage of population in school all levels</i>	
	1953	1957	1953-54	1957-58
Africa	214,048	232,569	5.3	7.2
Northern Africa	45,588	49,310	6.7	8.7
Middle and Southern Africa	168,460	183,259	4.9	6.8
America	348,781	379,634	16.3	18.3
North America	175,278	188,682	21.0	23.5
Middle America	54,959	61,150	12.3	13.8
South America	118,544	129,802	11.2	12.7
Asia (except U.S.S.R.)	1,405,417	1,511,608	9.6	10.3
South West Asia	63,880	68,056	6.9	8.8
South Central Asia	473,593	499,702	7.3	8.4
South East Asia	165,794	177,508	10.6	11.8
East Asia	702,150	766,342	11.2	11.3
Europe (except U.S.S.R.)	400,928	413,985	14.8	15.5
Oceania	13,330	14,661	17.4	19.4
U.S.S.R.	192,700	203,600	17.3	16.0
<i>World Total</i>	2,575,204	2,756,057	11.6	12.4

^a From *World Survey of Education, III, Secondary Education* (New York, 1961), pp. 18-19.

^b The world regions given in this table, where not self-explanatory, are constituted as follows:

Northern Africa: Spanish West Africa, Spanish possessions in North Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Republic (Region of Egypt).

Middle and Southern Africa: The remainder of Africa.

Northern America: Alaska, Canada, Greenland, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Bermuda, United States of America.

in Educational Institutions ^a

<i>Percentage of school enrolment in secondary level</i>		<i>Percentage of school enrolment in higher education</i>		<i>Estimated enrolment in institutions of higher education in 1,000's</i>	
1953-54	1957-58	1953-54	1957-58	1953-54	1957-58
10.1	8.5	0.8	0.8	91	128
21.2	15.5	2.2	2.1	66	92
6.0	6.1	0.3	0.3	25	36
17.0	18.0	4.7	5.2	2,675	3,590
20.8	22.0	6.2	6.9	2,287	3,085
6.5	7.2	1.8	1.8	121	156
11.8	13.1	2.0	2.1	267	349
15.6	16.8	1.3	1.6	1,724	2,460
11.0	13.1	1.1	1.4	51	83
21.9	22.5	1.8	2.1	630	871
8.4	10.4	1.3	1.5	229	321
14.7	15.9	1.0	1.4	814	1,185
23.6	25.9	2.3	2.5	1,341	1,642
20.2	21.5	2.3	2.4	54	69
58.9	41.5	4.7	6.4	1,562	2,099
22.1	20.8	2.5	2.9	7,447	9,988

South West Asia: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, United Arab Republic (Region of Syria), Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, the Arabian Peninsula.

South Central Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Ceylon, Maldives Islands.

South East Asia: Burma, Thailand, Malayan Peninsula, Philippines, Indonesia and other islands south-east of the mainland.

East Asia: China, Japan, and the remainder of Asia, except the Asian parts of the U.S.S.R.

ment both to foreign study and to the growth of indigenous educational institutions throughout the world; the trends in progress derive support from so many sources that it is most unlikely that expansion on either front will be brought to a halt in the near future, whatever the rational case for doing so might be. Among the new nations where the relative costs of this expansion are such that it is dearly bought, the data attest to the high value set upon educational advance at all levels by nations and by individuals. But they tell us nothing about the actual contribution of the alternative educational channels to political and economic development. Recent discussion as exemplified elsewhere in this volume has taken a much more critical, even skeptical, view of this contribution than has hitherto prevailed among donor nations or among eager would-be recipients.

Holding this skepticism momentarily in abeyance and granting that expansion in the number of highly educated persons on whatever terms will be regarded as a necessity by the new nations, we suggest that there are certain obvious advantages that favor throwing the main emphasis toward the creation and expansion of indigenous institutions rather than toward the support of expanded foreign study that should be noted at the outset. Other things being equal (and except for some highly specialized kinds of training), it will cost less to establish and man an educational institution at home than to ship the same number of students to universities abroad and maintain them there. In principle, the curricular emphases in such an institution can be directed more closely to national and regional needs than is possible in the case of foreign institutions, which must be primarily responsive to the needs of other clienteles. Also it should be possible in principle to integrate the indigenous institution with the local society so that patterns of student recruitment and placement direct the flow of newly trained talent to the positions in the emerging social order where it is most needed, and thus avoid the cultural uprooting, social dislocation, and the always potential alienation inherent in prolonged foreign sojourn. In the new nations, moreover, the indigenous institution offers an attractive potential agency for welding and solidifying national identity and a focus of pride and prestige in the competi-

Table II. Enrolment in Higher Education in 1958-59 by Field of Study^a

Country	Total enrolment ^b	Fine Arts					Social Science					Natural Science			Engineering Medicine Agriculture		
		Humanities	Education	Arts	Law	Science	Law	Science	Science	Science	Science	Science	Science	Science	Engineering	Medicine	Agriculture
Belgian Congo	398	41	58	—	41	91	41	91	54	37	61	15					
Ghana	1255	215	66 ^c	75	93	323	93	323	116	226	56	85					
Kenya	797	30	442 ^d	43	—	65	—	65	37	78	40	62					
Malagasy Republic	424	30	—	—	282	—	—	—	112	—	—	—					
Federation of Nigeria	1984	529	117	91	—	272	—	272	631	146	176	22					
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	125	—	28	53	—	—	—	—	37	—	—	7					
Senegal	1458	317	5	—	576	21	—	21	312	14	178	35					
Sierra Leone	371	108	1	—	—	105	—	105	57	10	—	—					
Somaland (It.)	245	—	—	—	—	245	—	—	—	—	—	—					
Uganda	837	282	78	22	—	7	—	7	246	14	101	87					
Total	7894	1552	885	284	992	1129	992	1129	1602	525	612	313					
Percentage by field	(100)	(20)	(11)	(4)	(12)	(14)	(12)	(14)	(20)	(7)	(8)	(4)					

^a From UNESCO, *World Survey of Education*, III, p. 42.

^b Includes enrolments from other African countries, most of which had no facilities for higher education.

^c Includes only students enrolled in education at the university; excludes teacher training colleges.

^d Includes higher teacher training courses.

tion for national status. Given the association of reliance on foreign study with dependent colonial status and the symbolic value of the indigenous university as a badge of national autonomy and parity, the strong appeal of investing heavily in the development of indigenous higher education is evident.

But other things are obviously not equal. The ways in which institutions are embedded in their societies diverge from the rational ideal. What may be possible in principle for the indigenous institution may be difficult or highly improbable to realize in fact. Comparison of indigenous and foreign education, if it is to be useful in the present context, must start from a review of existing patterns of indigenous higher education. When we turn to the assets and liabilities of foreign study, our consideration is likely to be profitable to the extent that we aim not so much at a balance sheet of indigenous vs. foreign, but at a clarification of strategic ways in which the judiciously planned use of foreign study can supplement indigenous education, correct some of its liabilities, and hopefully serve as a source of ferment to catalyze modifications in directions that have greater promise for fostering desirable consequences in political and economic development.

The ground to be covered in this review already has been treated expertly by Mr. Eisenstadt from a theoretically sophisticated perspective,¹¹ so the kind of schematic and cursory overview that is compatible with my lack of specialized competence in this area may suffice for present purposes. The field of consideration is higher education in developing countries generally, but special attention will be given to the situation of the new nations of tropical Africa.

For an instructive starting point, we cannot find a better case than that of Japan, a uniquely successful instance of controlled modernization in which higher education played a central role. The outlines of the story are familiar. Upon the opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, a segment of the feudal elite sought to promote the rapid modernization of the society while maintaining firm controls to preserve the traditional hierarchical social order with its values of honor, respect, duty, and fealty to the

11. See above, pp. 27-47.

emperor. Soon after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Education Law of 1872 made formal provision for the support of overseas study, and the trickle of Japanese who had found their way into Western schools during the later years of the Shogunate was augmented by a substantial flow of officially sponsored government scholars, going under the close supervision of the Ministry of Education and committed to work for the government upon their return. Initially directed especially toward America, the flow of officially sponsored students turned more to Europe, especially Germany, by as early as 1880.

Meanwhile, the government took rapid steps to convert or replace the traditional academies of classical learning to meet the urgent need for institutions devoted to the study of the sciences, technology, and social institutions of the West and staffed them heavily with expatriates. By 1877, when Tokyo Imperial University was established, Americans on the faculty were gradually being replaced by Germans in their preponderant role.

The authors of *In Search of Identity*, on whose account I have been drawing, make in this connection a comment with suggestive overtones for the appeal that Eastern European models may currently have for some of the new nations:

It is important to remember that it was not by accident that Germany provided the model for the principal government university. In seeking models for various modern institutions, the Japanese often found other countries more suitable than the United States, where conditions were too different to be extensively imitated. The fact that European conditions more closely approximated those of Japan—the feudal background, the importance of hierarchy, the relative scarcity of resources—suggested that although American technological development was worthy of respect, it was Europe, especially Germany, to which Japan should look for the models for such important institutions as the Diet, the constitution, and the university.¹²

The centralized system of higher education that rapidly emerged, culminating in the highly prestigious Tokyo Imperial University, was from the beginning closely integrated with the elite structure of the society. The provision for highly competitive standards for entry to the university, however, introduced a major emphasis on

12. Bennett, Passin, and McKnight, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.

achievement criteria to balance the continuing importance of the traditional ascriptive criteria of class and connections. The academic system culminating in the university was thus not primarily an institution for legitimizing the prerogatives of an existing elite and for socializing them with respect to the traditions and qualities required for generalized elite roles. For youths predominantly of "good" family, it provided a setting for the stringent competitive selection of those who were to attain the high positions of leadership in modern Japan, a setting in which they were also to form the networks of close personal association upon which their subsequent influence and advancement were to depend heavily. It was purposefully geared toward specialized mastery of Western knowledge and technology. And surely, given its heavy competitive emphasis on standards of excellence, it could hardly have been better designed to instil and augment achievement motivation in the future leadership of the nation, which, if we follow David McClelland, is a most important step in providing the conditions for economic growth.¹³

Once this system became firmly established

the elite universities, particularly those supported by the government, became the privileged training ground and provided the connections needed for acquiring desirable positions in bureaucracy and management; the lesser universities provided channels to lesser businesses and bureaucracies. The student who went abroad in the early years of Meiji was virtually guaranteed success, so urgently needed were foreign skills. But after about 1900 the young Japanese who wished to make a success of his career found it necessary to chart his course very skillfully, to establish his connections as early as possible, and to maintain them carefully.¹⁴

Through the strategic placement of their graduates, the various faculties of Tokyo Imperial University came to enjoy a virtual monopoly on channels to top positions in many spheres of business, industry, and government.

13. See David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, N. J., 1961). The point of greatest competitive pressure was prior to admission to the university. See Herbert Passin, "Education and Political Development in Japan," paper prepared for the Conference on Education and Political Development sponsored by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics, June 25-29, 1962.

14. Bennett, Passin, and McKnight, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

Under these circumstances, foreign study took on changed significance. The growing prestige of the national system led the government to restrict its sponsorship to finished products of Japanese education, who went abroad to acquire further specialized training, secure in their linkage to the elite channels. Tightly competitive as the system was, unsponsored students continued in substantial numbers to find ways to go to the West for higher education, but on their return many of them found themselves cut off from the preferred avenues for using their training. Until the special circumstances of the American Occupation, they tended to gravitate to marginal social and occupational roles.

The Japanese experience will not be duplicated elsewhere, but it exposes to view in virtually ideal type one institutional pattern that marshaled educational resources very effectively in selecting, motivating, training, and deploying an elite well equipped to carry out spectacularly rapid modernization, if not to lay a firm basis for political democracy. It also illustrates the complex relationship between indigenous and foreign higher education: it would be folly to ask which contributed more, or what were the general advantages and disadvantages of each. Over the seventy years prior to World War II, the weight and role of these two indispensable ingredients repeatedly shifted and were to shift once more in postwar reconstruction.

The more typical case outside the industrialized West is one in which indigenous higher education is only ambiguously linked to the prospects of modernization. The established universities in Latin America and the Middle East have tended to maintain their traditional role in the service of an entrenched elite with little interest in modernization. Emphasizing the traditional liberal arts and professions, they have typically contributed to development in none of the ways—selective, motivational, scientific, or talent-channeling—that we noted in the case of Japan. Indirectly, they may contribute to change as a by-product of social instability; volatile student bodies, hardly engrossed in their studies or tied by a sense of social purpose or personal consequence to their pursuit, become a fertile field for the politics of violence and radical protest. Political stability is further endangered when grossly ex-

cessive numbers of students enter training for prestigious, genteel professions such as law, with many having little prospect of putting their skills to constructive use.¹⁵

The problems of these established, often honored, universities are augmented by, if not rooted in, genteel impoverishment. With the lecture system, part-time faculties, deficient libraries and laboratories, and minimal contact between students and staff, the opportunity for favorable educational impact would seem to be small. These problems are also to a considerable extent shared by the universities of the Indian subcontinent, originally founded along English patterns as a recruiting and training ground for the lower ranks of the colonial civil service.

In countries where such conditions prevail in the major institutions of higher education, the urgent priority should logically be to reform and up-grade indigenous education, not to expand it or foreign study. Educational facilities are needed to support serious encounter with modern knowledge and technology; instructional methods should be modified to place less emphasis on verbalism and rote knowledge (smacking of an initiation test en route to gentility) and more on thought and performance. The structure of reward and opportunity for students should be manipulated so as to channel enrolments into fields of social and economic needs, and better provision is essential for the placement and utilization of graduates whose skills are actually needed but are presently little used. Major changes of this order are of course not readily accomplished. Members of American faculties teaching in such a setting on Fulbright exchange programs have frequently found the limitations on what they could individually accomplish quite frustrating.¹⁶

It would seem to be a mistake, where these educational conditions are involved, to look to massive programs of foreign study as a replacement for or *general* supplement to deficiencies in the

15. See W. A. Lewis, "Education and Economic Development," *Social and Economic Studies*, X (June, 1961), 113-127; also A. Curle, "Some Aspects of Educational Planning in Underdeveloped Areas," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXXII (Summer, 1962), 292-300.

16. See Gordon Macgregor, *American Fulbright Scholars: The Experiences of American Scholars in Countries of the Near East and South Asia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962).

indigenous institutions. Unlike the case of new countries where each highly educated person from abroad makes a highly discernible difference, the students returning to older countries are all too likely to get lost in the shuffle. By sheer numbers, they are less likely to influence the prevailing educational pattern, which is well established, than is the case in a new nation still in the process of forming its educational policies. On the other hand, strategically planned programs of foreign study can play a part in institutional reform. They can also supplement indigenous institutions in training for critically needed specialized skills. In a later section we return to consider ways in which programs of foreign study might be more appropriately focused toward this end.

A different case is represented by indigenous higher education as a historical novelty in the developing nations of tropical Africa. In some, the founding of a first institution of higher education is an early item on the agenda of new nationhood. For others, firm patterns of educational policy had been set near the end of the period of colonial tutelage, but these are likely to be under continued scrutiny in the early years of independence and subject to the conflicting pressures of admission, costs, and shifting conceptions of national interest. In spite of obvious differences in the social and historical setting, the situation parallels in some ways that of early Meiji Japan, in that all specialized Western education at a high level is at a premium, expatriates necessarily play a major role in staffing faculties, and foreign study remains an indispensable massive supplement to the products of indigenous institutions.

To understand the significance of higher education in tropical Africa, one must remember that it occupies a nearly stratospheric position atop a steep pyramid of status in which an immense gulf separates the still illiterate from those with primary schooling, and another gap perhaps as large divides the latter from successful graduates of academically oriented secondary schools—in the formerly British areas, the holders of the coveted General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.), which is commonly seen as the open sesame to a white collar career. By American standards, the G.C.E. carries more status than a routine college degree. The secondary

school graduate is already an accredited participant in the modern world; the university graduate, a fortiori, occupies a pinnacle of status that may be so highly valued in its own right as to overshadow the instrumental competences and capacities that higher education inculcates. It is the legacy of colonial rule that this status, and to a lesser degree that of the secondary school graduate, is that of an assimilated European.

Indeed, the often-cited contrast between the French policy of assimilation and the British one of fostering indigenous institutions and indirect rule breaks down in the secondary and higher educational institutions that eventually were established in the French- and English-dominated territories: the institutions in both cases are frankly assimilationist with language, institutional forms, curricular content, and academic standards adopted from or closely modeled after those of the Metropole.

Both the classical European model and its African version were geared to produce scholars and gentlemen—members of an elite held together by shared familiarity with a classical cultural tradition, one that in the African case might still be only superficially grafted on a radically alien background. As Francis Sutton remarks:

The traditional structure of European secondary education fits the assimilationist doctrine very well. It provides a screen through which aspirants to power and high position must pass and which assures their possessing diffuse cultural attainments.¹⁷

The correspondence in institutional outcome in this respect between the British and the French areas in spite of divergence in colonial policies reflects the charismatic power of Europeans as a super-elite in colonial African eyes, and the consequent immense prestige of things European. To quote Sutton again:

The English and French are now criticized by Africans (and by Americans too!) for the excessively "literary" character of the education they offered to Africans. In rebuttal they can and do point to African de-

17. Francis X. Sutton, "Education and the Making of New Nations," paper prepared for the Conference on Education and Political Development sponsored by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics, June 25-29, 1962.

mands that the distinctions between metropolitan and African education be eliminated. This became a matter of principle. . . .¹⁸

It was a matter of principle at the university level too. Melville Herskovits writes:

The problem of adapting subject matter to African requirements, which we encountered in discussing the curricula of the lower schools, was also present in the universities. Aside from the fact that for the Europeans who founded these institutions, the validity of the home curricula seemed self-evident, there was also the point of view of the African to be taken into account. Almost everywhere the value of a university degree was recognized to the extent it was like that of the Métropole, and deviations introduced by European teachers were resented as attempts to dilute the purity of the degree, and hence its worth. . . . At times the insistence on equivalence was so strong that it would go beyond curriculum to traditions which had only symbolic value, such as that attached to wearing the academic gown to lectures and other university exercises by undergraduates in certain university colleges established under British auspices.¹⁹

One is reminded of the vehement and principled insistence of the older-generation female faculty at an American woman's college that the curriculum be in all respects equivalent to that currently fashionable in the Ivy League—any difference surely would mean inferiority!

As a result, one contrast between indigenous and foreign education that is often important hardly holds in the African case: *both* are likely to involve alienation from cultural roots and from major segments of the current society. In essential respects, this indigenous education *is* a foreign education. The African university exists apart from the immediately surrounding society and culture, as does the residential secondary school in its compound.²⁰ With its

18. *Ibid.*

19. Melville J. Herskovits, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa* (New York, 1962), p. 256.

20. Dwaine Marvick's recent questionnaire study, "Higher Education in the Development of Future West African Leaders: A Survey of the Perspectives of Students at Fourah Bay College, Freetown, Sierra Leone," prepared for the Conference on Education and Political Development sponsored by the Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics, June 25-29, 1962, vividly portrays an institution with European faculty and curriculum, nationally and tribally diverse students, and, in effect, no hosts. The students whom he describes

confluence of students from different tribal origins, different vernacular languages, different nationalities, it is a melting pot where national or pan-African identity as well as quasi-European status may be established.

These features of academic education in tropical Africa raise a number of problems with respect to its role in political and economic development. While the university may fan national or pan-African sentiments, the salience of status considerations in higher education accentuates new lines of social cleavage to supplant the old tribal ones. The high emotional charge attached to the university life and the academic degree is likely to hamper the rational and utilitarian consideration of educational policy. And the European model of a gentleman's education, for all its solid ingredients of modern knowledge, may still serve more to validate elite, quasi-European status than to equip and motivate the student in ways consonant with national development. It seems to exert a pull even on institutions marginal to the main stream of academic life: the technical schools at the secondary level, which may strive to be as academic as the traffic will bear, or the higher institutes or universities of science and technology, which may find more prestige in basic science along the lines of a would-be Massachusetts Institute of Technology than in the down-to-earth practicality of a California Polytechnic.

Furthermore, if national development fails to keep pace with unrealistically high aspirations and if opportunities for prestigious employment of the university-trained should dwindle, the heterogeneous assembly of uprooted students on African campuses may become fertile soil for the development of volatile extremist movements along Latin American lines.

This catalogue of existing and potential problems should not obscure the important positive function that the new universities are performing in creating new national elites well educated in modern knowledge and well acquainted with exacting standards

are more uprooted and culturally homeless in their college years than the sojourner at a foreign university, where there is at least an integral culture shared by host nationals at the staff and student levels.

of excellence. Indigenous higher education of this type will surely expand, although its exclusiveness, its standards, and the European flavor of its curricula may not be immune to political controversy.

In the case of tropical Africa, foreign study for the present must be relied on as a massive supplement and, for some countries, as a substitute for indigenous undergraduate education. At the post-graduate level, the training of African senior staff to replace expatriates on the faculties of African institutions of higher education has high priority. Given the status-oriented aspect of the present African university (which I may have overemphasized but which surely has a factual basis to be reckoned with), the channeling of well-selected, highly qualified Africans into relevant instrumentally oriented, specialized programs of foreign study might prove a strategic contribution. The aim should be not merely to add to the class of prestigious "been-tos," but to return exemplars of well-motivated technical competence to key positions in the new national life.

While relatively few students from the French-speaking areas will come to America, the United States stands in a special position with respect to the former British colonial areas. Data sampled earlier in this chapter indicate that in spite of the divergence between British and American educational systems, substantial numbers of Africans from the Commonwealth countries study in the United States, and the flow will undoubtedly increase. Given the entrenchment of British educational patterns at the outset of nationhood, we must consider whether these students will be side-tracked on their return. In view of the thinness of the stratum of highly educated persons in African society, this seems quite unlikely. Rather, the growth on the African scene of an appreciable segment of intellectuals trained in the more pragmatic and instrumental tradition of American higher education might serve as a catalyst to induce change in the status-oriented features of indigenous higher education, which we have suggested has disadvantages for political and economic development. To encourage such trends, sponsored programs of American study for Africans should maintain strict selective standards, the fields in which foreign

study is supported should be carefully chosen, and the students should be directed to American institutions of high quality.²¹

This is not to suggest that American institutions of higher education—say, the land-grant colleges—can or should be transported whole to African soil to replace British ones. It is rather to suggest that providing British-oriented Africa with alternative educational models may widen their range of effective choice and increase the likelihood that indigenous educational institutions may develop along lines more closely adapted to national needs than is possible for any post-colonial echo of overvalued metropolitan practice.

IV. Foreign Study As Related to Social Development

In our consideration of indigenous higher education, we have noted that the contribution of foreign study to modernization depends upon the situation in the recipient country and that the circumstances that prevail in its indigenous educational institutions are an important consideration. It remains to draw upon evidence and conjecture to examine in greater detail the impact or lack of impact of foreign education from this perspective.

In order for study abroad to advance national development, a chain of many links has to be completed. Sufficiently able persons have to be enrolled in training institutions overseas, they have to learn something that is potentially transferable to use in their home country, they must return, and after return they must be motivated to put their training to use in opportunities where its use makes a difference to the national society. There are many opportunities for this chain to be broken to nullify the contribution of foreign education to national development, whatever other values it may entail.

Concerning several of these steps, there is little if any systematic evidence available. We know virtually nothing about the effect

21. Preferably, however, they should be encouraged to attend institutions which have not been wholly captured by the ethos of pure research for its own sake.

of an American study sojourn, for example, on arousing in foreign students higher levels of the achievement motivation that David McClelland²² holds to be the central ingredient of the entrepreneurial spirit and an important precondition of economic growth. Joseph Veroff provides a shred of suggestive evidence (from data obtained by administering a crude measure of need for achievement to a subsample from the Institute of International Education African student survey) in his conclusion that when newcomer and long-sojourn groups of African foreign students (matched for nationality) are compared a substantially higher proportion of the "oldtimers" receive high achievement scores.²³

Sufficient evidence is at hand, however, to make it clear that obstacles to the utilization of knowledge and skill after return are the strategic factor that limits the effectiveness of much foreign study.

On this point, the earliest and still one of the best intensive studies of returned foreign students is that carried out in 1953-1954 by John and Ruth Useem among a sample of American- and British-trained men in Bombay State. Their findings suffice to dispel any notion that educational exchange offers a panacea to underdeveloped countries: of men who had studied abroad before and after independence and had been back in India from one to eighteen years, they report that "less than 10 per cent ever have jobs in which they work full time in the field for which they have taken specialized training."²⁴ Even among those whose foreign sojourn had been sponsored by the state or central government, 55 per cent were not employed in work for which they had been trained. The picture, over-all, is one of underutilization and ineffectiveness. In the absence of a comparison group of Indian-trained men of similar background, we do not know that the returnees were at a relative disadvantage. The Useems think not and regard foreign education still as marginally advantageous in the highly competitive job market of the Indian middle classes.

22. See McClelland, *op. cit.*

23. Joseph Veroff, "A Study of African Students Sojourning in the United States," paper presented to the American Psychological Association, St. Louis, Sept., 1962.

24. John Useem and Ruth Hill Useem, *The Western-Educated Man in India* (New York, 1955), p. 81.

Even if the secondary skills of the foreign-trained could be brought to bear in their own work, it is clear that in this case specific foreign training would have only very limited effect on national development.

The less systematic study by Ralph Beals and Norman Humphrey²⁵ of Mexican students who returned after being trained in the United States tends also to be discouraging. Although they trace in their interviews ways in which the returnees believed they had transmitted techniques, skills, and knowledge acquired during their sojourn—more often by those employed in business and industry than by those employed in government, and by those trained in science than by those trained in the humanities—their respondents tended to give neutral or negative judgments of the value of their sojourn for their careers. Often American training was seen as a source of handicap, failing to produce degrees or credentials that corresponded to those locally honored, and involving, as it did for many, the loss or restriction of potentially influential contacts. Given the anti-*Yanqui* climate of opinion, they had in any case to avoid the appearance of Americanization.

What is common to the two instances is the society in which the foreign-returned is not perceived as having in his training any scarce commodity to offer: not only is he one of many, but he also finds himself in competition with the products of an established indigenous system. He enters an inefficient job market where he is likely to be entrapped in the particularistic morass of nepotism, traditionally expected bribery, and red tape, which are themselves the symptoms of a widespread syndrome of underdevelopment.

In terms of sheer numbers, it seems likely that a substantial part of the stream of educational exchange flows under these relatively unpromising conditions, particularly at the undergraduate level, and often without sponsorship. The locally available facilities for higher education are not very attractive; for many members of the middle class, chances at home are not very promising and hopes readily develop that foreign training is a way out. When, near the end of their planned sojourn, such students look ahead with in-

25. Beals and Humphrey, *op. cit.*

creasing realism to the dismal prospects awaiting them on return, they are all too likely to employ every available stratagem to prolong their stay, presenting a recurring problem that is familiar to American foreign student advisers, immigration authorities, and sponsors of educational exchange programs. These dignitaries are likely to tell themselves that to the extent that such a student eludes attempts to send him home, exchange has failed. His country needs his skills, so there is a moral obligation to get him back. Too often this seemingly hardheaded position is insufficiently cynical. His country *needs* his skills, yes, but it is precisely because it is so very unlikely to *use* them that the student bends every effort to postpone his return.

Among the means available for fostering political and economic development in countries that present this kind of picture, we have already assigned relatively low priority to programs of foreign study. But the flow of foreign students from these countries will continue because of private motives and public policies pursued on other grounds. To the extent that the resources for support of foreign study can be deployed strategically, they obviously should be concentrated on the problem of utilization. Thus, the Useems²⁶ recommend that much more administrative and financial attention be given to supporting the returned student, such as placement services, subscriptions to professional journals, and preferential use in lieu of "foreign experts" in programs of technical assistance to his country. Noting that older persons who are established before studying abroad in definite jobs to which they are committed to return are a better bet for short-run gains in utilized training, they suggest that focusing support on particular organizations or departments which send a number of individuals for training, either as individuals or as a team, has the advantage that on return they are more likely to give one another support in modifying traditional practices. Younger persons embarking on foreign study might appropriately be counseled to stress basic methods and principles and practical experience, on the expectation that they will probably not have the opportunity to use any more narrowly specialized training. Higher standards of selection and in

26. Useem and Useem, *op. cit.*

the dispensing of degrees and recommendations, moreover, would help protect the negotiable value of foreign training from further depreciation. Concern with utilization thus calls for a redistribution of emphasis in educational exchange, a challenge that still largely remains to be met.

The social and historical circumstances in which foreign study has contributed in conspicuous and important ways to social development are not well documented, but one suspects that these most favorable circumstances have applied to only a relatively small proportion of the total flow of persons in educational exchange. The historical case of Japanese modernization supports the intrinsically plausible view that returned students have the greatest impact when they fill a virtual vacuum of Western training and such training is in high demand. This pair of conditions would seem to arise when a previously isolated and backward area is suddenly opened to the modern world under auspices promoting high national aspirations: it is the common ground we noted between Meiji Japan and contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. In other less isolated areas of underdevelopment, persons seeking to trade on their Western knowledge and skills cannot count to such a degree on their novelty, scarcity, and prestige. Less isolated national and colonial systems more often have accommodated gradually to Westernizing influences in ways that protect the position of traditional elites. To use a gross metaphor, these social systems tend to develop a kind of immunity reaction against influence by such foreign bodies as returnees from abroad.

In the newly opened country, the small numbers of returned students in the early years will surely have an impact. They cannot be absorbed unnoticed in the traditional scheme of things. Just what this impact may be, however, cannot be taken for granted. Whether or not it points in the direction of solid economic growth and stable political development will depend on a multitude of factors other than the infusion of foreign educational experience as such.

At the outset, selection for foreign study is likely to be haphazard, as is choice of the kind and quality of training that the students actually obtain. As early cohorts of these casually selected

and trained students return, they have the first-comers' advantage in manning the key social positions that require Western higher education. It therefore becomes an important consideration whether or not a fluid opportunity structure is developed that meets the aspirations of subsequent waves of returnees (and, for that matter, of graduates of the new indigenous institutions) for advancement and opens channels for putting their probably superior abilities and preparation to effective use.

A related consideration is whether and how soon haphazardness in selection and training is supplanted by deliberate policy. The inception in 1960 of the American Universities Program for Africa,²⁷ administered for a large number of participating universities by the African-American Institute, is a most important step in improved selection as well as in the extension of financial support for training at leading American campuses. The early and understandable major role of southern Negro colleges and universities in training Africans—their very existence as segregated institutions being a questionable anomaly in the American social and educational scene—was not entirely fortunate.

In this initial period when foreign study must be relied upon to substitute for or to supplement heavily the limited openings in indigenous institutions, undergraduate training abroad is proportionally more important than it should be later. Apart from the sheer unavailability of the indigenous alternative, the one consideration favoring foreign over indigenous undergraduate education is the greater malleability of the younger student in personality and basic attitudes. But this very feature raises as serious potential problems as it presents opportunities: at the undergraduate level there is greater danger of alienation of the student from his home society, greater likelihood that his morale may become dependent on facilities and consumer benefits that will not remain available to him at home.²⁸ Given the intrinsically lower costs of indigenous

27. Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, *African Students in the United States: A Guide for Sponsors of Student Exchange Programs with Africa* (New York, 1960).

28. In the case of African students in the United States, however, immigration does not seem to present the lure it has for other foreign student groups: "An estimated 10 per cent of all foreign students either remain permanently in the U.S. or eventually return to the U.S. In contrast to this, 97 per cent of the Africans

undergraduate education, planning should aim at shunting the sponsored segment of the undergraduate flow to indigenous institutions as soon as feasible.

The urgencies of educational development in tropical Africa, the shortage of private funds that permit the undirected choice of foreign study at the student's whim, the scarcity of public funds which imposes selectivity—all converge to favor the early development of the sort of intensive rather than extensive, programmed rather than haphazard employment of foreign study in the interest of national development for which the Useems argue in the case of India. By way of prophylaxis, many of the measures that they recommended to correct deficiencies in the Indian use of educational exchange can be instituted before the problems become so serious. Their recommendations on following through with the foreign student after his return—maintaining contact, supporting some of his needs for professional or scientific communication, seeking his advice, perhaps providing refresher training after a period—seem particularly appropriate. To the extent that resources for foreign study are focused on the particularly important sector of staffing new and expanding indigenous universities and technical institutes, this kind of follow-through can be integrated with technical assistance to the indigenous institutions, an equally important topic outside the scope of this essay.

The new nations of tropical Africa thus present a situation in which higher education is strategically needed for social development at an early stage when both indigenous and foreign education have important potential contributions to make.²⁹ The opportunity is available, through planning, to avoid in this instance mistakes that have severely limited the social contribution of foreign study in other countries outside the industrialized West.

stated that they were *certain* to return to their home countries. An additional 2 per cent indicated they would *probably* return. . . ." J. M. Davis, R. G. Hanson, and D. R. Burnov, *International Institute of Education Survey of the African Student* (New York, 1961), p. 32.

29. Since this chapter was written, the report of the Tananarive Conference makes available a valuable source of data and of African perspectives on achievements and needs in regard to indigenous institutions of higher education. See UNESCO, *The Development of Higher Education in Africa. Report of the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, 3-12 September 1962* (1963).

Military Training and Political and Economic Development

Lucian W. Pye

I. Introduction

Reports say that recently in a newly independent African country at a high-level budgetary meeting, during which pitifully scarce resources were being painfully allocated, a foreign adviser raised the question of why the country needed an army. The African minister instantly replied, "Why does the civilized man have to wear a necktie?"

Regretfully, we do not have profound studies of the deep significance and the subtle nuances that the cravat has for the modernized male, and why he would be so desperately uncomfortable if he were without one at particular occasions. Infinitely more regrettable, however, is our lack of knowledge about the role of the military in building the nation-state and giving a people a feeling for national existence and national progress. There have been, of course, many theories and theses about the role of war in the creation of nations, some of which are strongly colored by mysticism about the need for valor and strife to express the spirit of a race and the roots of a folk people. There also have been numerous studies of militarism, its causes and consequences, and of the political role that soldiers may have played in the politics of nation-building. What is missing, however, is a general study of all the specific ways in which armies and the military affect the dynamics of nation-building.

Without a broader understanding of the functional role of the

military in numerous phases of development, we lack clear guidelines for appropriate resource allocations to the military for either an ideally optimal strategy or for any specific contemporary case.

The problem of judging the potential contribution of the military involves far more than just evaluating the relative ability of armies as compared to civilian institutions in efficiently carrying out programs and projects relevant to economic and political development. The issue also goes beyond merely trying to determine whether the military may be dissipating more resources than the value of their positive contributions. Because the military is likely to be a highly dynamic institution that will inimitably claim and obtain a place within the establishment at the heart of the nation-building process, it becomes profoundly difficult to observe and measure its countless direct and indirect influences on all the dimensions of development. Clearly, the dynamics of social mobilization and of psychic release that lie at the base of the developmental process are peculiarly sensitive to processes of mobilizing national power and of creating community-wide defenses. But as we said at the beginning, we are still surrounded with ignorance as to the nature of the relationship between military institutions and national development.¹

Had we begun this analysis by considering the relationship of education to political and economic development, we would have made essentially the same point, for, oddly enough, we know pitifully little about the role of education in the developmental process. We do have numerous studies that reflect a profound ideological view of the vital importance of education in aspects of human progress. These are analogous in a sense to the somewhat mystical studies of the vitality of the military arts and of war in giving vigor to national development. There are also many studies of manpower needs in developing societies and of the importance of

1. The literature on the role of the military is growing. See for example: S. E. Finer, *Man on Horseback* (New York, 1962); W. F. Gutteridge, "The Education of the Military Leadership in Emergent States," in James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, 1964); Samuel P. Huntington (ed.), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York, 1961); John J. Johnson (ed.), *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962); Guy Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics*, XI (1959), 325-345; and P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, Ind., 1961).

education for training the desired numbers in the expected skills. But these studies, just as most of those in the realm of military affairs, fall far short of dealing with the full meaning of an educational system in the processes of national development. The full significance not only of the processes of education but of the structure and dynamism of a society's total educational system defies ready measurement. Again, because it is operationally so difficult to evaluate the contribution of education to development, it is as difficult to establish policy guidelines in this area as it is in the role of the military in national development.

These introductory remarks clearly point to the consideration which must dominate this entire essay, which is that we know so little about the full role of either the military or education in national development that we are bound to compound our ignorance when we seek to mix the two subjects. Unsure of the more profound implications for national development of these two fields, we are also left with a feeling that possibly even the more commonplace observations about the relationship of military training and education may be irrelevant to the essential dynamics of nation-building.

In confronting such a situation, our best strategy is to begin with a straightforward analysis of the consequences for national development of military-inspired contributions to education. From such a start we may be able to proceed cautiously into the more subtle and complex dimensions of the problem.

II. Soldiers As Schoolmasters

Traditionally, the soldier and the educator were seen as beckoning youth to follow quite different paths. Soldiering was the very antithesis of the intellectual life, and scholars invariably saw an enemy in any form of militarism. Wherever educators and scholars were supreme, as in Confucian China, they sought to place the soldier at the bottom of the status scale as at best a necessary evil.

Increasingly, however, the modern army, in its dependence

upon a most complex array of skills, has become a massive educational system. In no other profession are men expected to spend such a high proportion of their careers as students attending a variety of schools. Few other professions place such faith in the powers of formal education and assume that men in mid-careers and those about to take up the highest responsibilities can profit by sitting in classrooms and attending lectures. In the United States Army, career planning requires officers to spend about 17 per cent of their active duty time attending schools, learning special skills, and increasing their general knowledge. As a result of all these developments, the American military establishment maintains one of the most extensive and complex educational systems in the world, ranging from the military academies and the war colleges to some three thousand specialist training schools and courses. Within the government, it is recognized that no civilian institutions can match the military in designing and conducting schools and courses of training at all levels of sophistication.

This alliance between the military and education is fully realized only in industrial societies with highly specialized forces, dependent upon the most advanced technologies. Yet the trend is also discernible in the newly developing countries that seek to follow the current fashions. Formerly, in poor and backward countries, it was customary for the armies to be composed of the most miserable and least-talented dregs of society who needed to be trained in only the most elementary routines. Now, however, the warrior must at least be literate, capable of handling machines, and responsive to some sense of pride and possibly even sensitive to political or national loyalties.

Much loose talk characterizes the underdeveloped regions as currently undergoing rapid and radical changes. In reality change has generally been painfully slow, but this characterization is usually valid with respect to military traditions and reliance upon education. No one can question the degree of revolutionary change between the illiterate, rag-tag armies of the warlords of the 1920's and the alert and training-conscious forces of both the Communist Chinese and Chiang Kai-shek, or between the Ethiopian troops which Mussolini scattered and their current officer corps and crack

regiments. The revolution has been inspired in part by the requirements that follow from the revolutionary advances in military technology and in the complexity of weapons systems. As warfare has changed from being mainly a test of man's physical strength and endurance to becoming increasingly a test of man's skill in mastering machines, the spirit of armies has undergone dramatic changes. In the developing countries, however, change also has been in response to the need to inspire more effectively feelings of political loyalty and a willingness to take initiative.

Thus, the trend has been for even the poorest armies to try to provide new forms of education for both officers and men. Armies in the new countries cannot expect their recruits to have received even the minimum standards of education that are considered essential for making good soldiers; hence they acknowledge the need for army training to include elementary general education. In responding to this need, the military often set for themselves an even larger mission of training men to become more productive citizens once their service has been completed. The Turkish Army, for example, in addition to giving literacy training to all illiterate recruits, now requires them to complete the equivalent of four years of elementary school before their discharge. In the Indian Army, nearly one-third of the training time is devoted to education comparable to regular schools. The Egyptian Army takes some pride in the techniques it has developed for teaching reading and writing to its recruits.

Schooling within the military takes on a wide variety of forms even in the more underdeveloped countries. We can briefly survey the character and consequences of some of these programs.

III. Officer Education

Historically, the most explicit and notable educational programs were those devoted to the training of officers. In the colonial period, officer training generally entailed a screening process that selected the most qualified candidates to be sent to the military academies of the mother country, to Sandhurst, St. Cyr, and even

West Point.² In some of the more advanced colonial countries, military academies were established well before independence. The Indian Military Academy, patterned on Sandhurst, was opened in 1932 at Dehra Dun, and the Philippine academy at Baguio incorporated not only many of the curriculum features of West Point but also many of the traditions of cadet life.

The problem of officer training always has been profoundly complex because of the twin requirements of technical competence and political loyalty. When the military arts rested on a less-sophisticated technology, the tendency was always to stress the considerations of loyalty in both recruitment and training. Thus, the Duke of Wellington could argue long after the Battle of Waterloo that the most efficient method of maintaining the best British officer corps was to continue the practice of making men buy their commissions at significantly high fees, for the officers would then have a real stake in both the army and in British society. In the colonial setting, the dilemma of competence and loyalty was peculiarly acute. Young men from families close to the colonial authorities generally had little taste for military life, and others readily became nationalists with little sympathy for the colonial system. Colonial authorities usually sought to resolve this dilemma by recruiting men who had displayed talent and interest in the language and culture of the mother country. This meant that the officer class came from a stratum of those with a Westernized education. Thus, with the beginning of most of the colonial armies, there was a very definite link between the officers and education.

These considerations help explain the general tendency of the officer class in the new countries to represent an emerging social class within their general societies. Aside from a scattering of members of the traditional aristocracy, most officers came from families who were in some way breaking from tradition and exploiting the opportunities for advancement provided by the disruptions of the colonial system. It would be difficult to overstress

2. Arrangements still exist with the Philippines for a limited quota of Filipino cadets. The majority of officers in some of the Commonwealth countries, such as Ceylon and Malaysia, have passed through R.M.A. Sandhurst, while in other Commonwealth countries that now have their own academies, such as Pakistan, a small number are still sent to Sandhurst.

the significance of this social fact, for it helps to explain the impatience for development and the acceptance of social change characteristic of so many armies in the new countries. In some countries, as in Latin America, ties may exist between landed interests and the officer class; but more commonly the alliance in the new countries is between officers and other groups of emerging modernizers such as the intellectuals and the urban bourgeoisie. The reality of upward mobility provided by the combinations of modernized schools and army careers often can provide the emotional basis for a later social revolutionary ideology. There is, for example, little doubt that a connection exists between the fact that President Nasser's class of 1938 at the Egyptian military academy followed shortly after the Wafd government's decree that admission to the cadet ranks would be based only on educational and not class or wealth criteria.

Before military academies were established, the usual practice in most colonial areas was to provide special high schools or colleges (in the British sense of the word) that prepared cadets for their final training in the mother country. Thus, in India, as early as 1922, the Prince of Wales Royal Military College was opened at Dehra Dun to provide the requisite education for men destined for Sandhurst. These schools were noteworthy in that, more often than not, they represented the first efforts to introduce curricula that stressed mathematics and engineering rather than the liberal arts and the law. The example of West Point as the first engineering school in this country seems to have been repeated in the case of several of the other military academies or colleges in the new countries.³ In Malaysia today the Federation Military College stands out as the main administrative and engineering school in that country to which men destined for civil service careers are frequently assigned for advanced training. In this respect the mili-

3. West Point has served as a very explicit model in several of the new countries. For example, in spite of the great indebtedness of the Indian Army to Sandhurst, the National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla near Poona, established in 1955, is modeled along the lines of the United States Military Academy. The Korean Military Academy is almost a complete replica of West Point procedures, including the daily grading in all recitations and the honor code. On this point and for the best general discussion of officer-training schools in the new countries, see Gutteridge, *op. cit.*

tary have taken the lead in giving status and respectability to the kind of education that may be peculiarly relevant to the problems of national development.

The connection between education and officer training in affecting the recruiting process and giving a practical content to the learning process has prepared the officer corps of many of the new countries for constructive roles in the nation-building process. Their educational experience has given them a uniting common outlook and made them feel that they legitimately belong in the ranks of the nationalist elite. Having met the test of modern education, they can rightfully claim their place in the inner circle of the small group of modern men who are currently ruling most of the developing countries. It is extremely significant that, while standards often have declined in the local civilian colleges and universities, great care has usually been exerted to preserve the integrity of the military academies to prevent their becoming the victims of the general diffusion of politics.⁴ As long as education has helped to hold together the military and keep them headed in directions compatible with the nation's general interest, the country has generally had some hope for constructive economic and political development. Where the educational experience has failed to do this, the military usually have been such a liability to the entire society that effective development has been precluded.

IV. Schooling of Soldiers

The social and economic gap between officers and enlisted men is extraordinarily great in underdeveloped areas. So is the difference in their education. Whereas great efforts are usually made to give officers education similar to that given to their counterparts in the industrialized societies, the same is rarely done in the train-

4. The Burmese government originally decided against a separate military academy and preferred to have their future officers share the common experience of Rangoon University with their civilian contemporaries, but as the standards of that university declined, increasing thought was given within army circles to the desirability of a separate national defense academy.

ing of the regular troops. On the other hand, the soldiers usually receive significantly more education and training in modern skills than the mass of the people. These are almost always skills that are of particular relevance for economic and political development. To the extent that the new countries have orderly systems of military service, discharged veterans have become useful additions to the labor market with their training in the operation of machines and their understanding of organizational discipline.

Colonial armies did not generally have such positive consequences for economic development because they were devoted entirely to producing a professional force. The colonial ideal of lifetime careers reflected partly a concern with economy and partly a realization that loyalty and discipline could only be achieved out of professional pride and not from any non-existent sense of citizenship. Military careers frequently became family, tribal, or community traditions and some groups were acknowledged as being "martial races." Military experience, even that involving service abroad, did not generally inspire the veterans to bring about significant changes in the civilian communities to which they returned. Beyond the obvious consequences that came from the wealth of discharge or retirement pay and a greater appreciation for the rules of hygiene, former Filipino men from the United States Navy or ex-Gurkhas from the British army usually blended back into the communities of their origins with remarkably few problems of adjustment.

In the post-colonial era, the trend has been toward shorter periods of service, a greater degree of turnover, and a larger impact of veterans on the social and economic life of their communities. The spirit of the professionalized army was compromised in some countries, such as Indonesia, Burma, and Vietnam, by the Japanese occupation and the struggle for eventual independence. Indeed, the experience of organizing and disbanding a citizen army and irregular forces was in many countries the most significant act of diffusing a sense of patriotism and an understanding of nationhood.

The technological advances in military affairs have even reached the experiences of the common soldier in the underdeveloped

areas. The mechanization of forces, the increasing reliance upon motor vehicles, the introduction of more complex weapons systems, all have compelled armies to train their troops in appreciating industrial skills. In much of Asia, armies have been the most important single source in training automobile and bus drivers and maintenance men for the civilian economy. The arts of handling machines and of servicing and maintaining them are essential skills for any modernizing economy, and people of a traditional society often seem to find it exceedingly difficult to learn them without some dramatic experience such as training during military service.

In addition to technical skills relevant for a more industrialized society, military training can teach people in transitional societies many of the appropriate attitudes that are essential to the large-scale group activities necessary for economic and political development. Beyond the obvious values of discipline, responsibility, and co-operation, military training can help provide the middle-level leadership or management that is usually extremely rare in transitional society but which is absolutely essential if there is to be substantial economic or political development. Former non-commissioned officers can provide the cadres of foremen and plant and field managers that only infrequently can be trained through civilian educational programs. The products of formal educational systems usually develop higher status ambitions and have little self-confidence in face-to-face relations with uneducated workers. In the early industrialization of both Europe and America, experience in military leadership was heavily utilized in the organization of factories and in the recruitment of foremen.

One of the most profound consequences of military training for economic and political development is the creation of new national loyalties and a sense of citizenship. Within the military environment, peasants and workers discover that they belong to a larger collectivity and that national politics affects all of life. It is significant that much of the political awakening common to the new countries has tended to be intensely partisan, inspired very often by a nationalist political party. In such settings the military is frequently the only institution in the society that seeks to instil a

broader, non-partisan sense of loyalty to the entire nation. Indeed, the sense of loyalty and political awareness taught by the military can be of vital importance in producing a stable sense of citizenship based upon an unqualified commitment to the national system rather than to parochial considerations.

It is possible to outline a wide range of attitudes and sentiments that are essential to national development and that can be effectively instilled in people through military training. Rather than enumerating these, it may be more important to note that in many underdeveloped countries these values are difficult to achieve because the armies themselves are so poorly organized and ineffectually led that they cannot provide the necessary environment for constructively changing attitudes. Under such conditions, military life is likely to produce not citizens but alienated subjects. There is thus clearly a danger in maintaining a military establishment but underinvesting in it, a point to which we shall return shortly.

V. Military Management of Civilian Development

The relationship between armies and education does not end with just the training of officers and the development of more constructive citizens among discharged veterans. In most newly developing areas, the military are directly involved in governmental activities that often include the management of educational and technical training programs. We cannot go into all the complex relationships that frequently exist between armies and politics in developing countries except to note that almost all of them contain some consequences for changing the attitudes of people and effecting economic and political development.

One conspicuous relationship is the area of civic action that is currently receiving so much stress in the general concern with problems of counter-insurgency in the new countries. American military thinking in the past two years has been moving strongly in the direction of encouraging the armies of the newly emergent countries to develop civic action programs. In these programs,

military personnel are called upon to co-operate with and reinforce the civil authorities in the rural areas in carrying out a wide variety of public service activities, which can range from army engineers helping with roadbuilding and construction of public buildings and schools to direct action programs of health, education, and technical training. Military personnel in South Vietnam have worked closely with the civil administration in providing more extensive services to the strategic hamlets. In Laos the army at one stage assumed the main burden of government in the rural areas. In Indonesia the army plans to devote nearly one-third of its forces to civic action programs.

Some serious questions can be raised as to the wisdom of armies assuming such civil responsibility. It might be helpful to consider this problem within the context of American policy and in terms of our shifting emphasis upon military and economic aid. The manner in which political discussions about foreign aid in general have been carried out in recent years has led to a great deal of confusion over the purposes and practices of both military and economic aid. The logic that justified such a distinction in the first instance has been largely lost as advocates of limited programs have felt it politically expedient to suggest that there is a substantial difference between the two categories of aid.

Specifically, the champions of developmental aid strictly on the basis of economic criteria have been the strongest in challenging the validity and utility of military aid, which they tend to characterize as wasteful and—even worse—a positive inhibition to effective economic growth. The charge has been made that American military aid has created abnormal situations in the recipient underdeveloped countries and has forced governments to make grossly uneconomic allocations of their resources. Supposedly in these situations the government's military burden, which still exists in spite of our assistance, has been so great as to divert not only material resources and finances but also its attention and energies away from the fundamental steps that must be taken to generate genuine economic growth. Those who hold this position have argued that in practice the concept of defense support has never been effectively realized, for it has been impossible to pro-

vide merely that amount of assistance that enables a government to maintain a stronger military establishment than its own resources would have made possible. It is further contended that the very existence of substantial military assistance diverts national leaders from performing the essential tasks necessary to set the stage for fundamental economic development.

Apparently most of the critics who employ considerations of the requirements for economic development in attacking military aid feel little sense of urgency about possible military threats to the underdeveloped countries. As the example of the Korean invasion has faded in memory, the champions of more purely economic forms of development have increasingly contended that the Communist threat in the underdeveloped areas is not military but arises almost entirely from domestic social and economic conditions.

These views, in combination with other considerations about the nature of internal wars in underdeveloped countries, have provided the basis for a gradually emerging American doctrine on counter-subversion. To this extent the advocates of military aid have been able to incorporate the considerations of their economic-development-minded critics while preserving the integrity of their prime military point of view. The military problems of maintaining law and order and of insuring civilian co-operation in case of war fully justify the expenditure of resources to reduce social and economic discontent. In theory there can be no sharp point at which defense support aid terminates and economic aid begins. In practice, many projects, ranging from public health measures to the establishment of transportation and communications facilities, which are incorporated under "economic" aid in some countries, are handled by "military" aid in others. There has thus gradually developed considerable confusion of purpose between the two forms of aid, and the categories have lost, to a considerable degree, their distinctive qualities.

Indeed, in pressing the case for the potentially constructive role military aid can have in economic development, some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that the military in many underdeveloped countries are more competent than civilians in performing certain crucial functions furthering economic development. In

their view, the goal of military aid becomes identical with that of economic aid, and, instead of being a depressant to fundamental economic development, our military aid can be justified as a most efficient way of stimulating national development. In the unstable setting of most underdeveloped countries, armies can be expected to perform more effectively many of the crucial civilian tasks essential for preparing the society for sustained economic growth.

Thus, we see that during the few years in which American policy has been supporting military development in the underdeveloped areas there has been a substantial change in our public doctrines. The politically more popular category of military aid has given way to the greater faith in economic aid, but at the same time military aid has changed from being a possible obstacle to development into being a potentially positive factor in producing economic growth.

The realization that armies can play a positive role in economic development has come in part from recent historical developments. In eight Afro-Asian countries, military leaders have assumed control of their country's destiny and in all cases they have emphasized programs for economic and material advancement. An increased appreciation of the potentially positive role of armies in underdeveloped areas has also come from the recognition that many American programs of military aid have been engaged in precisely the same types of projects as covered by some of our programs of economic assistance. The recent tendency to accept the military as capable of contributing to development has been generally premised on the assumption that armies in underdeveloped countries can perform many essentially civilian functions more effectively than the existing civilian institutions in these countries. That is to say, the strongest arguments supporting the role of armies in economic development have been that the armies in underdeveloped countries are likely to behave more like civilian institutions than military establishments.

There is a need for systematic research into the potentialities of military establishments for guiding economic development and assisting in the administration of national policies. Through such research it would be possible to determine various reasons why the

military in different underdeveloped countries have had varying degrees of success in furthering policies of economic development. There are, for example, serious problems in the realm of organization that call for study: How can the military in underdeveloped countries be effectively associated with the general planning process so as to encourage a rational allocation of resources to national development? To what extent can the military be effectively used to provide administrative skills and guidance in the implementation of industrial and agricultural projects? In posing such questions for research, it is important to keep in mind the question of whether such essentially civilian roles are likely to compromise the military effectiveness of the armies involved.

If the process of national development is viewed in broad terms and as involving far more than just economic development, it becomes apparent that the developmental function of the military can encompass far more than just providing support for civilian economic developments. It would seem, in fact, that the military have a fundamental role to play in the developmental process that is related to neither their task of defending the nation from foreign attack nor their ability to facilitate basic economic and administrative developments. This role is largely a psychological one and it involves giving to a people a sense of identity and national pride.

One of the basic obstacles to development in most former colonial territories is the existence, particularly among the national leadership, of a constellation of psychological insecurities and inhibitions. The sense of inferiority of a people who have once been dominated by foreigners and their need to be assertive cannot be easily eradicated. It has been frequently suggested—but only by people who have never been subjugated—that the vigorous pursuit of economic activities and the constructive spirit of economic development programs can help overcome these feelings of insecurity and frustration. However, the historical record shows very few cases in which success has been essentially administrative and routinized tasks have provided adequate compensations for earlier humiliations. People need more than improvement in their economic life to find their basic sense of identity.

The need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm

seems to be an essential prerequisite for national development. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial development. Two leading non-Western countries that have successfully entered the modern world are Japan and Turkey, and they have been most effective in building their military establishment. It is therefore not strange that India, the most successful of the currently developing democratic countries in Asia, also has one of the most powerful and efficient military establishments in Asia. The story of Chinese economic and national development has been one of significant advances that have followed upon the initiative of developments in the military sphere. The relative ranking of countries in Africa in terms of economic development and national cohesion coincides, in all except two cases, with judgments of their relative military systems.

One very fundamental function of the military in the national developmental process is to assist a people to gain a sense of self-respect and dignity so that they can fulfil demanding and protracted community tasks. In nearly all cultures, and certainly in the culture of the nation-state system, manhood is closely associated with the warrior and the military arts. Military development may thus be crucial in assisting former colonial peoples to overcome their profound sense of inferiority. This is in part because any people who feel that their national army is ludicrous and ineffectual must also feel that their collective national identity is also incapable of great things.

At a more fundamental level, the military sphere appears to be a peculiarly sensitive one psychologically because it touches upon the source of national humiliation of former colonial people. Europeans may recognize many areas in which they consider themselves to have been superior and which provided the basis for colonialism; but almost all colonial peoples are willing to admit their inferiority in only one area, the military. In order to regain a sense of equality in their own eyes, these former subjugated peoples feel that they must now redeem themselves in the field of their initial greatest weakness.

The fact that a deep sense of military inferiority was a part of

these peoples' first reaction to the modern world seems in many cases to have colored their capacity at present to modernize their societies. The leaders of many of the former colonial countries often have profound psychological inhibitions toward making complete and enthusiastic commitments to modernize their societies. In some cases they are disturbed by the idea that they should try to emulate the ways of their former rulers who once insulted and mistreated their traditional culture.⁵ In many cases it seems that the best, if not the only, way in which a people can conquer such inhibitions and prepare themselves for the broad tasks of national development is for them to feel first of all that they have been able to regain their self-respect in the military sphere. To make the full emotional commitment to modernization they must feel that they have gained an equal footing with their former conquerors. Until such people have gained a sense of national self-respect they are likely to feel that their efforts at modernization serve only to remind them of their relative inferior position to the European world.

The fact that most of the colonial world has gained its independence without bloodshed or a test of arms makes this psychological problem an even more acute one. In countries where the struggle for independence was only a symbolic or verbal one, there is often a peculiar need to establish as quickly as possible a respectable military force. This pattern has been the dominant one in all of independent Africa, and those few African countries that still lack their own symbols of organized force seem to be merely plantations run by administrative oligarchies that call themselves governments.

For the West even to appear to oppose military development in the new countries can be easily interpreted by their people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position. Rationally, a very plausible case can be made for preventing the development of arms races in the

5. For an insightful discussion of the deep psychological obstacles many former colonial peoples have toward economic development and social modernization, see Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill., 1962).

African continent by strict controls over the supply of arms to separate African countries. Psychologically, however, such a policy would be most unrealistic and undesirable. A new country often feels that the real proof of its full independence is in the willingness of its former rulers to share with them the weapons and the means of violence that once were the monopoly of the Europeans.

VI. United States Policy Objective of Strengthening Progressive Military Development

Although in our analysis we have stressed the potential the military have for advancing the economic and political development of the new countries, we should acknowledge that the military in many underdeveloped areas have been one of the most powerful forces retarding modernization. This has been particularly true in those countries in which the officer class has been closely related to a feudal, landed aristocracy. The history of Latin America, for example, has been largely one in which the military have impeded democratic and economic development.

It should be noted, however, that in recent years there have been rapid advances in military technology, and it has become increasingly difficult for armies to remain as isolated, closed societies that stress status and caste considerations. The art of warfare now calls for more and more of the skills and attributes basic to an industrialized society.

These considerations suggest that as United States policy pushes for the strengthening of the armies of certain underdeveloped countries, it is also interjecting into these societies a greater respect for the skills and attitudes essential for modern society. In analyzing fully the potentialities of military aid, we may find that we have a powerful device for modernizing transitional societies; although in taking advantage of such an opportunity, we also would have to insure that the military do not become a force of reaction.

The very real danger of the military becoming an obstacle to social change suggests the need for developing techniques to impress

upon the military leaders of the new countries a strong sense of responsibility and of pride in profession. In numerous ways the American military are in a position to help create the appropriate sets of attitudes and values in our allied military leaders. Through the associations which are established by our military advisory groups and the many kinds of schools at which allied officers study, we have the bases for communications about the contributions and the limitations of armies in building nations. Indeed, we have more associations at an official level with the military than with any other group of people in the new countries.

If we are to realize the potentialities of the military in the new countries and the opportunities of our favorable basis of communications with them, we must establish a clearer understanding of the processes of political development and of what can and should be done to advance the transition of backward societies. This calls for the formulation of a doctrine for political development that can serve as a guide in all our policy efforts in the new countries.

Over the last few years we as a nation have been approaching the problem from different, isolated sectors. Thus, those responsible for economic aid have seen the problem of development mainly from the narrow perspective of actions designed merely to affect the economic system, or even only isolated aspects of the economy, and they have not, quite naturally, been concerned with the total process of social and political development. The same can be said of those responsible for cultural and educational assistance programs. Military assistance also has approached the problem from a single sphere of activities. Increasingly, we have come to realize that national development in transitional societies cannot be achieved by piecemeal approaches and that the sum of all the separate approaches does not add up to genuine development. As a consequence, there has been a growing interest in the formulation of more comprehensive and more coherent national programs of development. The concept of a country team organization under the leadership of the American ambassador reflects this rising concern for an over-all national approach to development.

With the emergence of a general concept of national develop-

ment, it is important that the full potentialities of the role of the military not be slighted. There is a danger, given the historic Western feelings about a rigorous division between civil and military spheres, that those involved in building such a doctrine for American policy might neglect the full role that the military can play in the nation-building process. As we have suggested repeatedly, it is quite clear that social science research is in a position to suggest various ways that the military in transitional societies can contribute positively to national development.

Possibly an even more important reason why the role of the military should be carefully and explicitly treated in any doctrine of national development is the tremendous harm that armies can cause to a nation's growth. We have tended to stress the positive potential of armies, but in doing so we have been conscious also that the military have frequently constituted a major obstacle to all forms of social, economic, and political progress. Historically, more often than not poor countries have suffered from the effects of the unenlightened policies and ambitions of their military forces. It is precisely because there is such a great danger of the military's retarding national development that we have been interested in discovering the positive potentialities armies may have for facilitating economic and political advancement. The burden imposed by incompetent and backward-looking military leaders upon their countries may indeed be one of the greatest obstacles to progress in the entire history of the underdeveloped countries.

With these considerations in mind, it may not be an exaggeration to suggest that one of the greatest contributions of social science research to the advancement of the underdeveloped areas may be in learning more about the way armies can facilitate rather than impede development. Our awareness of the great dangers that armies can present to national development should strengthen our feeling of responsibility for insuring that our assistance to the military will advance the national well-being of the new countries.

American Higher Education and Political Development

Joseph LaPalombara

I. Introduction

It is now a commonplace to speak of the world we live in as a place of rapid and often cataclysmic change. Nation-states, the products of long and painful evolution in previous centuries, now proliferate at a dizzying clip. Moreover, once they achieve independent and sovereign status, they do not wait quietly in the wings but have a distressing tendency to search out the limelight, upstaging and causing considerable jitters among the seasoned actors in the world company of nations. A crisis of leadership and national integration in the Congo, an assassination in Togo, economic stagnation and a military coup in Burma, the trauma of martial law in Pakistan, and exceedingly ambitious economic planning in India—these are merely a few in a long roll call of problems confronting the new nations that not only beg for solution but that profoundly affect the foreign policies (and the security) of the major world powers. Whether the new states can achieve economic, social, and political progress in a context of stability is a question of immense concern to all of the major powers. Of equally great concern to the United States—in a bipolar world—is whether these new states will evolve in directions that threaten or reassure world peace. To put this differently, it is obviously of central concern to the United States whether, in their short- and long-range evolutions, the so-called emerging nations move in democratic rather than totalitarian, peaceful rather than aggressive, stable rather than unstable

directions. The assumption, which I frankly share, is that our self-interest dictates a foreign policy aimed at helping the new states to take on total configurations that do not threaten world peace and, therefore, our own national security.

Even though it may be too early to judge the results of American endeavors in this important sphere, the evidence we have suggests that at best the record will look spotty and uneven. In the Middle East, our influence and image have risen and fallen almost as rapidly as succeeding governments; in Africa we have yet to evolve the kind of over-all posture that will reconcile what we do in Liberia with what we hope to do in places like Nigeria; in Latin America, Cuba symbolizes decades of neglect and ineptitude, and the Alliance for Progress appears as a feeble effort to deal with a problem of monstrous proportions.

It is one of the underlying theses of this essay that a central reason for our failures lies in the assumption, stated or implied, that vigorous economic development, of whatever institutional variety, will somehow bring democracy and political stability. We have indulged ourselves in statistical comparisons that show that the more democratic nations also seem to have the highest per capita incomes; we have models that suggest that there is an orderly progression from the traditional rural village to urbanization, literacy, media consumption, more urbanization, and, finally, political participation; we have, perhaps, an abiding faith that if the "revolution of rising expectations" can be managed by economic inputs, human freedom and the institutions that make it possible will follow in due course. We tend to overlook, I think, the reality that rapid economic growth can go hand in hand with Soviet totalitarianism and that the nightmare of Hitler took place in a Germany that was industrially and economically at the forefront of European nations.

It may be that our association of economic well-being and democratic institutions is a simple extrapolation from our own American experience. Or we may have been led to this association by the truly dramatic results of the Marshall Plan in Europe, although the Fifth Republic in an economically resurgent France should be reason enough for pause. Whatever the underlying reasons, I be-

lieve that the abiding faith I describe is real and that it has in part conditioned the nature of our intervention overseas in the years since World War II.

My purpose is to describe in its broad outlines the place that American higher education—the American university—has played in that intervention, to touch on some of the problems inherent in these activities, and to suggest some modification in the role the American universities might yet play in the political development of the so-called developing nations.

II. American Universities Abroad

The interest of American universities in world affairs is not a new phenomenon. Course curricula, study abroad programs for undergraduates, and long-standing institutional relationships between American and foreign universities attest to the certainty that our universities were not insular—not even in an era of extreme American isolation from world affairs.¹ However, in the years since World War II, American universities have entered world affairs, in one way or other, on a scale absolutely unprecedented in the history of this or any other nation. The Fulbright program sends American students and professors to foreign shores in exchange for equally large numbers of counterparts who come to this country to study and to teach.² Through the auspices of the United States government, private foundations and civic groups, home governments, and personal means in excess of fifty thousand foreign students come to the United States to study each year.³ In 1960 alone, the United States government was responsible for attracting to American universities over eight hundred foreign students in the field of public administration.⁴ In recent years, Amer-

1. See Cyril O. Houle and Charles A. Nelson, *The University, the Citizen, and World Affairs* (Washington, D.C., 1956), esp. the editorial preface by H. E. Wilson.

2. Institute of International Education, *Open Doors, 1960: Report on Educational Exchange* (New York, 1960).

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-27.

4. Clarence E. Thurber, "Lessons from Efforts to Train Foreign Administrators in the United States," in C. E. Thurber and E. W. Weidner, *Technical Assistance in Training Administrators* (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), p. 6.

ican institutions have plunged headlong (and often without ample attention to academic problems) in the direction of providing overseas experiences for their undergraduate students.⁵ There is apparently no limit to the present scope or intensity of the American university's involvement in world affairs. Indeed, the country has taken to its responsibilities in the international field just as tenaciously as the Middle West opted for isolation in a previous era.

The type of American university participation in foreign affairs of primary concern to us here goes under the general rubric of technical assistance, whether financed by the United States government or by private American foundations. These are the programs in which the universities are called upon to play a direct and intimate role in the implementation of United States foreign policy. It is through these programs that one might assume the American universities to have the greatest impact on the development of institutions and behavior in host countries. It is these programs, too, that are primarily responsible for the creation of certain problems discussed later in this essay.

A few years ago, there were 382 programs that involved American universities abroad. Well over half of these did not involve technical assistance of any kind but fell broadly into the category of educational exchange or student abroad programs.⁶ However, 136 programs were of the technical assistance variety, involving American university personnel going abroad and/or foreign participants coming to American universities for training experiences.⁷ Of the total programs, more than 30 per cent were managed by seventeen American universities, all of which were committed to five or more programs.⁸

5. For a lively and important critique of these programs, see John A. Garraty and Walter Adams, *From Main Street to the Left Bank: Students and Scholars Abroad* (East Lansing, Mich., 1959). Cf. Edward W. Weidner, *The World Role of the Universities* (New York, 1962), chaps. iv-vi. Weidner points out that, in 1957-1958, there were a total of 382 university exchange programs conducted by 184 American universities, including students abroad, religious programs, limited exchanges of students and faculty, research, and technical assistance. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-9.

6. Weidner, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

7. *Ibid.*

8. The universities (and the number of programs) are Harvard (18), Cornell (11), New York (10), California (Berkeley) (7), Indiana (7), Miami (7), Michigan State (7), Northwestern (7), Stanford (7), Wayne State (7), Wisconsin

Although some technical assistance programs are financed by American foundations, and a few by host-country governments, the great bulk of them involve contractual relationships between the American university and the Agency for International Development (AID, formerly International Cooperation Administration). In mid-1962, AID had 107 contracts with 65 universities to carry on programs in 37 countries. The outlay for the execution of these contracts exceeded \$100 million.⁹ Most of these contracts specify a relationship between an American university and a host-country institution of higher learning. Some of them, however, bring the American university into a relationship with a bureaucratic agency, such as the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in India (Kansas State), the Indian Ministry of Education (Ohio State), the Pakistan Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare (Hawaii), Civil Service Academy of Pakistan (Southern California), the Turkish Ministry of Education (Spring Garden Institute), Liberia's Department of Public Instruction (San Francisco State College), Government of the Western Region of Nigeria (Indiana, Harvard, Ohio University), and so on. Whatever the nature of the host-country affiliation, the overwhelming number of these contracts require that the American university send one or more (usually several) professional personnel abroad to execute the technical assistance requirements of the agreement. It is these field representatives who are theoretically expected, over the life of a contract (and its probable extension), to have some impact on the institutions and people with whom they interact. Presumably, all parties to the agreement expect that, as a result of the intervention of American university personnel, something will change.¹⁰

(7), Chicago (6), Syracuse (6), Florida (5), Michigan (5), Puerto Rico (5), and Tennessee (5). See Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, *The International Programs of American Universities* (East Lansing, Mich., 1958), p. 15.

9. Department of State, Agency for International Development, *AID-Financed University Contracts as of June 30, 1962* (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 3.

10. It is far from certain that host countries that seek out AID contracts always expect some changes to take place. In some instances at least, American professors are reluctantly accepted as the price to be paid for the securing of badly needed and wanted equipment at American expense. See Weidner, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171. I would add that my limited experience with these contracts in Europe suggests that indigenous faculty members are almost never enthusiastic to receive "help" from American colleagues. Quite the contrary is often the case. On this point, see Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

What is it that the American universities are asked to do abroad?

The list of AID-financed contracts is as varied as it is long. In Indonesia, the University of California (Berkeley) is asked to co-operate with the medical school at Djakarta in the modernization of the latter's medical school, in the training of teachers of medicine, and in the development of medical research. In the same country, the University of California (Los Angeles) is asked to assist in the evolution of an engineering and technical college at Gadjah Mada. Two other AID contracts in Indonesia place the University of Kentucky there to assist in the development of agriculture, agricultural extension, and the teaching of science and technology.¹¹ Another contract brings Indiana University to that country to provide training in the field of public administration.

The 1962 AID university contract report lists nine contracts involving seven separate American institutions in India. Berea College is working with the Indian government's Rural Institutes of Higher Education; the Carnegie Institute of Technology provides technical assistance and training in the industrial field for Hindustan Steel Limited; the University of Illinois, at several Indian host institutions, is providing training in the fields of agriculture, education, and engineering; Michigan State University is helping to develop engineering programs and faculty at Grindy College (Madras) and Poona Engineering College (Poona).¹² Were one to add the myriad projects in India financed by the Ford Foundation that recruit additional American university personnel, the degree of American higher education's participation in that immense country's development would appear truly astounding.

In 1962, Pakistan, too, was the object of nine AID contracts requiring the participation of six American universities. The projects included the training of teachers of agriculture, home economics, and engineering, assistance in the development of medical schools and medical research, and special assistance, ranging from basic education and in-service training to field administration in the area of public administration.¹³ In Latin America, Brazil is a major

11. See Bruce L. Smith, *Indonesian-American Cooperation in Higher Education* (East Lansing, Mich., 1960), pp. 121-124.

12. Department of State, Agency for International Development, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

recipient of AID assistance involving American universities; in Africa it is Liberia and Nigeria; in Southeast Asia it is Thailand and Vietnam.¹⁴ Generally speaking, the emphasis of these programs is on health, agriculture, medicine, education, and public administration. These programs reflect on the whole what I have stressed earlier, namely, that the major thrust of United States government-financed university participation abroad is in the field of economic development, or in activities like education and public administration that are closely related to the development of the economies of the host countries. Indeed, whatever emphasis is given to the area of public administration is almost always technical (not philosophical) and based on the quite accurate assumption that, in the developing nations, public bureaucrats will have much, if not all, to say and do in moving economies forward. Americans are apparently highly valued for their technical skills; it is far from clear, however, that they are equally valued for the political and social philosophies they take into the field.

What of the American foundations? Have they been significantly different in the kinds of enterprises in which they have managed to involve American universities abroad? The work of the Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America in the field of public health is too well known to require minute specification here. Nor need we analyze the many individual scholars, from all disciplines, who have ventured abroad in recent years under foundation auspices. The major foundation accounting for American university projects in the developing countries today is the Ford Foundation. Perhaps some of the flavor of the Foundation's concern and interests can be felt if we note what it has done in Indonesia, a Southeast Asian nation of vital strategic interest. At the University of Indonesia, and with the University of California's (Berkeley) assistance, the Foundation fostered the modernization of the local institution's faculty of economics and the development of the Institute of Social and Economic Research. University of California personnel are responsible for a number of research publications in economic development of considerable interest to the Indonesian government. Additionally, Indonesian participants, sent to this country for training, are expected to carry forward the re-

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-22.

search program of the Institute. Ford funds also are responsible for a Cornell University–University of Indonesia long-range research endeavor in the area of post-revolutionary social and political conditions in the country. A third project financed by the Ford Foundation brings to Indonesia from the State University of New York a number of American professors who will assist in the modernization and expansion of teachers' colleges at Bandung and Malong.¹⁵ It is apparent that the foundation's programs are neither as "operational" nor adhere as strictly to "safe" areas as is the case with the university contracts financed by AID.

The same conclusion concerning foundation-supported projects may be gleaned from an analysis of the 382 international programs of American universities cataloged for 1957–1958 by Michigan State's Institute of Research on Overseas Programs.¹⁶ The inventory demonstrates, first, what a dominant role in the universities' international activities the United States government has now assumed. Whereas just a few decades ago these programs were heavily financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, and to a lesser extent by the Carnegie Corporation, these private endeavors are now heavily overshadowed by the activities of AID alone. Not even the Ford Foundation's relatively massive entrance into the field in the 1950's served to redress this balance in any significant way.¹⁷

Second, it is obvious that, for the United States government, economic development and the training of certain human resources essential to it are the paramount rationale underlying the university programs that the government finances. Among those of the 118 different programs listed for 1957–1958, not more than a handful could be even remotely associated with political institution-building. The primary concerns are with the development of agri-

15. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–123.

16. Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–314.

17. Once the Ford Foundation moved into the international sector, it quickly displaced the position of leadership formerly occupied by its major competitors. As one student puts it, "By 1959, Ford was spending directly on international programs over three times as much as Carnegie was spending on *all* activities, and three-fourths as much as Rockefeller was spending on *all* of its operations." Richard E. Bjork, "The Changing Role of American Universities in International Relations: A Study of Certain Perceptions of Universities' International Activities and the Impact of Such Activities on Universities' Participation in International Relations" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1961), p. 123.

culture, the eradication of disease, the inculcation of technical skills, and the training of those indigenous persons who might in turn teach these skills to others in their societies. At best, such programs, if they are successful, will result in the creation or strengthening of certain types of institutions in the recipient countries. At worst, the programs will result in a transfer of skills to certain individuals, without the snowballing effect that should be sought in such programs. Whatever the ultimate impact, it is certain to be only vaguely related to political modernization. Once again, I would stress that these programs tend implicitly to assume a very close and causal relationship between economic and political modernization, or ignore altogether the question of such a relationship. My point, as I shall argue later, is that political development cannot be viewed as a by-product of economic transformation but must rather be an end in view consciously sought and vigorously implemented.

Third, the 1957-1958 inventory points to the conclusion that the foundations, too, are responsible for associating American universities in overseas programs closely related to economic development and the transmission of certain skills. Typical of this kind of program would be the effort financed by the Ford Foundation, involving four American universities, to train two hundred Indian steel engineers. Similarly, a Ford project involves Harvard University in the study of population dynamics in Indian villages and a search for the means of disseminating methods of birth control. Foundation-sponsored programs in business-management training, the development of home economics, the dynamics of village development and field administration, and assistance to governmental planning boards all fall into a general category of activity that is quite similar to the types of university programs financed by the United States government.

However, it is clear that the foundations are also sponsors of programs designed to tap the research skills of American universities, to strengthen the programs of these universities, and, perhaps, to touch on matters overseas that are more closely related to political development. Thus, among the thirty Ford programs (involving twenty-three American universities) listed for 1957-1958,

there are several that fall into each of the above categories. The University of California (Berkeley) is tied into a co-operative research training venture with the University of Cologne; Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy is studying Social Democratic parties in Japan; Cornell University is providing field training in Taiwan for the study of Chinese; Rice is committed to a broad-gauged study of the psychology of Middle Eastern nations; Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies is encouraged to conduct important research bearing on social, economic, and political developments in various parts of the world; Harvard, Michigan, and Stanford are launched on an interesting law-training program with several Japanese universities, and so on. In the light of projects such as these, the foundations are less susceptible than the United States government to some of the criticisms I will make about the impact on American universities of many of these overseas commitments.

To summarize what I have said thus far, I would stress that American universities have been quick to respond to the challenges presented by a shrinking world characterized by considerable turmoil and instability. As the United States government moved, more or less resolutely, to assume an enormous responsibility in international affairs, the American universities were and are asked to assume a share of this responsibility on a scale absolutely unprecedented in the history of American higher education. In recent years, American foundations have, if anything, added to the pressures on American higher education to become deeply involved in international affairs.¹⁸ Most of this involvement to date brings the universities into programs that are directly or closely related to aspirations and programs of economic modernization. Political institution-building is, at best, only a remote consideration; at worst, it is the kind of overseas involvement for American universities that is assiduously avoided. This last observation creates a problem of considerable interest to the social scientist. Before discussing it, however, I would like to touch on some general prob-

18. For an excellent review of the evolution of American higher education's participation in international affairs, see *ibid.*, chap. iii.

lems that grow out of university overseas projects, no matter how far they may be removed from the arena of political development.

III. University Participation: Axioms to Be Considered

Perhaps the best way to explore some of the problems that beset American universities in connection with the larger overseas contracts is to specify certain axioms that I believe should be followed by any institution interested in foundation grants or governmental contracts that will involve them abroad. The first of these is that, before leaping into this sort of activity, the university—faculty as well as administrators—should ask itself why it wishes to move in this direction in the first place. The university may see such an activity as an important opportunity to strengthen the research and teaching skills of its faculty. Or it may be that the institution feels a sense of responsibility to the United States government in the implementation of the nation's foreign policy. The university may rightly assess that its faculty possesses certain unusual skills that may be of particular appeal to the government or a foundation. The postwar evidence is certainly overwhelming that the United States government is convinced that its overseas programs cannot be fully and adequately managed without the participation of the country's universities. Surely no one would contest that making academic skills available to the government in a manner that is not damaging to the university is a quite appropriate and legitimate enterprise.

Data gathered by Michigan State University suggest that motivations for involvement in overseas contracts vary markedly and that the general academic thinking concerning this problem is somewhat chaotic. As one would expect, university administrative personnel are more interested than their faculties in such enterprises.¹⁹ One obvious reason for this difference is that the administrator senses the "bigger picture," and, in any event, is more

19. Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

immediately and directly in touch with the sources of contract funds. However, for the empire builder at any level there is the sweet inducement of funds—of contract overhead, money for equipment, more faculty, more secretarial and clerical assistance, more of the many symbols that the academic community in the United States has come to associate with prestige and status. For the faculty who are recruited to overseas programs, there are the enticing possibilities of higher salaries, tax exemptions, the opportunity to travel abroad, the chance to get close to the loci of power, and the prospect of trying out pet ideas in real situations. For many others, of course, there is the quite honest and pressing conviction that something meaningful can be done either to assist in the solution of thorny developmental problems and/or in advancing the knowledge of the relevant academic disciplines.

My point here is that the rationale of university involvement in such projects should not be vague or implicit but should be carefully explored, and the long-range liabilities or advantages for the university should be critically assessed. Only if such a procedure is followed will the university be able to gauge the impact of such commitments on its primary mission, which I assume to be teaching and research. Indeed, if such an objective examination of motives does not occur, the universities may fall short of fulfilling what some will identify as an appropriate secondary mission, namely, that of placing their human and physical capabilities at the disposal of the goals of American foreign policy.

If the first axiom is to be meaningfully adhered to, it is essential that campus discussion take place early in the game—certainly long before a government agency or a foundation approaches the university, funds in hand, with a request that the latter become involved in a crash program. I am fully aware that this type of placid discussion is not always possible, that there are times when university administrations must respond to genuine emergencies. On the other hand, it is now abundantly apparent that in many places there takes place little or no faculty discussion, and overseas programs are presented to the faculty from above, as *faits accomplis*. Where this occurs, there should be little wonder over the reluctance or inability of university faculties to respond to the

arduous demands on technical skills, administrative ability, and cultural adaptability that many of these programs entail. Little wonder, too, that an impressive number of universities turn to non-faculty members—to complete outsiders or “overseas mercenaries,” as they are called—for the staffing of international programs.

The problem of motivation is considerably aggravated by differing perceptions as to the meaning of these overseas contracts. As Richard Bjork indicates, both university administrative and teaching personnel tend to emphasize the educational and economic development aspects of their overseas projects.²⁰ Government officials, on the other hand, stress the political and ideological aspects of such enterprises. The educator is inclined to see his university as an instrument for training teachers, instilling certain technical skills, and helping in some direct or indirect way to satisfy the material wants of the developing nations. Government officials cast the university's role in a more ideological frame of reference; the university team is seen as a weapon in the Cold War—yet another means whereby the host countries might be induced to favor the United States and oppose the Soviet Union. These latter officials are less moved than university officials by purely humanitarian considerations.

This confusion of motives—even the clear acceptance of an essentially economic development role by higher education—apparently leads some American universities to steer clear of overseas contracts. But, as Richard Bjork aptly puts it:

High prestige universities such as Princeton and Yale may protect their “educational integrity” by staying on the fringes of economic development programs, but their reluctance does not, apparently, deter scores of other universities from fulfilling the expectation that universities will engage in such programs, even if they were once considered outside the call of universities.²¹

As a second important axiom, I would suggest that a university contemplating participation in an overseas contract ask itself exactly what will be the academic pay-off from its activities abroad.

20. Bjork, *op. cit.*, pp. 148 ff.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

I refer, of course, to something more than overhead, added funds for equipment, better relations with the government or foundations, and being *au courant* of modern trends in higher education. I am suggesting the question: How, as a result of a particular experience overseas, will the university be improved in terms of its central mission of teaching and research? One very obvious inducement is the assumption that overseas projects will provide important *research* opportunities for members of the faculty—opportunities that might not otherwise be forthcoming. On the surface at least, it often appears that the direct contacts that contracts facilitate with the governmental and educational institutions of host countries will make access to research documents and data much easier. As a matter of practice, one can cite numerous examples where exactly this result has ensued in part from overseas contracts. It is more likely to be the case, however, with the projects supported by private foundations than with those financed by the United States government.

One might generalize that American universities should rarely accept any overseas contract that does not provide opportunities for research. It is largely through this mechanism that the competencies of faculty members can flourish and potentially important knowledge can be added to our intellectual storehouse. Yet, it is fully apparent that, over the years, the universities have not been sufficiently insistent or tenacious in making this point with the federal government. Most AID contracts normally say nothing about research; many federal administrators are suspicious—even hostile—toward the research function. The notion prevails that, if faculty members are engaged in research abroad, they are somehow wasting the government's money. The administrator tends to view members of university teams as he would any other bureaucratic employee; there is a lack of understanding—often running in both directions—that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the university team to fulfil its specific mission, much less to carry on any meaningful research. Commenting on this problem in an era when tensions between the contracting universities and the federal government reached particularly ominous proportions, one observer remarked that “the basic relationship between ICA and the

American universities is an intolerable one from the point of view of the universities. ICA insists on keeping much too close a check on the execution of inter-university contracts. . . .”²²

At some bureaucratic levels, the general situation has improved since these words were written; both the federal government and the universities are now better aware of their respective needs, aspirations, patterns of behavior, and idiosyncracies. In recent years, funds for research have been earmarked in the AID budget; presumably (but this remains to be tested), United States Operations Missions (USOM) units abroad will be more receptive to the idea of having members of university teams engage in field research. Nevertheless, the universities continue to have a responsibility for educating administrators and congressmen regarding the singular contribution to overseas projects that the universities can make precisely because their faculty members, when they are competent, possess extraordinary expertise in this area. By research, I might add, I do not mean merely those investigations that are *clearly* and *immediately* connected to the operational goals of United States missions abroad. Basic research on the total dynamics of, say, the villages of South Vietnam should be encouraged, even if the connection between such activities and the problem of curbing the influence of the Viet Cong is not strikingly apparent. Of course, as members of USOM eventually discovered in Vietnam, it is precisely this kind of research that in the long run may offer the important clues to coping adequately with operational problems.

Nor do I mean that the universities should acquiesce in the conduct of “bootlegged” research. Nearly every university that has had a project abroad can claim that, somehow, some of its faculty managed to pursue some research activities—in addition to the formal role to which they were assigned overseas. Such collusion is unsatisfactory essentially because it means that the universities have failed to sell the government on what is after all their most important capability, namely, the ability to bring to bear on a

22. Norman D. Palmer, “Evaluation of the Policy Statement of the Committee on Institutional Projects Abroad,” in R. A. Humphrey (ed.), *University Projects Abroad: Papers Presented at the Conference on University Contracts Abroad, 1955* (Washington, D.C., 1956), pp. 21–22. Quoted in Weidner, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

problem the full force of the extraordinary research skills that the universities develop and husband.

It may be objected at this point that, on many of the government-financed projects, it is not research but narrowly defined technical assistance that the universities are asked to supply. The answer to this has been succinctly provided by Edward Weidner, who comments:

University contracts are not *necessary* to achieve any technical assistance goals, at least not necessary to those that have been laid down so far. There are several alternative devices that have been used, with favorable results in many instances. Individual advisors or consultants employed by governments, foundations, or others have been effective in the same areas in which university contracts exist. Though the Ford Foundation in Pakistan relies exclusively on university contracts to carry out its program, the Ford Foundation in India has relied almost exclusively on other devices. It is not clear that the first policy has been superior to the second.²³

It may well be that the talents of American professors are useful—even essential—to United States missions in the developing countries. However, these services can often be secured on an individual basis. Involving the American universities as such should imply some *special* competence and mission that only the universities can perform. Failure to adhere to this orientation may well result not merely in the waste of extremely scarce university resources, but it may carry with it an erosion of the meaning of institutions of higher education, both here and abroad.

This leads to a third axiom, namely, that in their overseas missions American universities should minimize participation in certain “operational” activities. Stated differently, universities should concentrate on the kinds of things they do best, namely, the organization, management, and development of teaching and research enterprises in other countries. To be more specific, I consider it a mistake, for many reasons, for universities to become involved in the reorganization of governments, the provision of direct in-service training for public administrators, the establishment of operating administrative agencies in the field, the direct training

23. Weidner, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

of policemen, and the reorganization of villages. These matters should be left to the indigenous governments themselves, or to the line units of the United States government stationed abroad. Problems incident to such programs might appropriately be researched by university teams. Demonstration projects might even be prepared for pedagogical reasons. But the universities certainly should guard against having professional faculty members enmeshed in activities that are only vaguely and remotely related to the functions of teaching and research. It should be added that, where this occurs, it inevitably creates difficulties for the university, not only on the home campus, but also in the relationship between university teams and American governmental agencies in the field. As we shall note below, the capabilities of American universities abroad are severely tested even when professors engage in activities that they know best; the problem of effectiveness is immensely compounded when these same professors are expected to engage in direct operations.

Fourth, it is essential that a university give careful thought to exactly how many different overseas projects, whether financed by the government or foundations, it can meaningfully and fruitfully undertake. This is an important axiom for many reasons. In the first place, there is obviously a limit to the amount of this kind of activity that even the largest of American universities can do well. A single commitment to an overseas project, even if it does not require more than four or six academic personnel abroad each year, places great pressures on the resources of a university. Energies of administrative and academic personnel, both on the home campus and abroad, must be expended in impressive amounts in order to keep a project moving along at reasonable efficiency and effectiveness. Pre-departure orientation programs, housekeeping responsibilities abroad, contract negotiations, and interpretations on the campus and overseas—a vast host of relationships, procedures, and activities emerge that quite dramatically communicate that the average contract is not something that can be taken casually in stride. A proliferation of commitments, which I believe now characterizes many of the universities cited earlier in this paper, almost certainly will place an undue burden on academic depart-

ments, particularly if the projects tend to fall into the same general fields.

If I may reflect my personal experience of recent years, I would testify that, over a period of just a few years, my own academic department quickly exhausted the number of professionals who were willing to undertake assignments abroad. I am confident that this has happened in other universities as well. When it does, when the university cannot reasonably recruit needed personnel from among its own faculty, it often hires quotas of the "overseas mercenaries." To be sure, in some instances such staff are permanently recruited by the university and are expected to return to teaching, research, and administrative positions on the home campus. Although such arrangements may create certain problems of staffing patterns in subject-matter departments, the arrangement seems preferable to one in which the overseas personnel have only a temporary identification with and responsibility to the sponsoring university. Professors abroad who hold only temporary affiliations with some of our great universities often have less than a full quotient of institutional loyalty and less than the degree of professional competence that the university would demand of its permanent faculty. Where this pattern occurs, the university involved becomes nothing much more than the hiring hall or recruiting agency for governmental units that wish to send academics abroad.²⁴ I am confident that the disadvantages that arise from this pattern far outweigh whatever advantages either the university or the United States government may hope to derive from the contractual arrangement itself.

Finally, I believe the universities should consciously explore the ways in which the institutional feedback from overseas contracts might be maximized. I am thinking here primarily about organizational and curricular changes that should reflect the university's commitment to and involvement in these international endeavors. It is surely in this area that one can expect to garner

24. For some interesting data on the sources of recruitment of faculty members identified with the international projects of universities, see Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-39. Nearly half of the universities involved in this survey went beyond their own campuses to recruit overseas personnel to some extent.

the long-range pay-off to students and faculties of experiences derived overseas. If a university is properly oriented to these international experiences, one would expect the teaching and research activities at home to be considerably enriched. The new knowledge obtained abroad should be meaningfully and systematically exploited. Students trained by such universities should be the beneficiaries of the accumulation of knowledge about foreign cultures that presumably results from overseas contracts. It is not enough to assume that returning faculty members will automatically take this new-found knowledge into the same courses they were teaching before they departed from the campus. While this impact or effect is undoubtedly true in some cases, it probably is not the case in most instances. The body of new expertise that is presumably garnered abroad should be self-consciously worked into revised curricula. Only if this is done can the university claim that the overseas experiences of its faculty produce the proper kinds of dividends.

No one needs to be persuaded that the phenomena of institution-building and socio-political-economic change are highly complex. The universities can make a significant contribution to a better understanding of these phenomena. Equally vital, however, is the responsibility of the university to assure that the kinds of activities in which its faculties engage overseas will shed greater light on the dynamics of these fascinating and important occurrences. Viewed from this vantage point, it is apparent that universities must make judgments and selections that reflect more than a quite understandable concern with international affairs or American foreign policy. In developing their patterns of involvement in overseas projects, universities must maintain an avid, conscious interest in the crucial business of extending the frontiers of knowledge of human organization and behavior. Only if this basic truth is clearly understood can the universities realistically expect to have a significant impact on the kind of institutional evolution that does take place in the developing nations.

What, then, of the specific role of the universities in political development?

IV. Universities and Political Development

As I observed above, AID (as well as foundation) contracts tend to involve the American universities in "safe" activities abroad. This is true whether what the university does is "operational" or more broadly and profoundly involved in what goes under the general rubric of "institution-building." North Carolina State College is invited to further textile engineering education in Peru, and not to tamper with basic social, economic, or political institutions in that backward country; the University of California is encouraged to provide in-service training for Italian public administrators in technical fields like organization and management, but is not invited to probe the nagging problems of administrative reform and the role of a public bureaucracy in a democratic society; Michigan State University is asked to work out a plan for the relocation of refugees in South Vietnam and to provide training for the Vietnamese police force, but is discouraged from probing too deeply into the fundamental reasons why both the refugees and the nature of the police are matters of grave political concern to that country.

A number of factors combine to cause a pattern of technical assistance by the universities that results in their being somewhat far removed from the concerns of political development, or other kinds of developments that are closely tied to the political.

First, it is certain that, for many reasons, the host countries would rather not have technical assistance deal with phenomena that are political. They are suspicious of the motives of the United States government and fear what may appear to be imperialistic drives or intentions. Although one can sense that this reticence is generally true of most recipient countries, it is naturally particularly intense in the ex-colonial areas. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the leaders of these latter nations to believe that the technical aid of the United States is based on altruism, and events in the United States itself help to confirm this assumption. A mere reading of the American press would confirm that the rationale for

technical assistance is largely tied to the idea of anti-Communism. The United States Congress, for example, is inclined to accept no other rationale and to use the narrow yardstick of anti-Communism to measure whether and how much technical assistance a country should receive.

Even where the indigenous governmental leaders are favorably disposed toward the United States and American foreign policy, they are often confronted with internal conditions that make it difficult to accept any American technical assistance at all. The disrupting reactions to the Marshall Plan of the left-wing parties of Italy and France are typical of what I have in mind. More recently, opposition to technical assistance contracts made its weight felt in countries like Mexico, Indonesia, and Japan. Because of potential local opposition, and because of the genuine fear of undue interference in internal affairs, one student of this problem stresses the importance of having technical assistance requests originate locally, and not from the United States government or the private foundations.²⁵

Because of genuine or externally induced diffidence toward the United States government, it is apparent that the host countries prefer foundation contracts. Foundations, by and large, are seen as not too closely identified or entangled with American government and foreign policy. Moreover, in many areas of the world the important pioneering efforts in medicine and agriculture of the Rockefeller Foundation serve to pave the way for the more massive current inputs of the Ford Foundation, even when the programs of the latter (such as those in India and Pakistan) are rather obviously designed to have an impact on the evolution of political institutions and practices.

It should also be noted that some foreign governments utilize the cry of interference in internal affairs as a weapon in their interactions with the American government. It is natural for recipient countries to seek economic aid and technical assistance with the fewest possible strings attached, particularly those strings that might in some way condition or bind the nature or direction of political development. If and when the United States govern-

25. Weidner, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185, 203.

ment does attempt to exert political pressure, the hue and cry of "internal interference," "dollar diplomacy," and "modern imperialism" can be triggered. This is precisely what occurred in South Vietnam when, in November, 1961, the Kennedy administration sought to steer President Diem's regime in less authoritarian directions. The government-controlled newspapers let loose a barrage of criticism that sent many United States governmental officials scurrying for shelter. By the same token, the Vietnamese government expressed no desire to continue a technical assistance contract involving Michigan State University, if to do so would mean a continued possibility that faculty members of that university might publish articles or books critical of aspects of the Vietnamese political system.

Forces and motivations such as these cannot be easily ignored. The United Nations itself, presumably a politically neutral agency, has found it extremely difficult to provide technical assistance in politically sensitive areas. Under the very best of circumstances, such activities are arduous and hazardous. As Walter Sharp rightly cautions, the provision of assistance aimed at influencing the direction of political development requires highly skilled, experienced, and sensitive practitioners who are in very short supply in the United Nations.²⁶ Not even the United Nations is immune to the charge of "political interference." In the face of such criticisms, the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, was once moved to admit that some United Nations technical assistance missions did have a political impact but "in a way entirely under the control of the Government."²⁷

Second, it is in part realities such as these that lead the American government to limit American universities abroad to areas of low political sensitivity. There exists a genuine and understandable fear that what the universities' representatives might say or do in sensitive areas would trigger the type of response from foreign governments and institutions suggested above.

26. For a very enlightening discussion of the problems of the United Nations in this area, see Walter R. Sharp, "International Bureaucracies and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 441-474.

27. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 459.

However, there is an additional and, perhaps, even more salient reason underlying AID reluctance to permit university teams to function in sensitive areas. The fact is that United States government officials are committed to a given line of policy and do not want the policy challenged or upset by the research findings or recommendations of university teams. Hinting at this pattern, Edward Weidner remarks:

It is remarkable that an agency such as ICA, which is responsible for the economic development of other countries, does not place more emphasis on economics in its university programs. The University of Chicago program in Chile is a major exception. For the most part ICA has refrained from encouraging or permitting American universities to engage directly in technical assistance in economics or economic development.²⁸

Weidner goes on to illustrate this tendency by citing the example of contract negotiations between ICA and my own university. Notwithstanding that the Vietnamese saw a close relationship between economic development and public administration, and requested that Michigan State University personnel in Saigon teach in *both* of these fields, officials of the American government objected. Even after agreement to such an arrangement was reluctantly extracted at Washington, ICA field officials in Saigon again challenged the wisdom of having professors teach economics or engage in economic research. Weidner cites one such official as justifying this restriction on the activities of professors with the comment: "They might recommend something contrary to ICA policy."²⁹

Thus, it is apparent that university personnel who wish to provide technical assistance in the "sensitive" areas face formidable obstacles not only from host-country nationals and institutions, but from officials of the American government as well. A sense of fixed mission and policies—and the conviction that all those abroad who are financed by the federal government must be "team players"—permeates the federal bureaucracy at Washington and in the field. The image of the university professor is often that of

28. Weidner, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

29. *Ibid.*

someone whose idealism or lack of experience with the "realities" of foreign affairs almost certainly will lead him to topple the apple cart if left to his own devices. Out of this mentality emerge attempts at supervision and tight control of university projects that make for strained relationships between the American university and the federal government.³⁰

Third, it is no secret that foreign elites have a high regard for the technical skills of Americans but not of the latter's virtues or capabilities in the fields of philosophy, political ideology, or the humanities. To a lesser extent, this same attitude is directed toward the American social sciences. Even here, however, respect is accorded American prowess in methodology and in the organization and conduct of field research. Less recognition is extended in the field of social science theory and, indeed, the image of the American social scientist as a skilled technician with inadequate training in history, theory, and the "significant" questions is uncomfortably widespread. To be sure, what the social sciences can prescribe in the field of political institution-building is still quite limited, but it is a general opposition to any prescribing in this area to which I refer.

In many of the ex-colonial areas, of course, American university personnel encounter entrenched scholars and Westernized elites who are deeply steeped in the university traditions and organization of countries like France and Great Britain. In many instances, the scholars involved genuinely see the university as an institution designed for the economically and socially privileged, more or less aloof from the current and mundane concerns of the government and society. The configuration of activities that Americans associate with the so-called land-grant college philosophy (i.e., demonstration projects, extension services, adult education, and research tied to agriculture and the mechanical arts) is alien to

30. It should be added here that university professors sometimes do fail to understand the "realities" abroad and steadfastly and naïvely assume that affiliation with a government-financed university contract involves an extension to the field of all of the rights of the academic community and *none* of the obligations that normally bind members of the federal bureaucracy. The point is that tensions and the lack of mutual understanding create a two-edged phenomenon that can be alleviated only through a better understanding of each party to an overseas contract of the other party's problems and viewpoints.

them. If such activities are carried on at all, they are viewed as properly not the concerns of universities, as such, but of other (and less prestigious) institutions of the country. Whether the concern of technical assistance is home economics, agriculture, engineering, or public administration, foreign universities—the logical institutional counterparts for American university teams—are frequently hostile to the technical assistance activity in the first place. Thus, even where there is a willing or grudging, admiring or disdainful acceptance of the technical expertise of American university personnel on the part of host-country university personnel, universities as such are often not considered appropriate institutions in which the technical activities themselves should be carried forward.³¹

Hostility toward American technical assistance often is also the result of insecurity on the part of the entrenched elites. Bold new programs often carry with them the implication that the power structure of a foreign university or governmental bureaucracy will in the long run be fundamentally modified. Additional insecurity is induced by the certainty that technical assistance programs involving empirical field research and demonstration projects will expose the incompetence of faculty members and bureaucrats abroad. In addition, the mere idea that a member of a foreign university faculty should go into the field to interact with, say, villagers or other segments of the population carries with it the threat of a loss of status and prestige. In short, the indigenous obstacles to accepting the changes implied by many American university contracts are formidable.

Examples of this point can be endlessly multiplied. In Italy, a program in public administration financed, first, by the American government and, later, by the Ford Foundation has never really

31. The reader who wishes to survey this problem in detail is well-advised to consult the publications of Michigan State University's Institute of Research on Overseas Programs. For example, the following items would be extremely rewarding: Smith, *op. cit.*; Richard N. Adams and Charles C. Cumberland, *United States University Cooperation in Latin America* (East Lansing, Mich., 1960); Henry Hart, *Campus India: An Appraisal of American College Programs in India* (East Lansing, Mich., 1960); Martin Bronfenbrenner, *Academic Encounter: The American University in Japan and Korea* (Glencoe, Ill., 1961); Walter Adams and John A. Garaty, *Is the World Our Campus?* (East Lansing, Mich., 1960); and Edward Weidner, *op. cit.*, chaps. ix-xiv.

been accepted as academically legitimate by the faculty of the University of Bologna where the project is located. Reports from University of California personnel assigned to the project reveal not only a long series of frustrations regarding every aspect of the program but also an aura of disdainful tolerance of the project by the Bologna academic community. Although some small successes within the Italian bureaucracy might be singled out as evidence of the University of California's impact, the examples of resounding failures far outweigh and outnumber them. Public administration as it is conceived, taught, and practiced in the United States is simply not accepted as academically respectable or as an area with which the Italian university should be very much concerned.

In Pakistan, Ford Foundation programs to provide training for middle-level administrators in the eastern and western sections of that country were not placed in, say, the University of Dacca or Peshawar but, rather, in two academies for village development created especially for that purpose. Faculty members in both of these academies for the most part received a year's training at Michigan State University. The latter institution also provides a limited number of field consultants to the academies. The academy at Comilla (East Pakistan), under the dynamic and charismatic leadership of an extraordinary Pakistani personality, has become a major force not only in the training of administrators but in the conduct of research and the actual economic development of the region as well. Faculty members of the academy who could not tolerate the demeaning or otherwise psychologically upsetting implications of field research in the villages generally left the institution and filtered into the more traditional university community. Those who remain are strongly dedicated to the role of the academy in shaping the economic, social, and, incidentally, the political institutions of the region. For those who are interested in the complex processes of change and development, the history of the academy at Comilla represents a gold mine of suggestive data.

The academy at Peshawar, on the other hand, is not nearly as successful. There the somewhat older members of the academy's faculty have stronger status drives. They identify not with a new mission and set of values, but, rather, with the traditional academic values of the University of Peshawar. Field work is con-

sidered a threat to status; demonstration projects are not viewed as appropriately academic; mere affiliation in the academy rather than in a bona fide university is interpreted as partial professional failure. The pattern at Peshawar is much more typical of the kinds of problems that American university personnel experience when they venture abroad on technical assistance assignments.

In Saigon at the Institute of Public Administration, whose development and expansion took place with Michigan State University assistance, all of the complexities of institution-building abroad materialized over several years. Hostility toward the Institute from the University of Saigon, which is deeply steeped in French academic values, has existed in relatively intense form from the very beginning. Political interference in the staffing and activities of the Institute, the use of many part-time faculty members with minimum identification with the mission of the Institute, an aversion to field research on the part of Vietnamese faculty members, a lack of appreciation of the talents of American professors in other than narrowly technical fields, an inability to recruit many first-rate intellects to the program of the Institute, a failure adequately to relate the work of the institute to the short- and long-range developmental problems of the society—these are only a few of the obstacles to effective intervention that members of the Michigan State University team encountered. Such progress as has been registered—and some of it is impressive in view of obstacles—amounts to a small pay-off for the heavy inputs of money and personnel.

Finally, in considering the factors that tend to remove American university teams from activities that are closely related to political development, we should note the hostility to that type of involvement manifested on the home campuses. In his survey of American universities with overseas programs, Richard Bjork found that only 5.2 per cent of all university personnel expect the university to perform acts abroad that are related to things political.³² The fact is that the word "political" carries negative overtones in this

32. Bjork, *op. cit.*, p. 151. By way of contrast, 23.8 per cent of United States government and foundation officials responding hold that universities are expected to perform political acts. In the case of the former, however, this response generally means the implementation of the United States foreign policy objectives. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

country, even among the members of an academic community. It is evidently perfectly permissible for faculty members to venture abroad to perform surgery in the fields of science and technology—even in the economic sphere. But there is something essentially taboo about becoming enmeshed in the development of political institutions and practices. This is clearly reflected in Bjork's comment that:

Indeed, a high official of a prominent eastern university stated that political acts are totally foreign to the primary purpose of great universities. Moreover, he stated, political involvement detracts from the educational efforts of universities and saps their energies.³³

If a statement such as this means that American universities should not be too closely and openly identified with the foreign policy objectives of the United States Department of State or of AID, there is some merit in it. Obviously, the effectiveness of an American university abroad, for many of the reasons already indicated, will be diminished if it is widely viewed as a mere instrumentality of the federal government. However, my assumption is that the general American aversion to politics and things "political" leads American universities abroad to avoid all activities that are openly political and, what is perhaps worse, not to think systematically about the indirect political impact that certain educational activities might carry with them if properly managed.

My strong belief is that American universities have a basic responsibility to participate in *political* development abroad, and that they have ideas, philosophies, formulas, and skills in this area that are as respectable and as "proven" as the prescriptions we offer in the so-called non-political areas. Because democratic political development cannot be viewed as an *automatic* or *inevitable* by-product of development in other fields such as economics, the involvement in this process must be self-conscious. It is not sufficient to assume that if literacy is increased, disease eradicated, technology improved, and material wants satisfied that the people who are the beneficiaries of such change will gravitate toward democracy and freedom. To cite an example that I have discussed

33. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

in detail elsewhere,³⁴ it seems to me extremely hazardous to assume that, from the standpoint of democratic political development, it is useful to make the bureaucracies of the developing nations more centralized, more efficient, or more compatible to the legal-rational bureaucratic model associated with Max Weber. It may very well be that, without the equally vigorous development of political parties and other secondary structures that are voluntary and relatively free, development of the public bureaucracy may be the first important step toward authoritarian or totalitarian politics. Similarly, as Joseph Spengler cautions, aggrandizing only or largely the public sector in economic development, at the expense of the private sector, may deny the developing societies a portion of their infrastructure that may be vitally necessary to democratic political development.³⁵

It seems to me that American higher education has a unique opportunity to make a contribution to the democratic development of the emerging nations. It is unique because the very nature of university contracts brings the American university into a relationship with institutions abroad that can profoundly affect the process of political socialization and behavior in these countries. Implementing a long-range program in the field of political development, however, would involve a number of steps that I can deal with only briefly here.

First, it is essential that all parties to university overseas contracts recognize openly and forthrightly that American universities properly can engage in *political* missions abroad. I mean by "political" not an operational commitment to the narrow and specific American foreign policy goals for each developing society, but a more profound commitment to the building of the institutional and behavioral structure that supports the democratic polity. Just as the universities are presumed to be competent to suggest how crops might be rotated, malaria controlled, budget divisions organized, village economic patterns changed, heart surgery per-

34. Joseph LaPalombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries and Dilemmas," in LaPalombara, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-61.

35. See Joseph J. Spengler, "Bureaucracy and Economic Development," in *ibid.*, pp. 199-232. It should be added that Spengler also musters cogent arguments for the view that a failure to encourage the private sector may also result in delayed or inadequate economic development.

formed, and home economics taught, we may expect that they also have something meaningful to say about the growth of democratic political institutions. This recognition that the universities are competent in the political sphere, broadly conceived, is a vital first step, without which any actual effort of university teams to have a political impact abroad will be misunderstood and lead to difficult relationships.

Second, the financing agencies, particularly the United States government, must not insist on a close and detailed supervision of what the university does abroad. Bureaucratic red tape can be an overbearing harassment; treatment of university personnel as if they are indistinguishable from others in the bureaucratic hierarchy causes needless tensions; viewing university teams as part of the narrow mission of a federal agency overseas will erode the broader contribution to development that the university team can make. Within the framework of a broad developmental mission for the American university—a mission that includes political development—the universities should be accorded maximum leeway. In this sense, the practices of the Ford Foundation in places like India and Pakistan might very well be looked to as possible models.

Third, it is desirable that the universities, themselves, launch an aggressive and co-ordinated research program into the meaning of “institutional development” or “institution-building.” As one scholar with a great deal of overseas experience notes, “References to institution building and institutional development as a factor in modernization can be found scattered in writings and speeches over the past several years, but the concept has not been carefully defined or systematically investigated.”³⁶ Yet the concept is vital to any kind of university involvement in overseas contracts, and the state of our knowledge regarding it must be carefully assessed.

Fourth, it is both probable and desirable that American universities will be affiliated with counterpart institutions in the developing countries. Regarding these institutions, as well as the programs that are jointly undertaken, we must ask the question

36. Milton J. Esman, “A Note on Institution Building in National Development,” (mimeographed, University of Pittsburgh, Nov. 16, 1962), p. 1.

how what is done may be handled in a manner designed to affect the *political* institutions and behavior of the country. It is not enough to impart the mechanics of a curriculum in teacher education; it is equally vital to communicate the *political* philosophy that underlies the American system of education. It is not sufficient to explicate abroad the mysteries of budgeting and personnel management, centralized purchasing, and classification systems; it is crucial that the American philosophy regarding the role of public administration in a free society be communicated as well.

To be sure, many of the American professors who ventured abroad in recent years did exactly this. Indeed, I have heard many of them lament that their counterparts overseas listened attentively to technical advice and tended to discount comments that sought to relate democratic theory to instrumental techniques. My point, then, is not that none of this occurs but, rather, that it does not result from self-conscious planning.

Fifth, American universities should frankly acknowledge that many of those whom they send abroad are ill-suited to their assignments. It is now painfully obvious that a professor who is a distinguished authority in his field will not necessarily be a raging success when he is transferred to a foreign setting. Edward Weidner lists six qualities that are essential to job success overseas.³⁷ These are mastery of subject matter and competence in the role to be played, ability to adjust *professionally* to conditions of the host country, enthusiasm and dedication toward the mission of the project, a general capacity to adjust to conditions of a strange environment, cultural empathy, and facility of implementation in the sense of getting the job done. Weidner adds almost as an afterthought that the professor should also know something about the area to which he is assigned. I would stress this as a key qualification—particularly if those who venture abroad are going to have an impact on the political evolution of the societies involved. I also would add that universities should use their own faculties in these assignments and should simply not participate when this pattern of recruitment becomes difficult or impossible.

37. Weidner, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–228.

In any event, an enormous problem of providing the right kinds of talent for these projects confronts American universities. I do not believe that the brief and hectic pre-departure orientation programs associated with AID contracts are adequate; they impart much superficial information and are likely to be damaging rather than valuable. If the universities are to continue to be active in this sphere—as seems certain—greater attention than is manifested to date will have to be accorded the problem of training.

The federal government is certainly aware of this problem; years of experience during which governmental and university personnel were thrown into overseas situations on a crash basis exposed many weaknesses. AID is apparently intent on providing training—or better training—for contract as well as direct-hire personnel.³⁸ The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, appointed by Dean Rusk in late 1961 and chaired by Christian Herter, has now turned out an impressive report that should have considerable impact on federal training programs for overseas assignments.³⁹ I think it is significant, however, that the report pays scant attention to the kinds of training that would be appropriate for those whose mission it might be to influence the shape and development of political institutions abroad. Nevertheless, implementation of the report would significantly strengthen our representatives overseas. The universities surely can do no less in this area.

Last, there must emerge a co-ordinated feedback system whereby both the successful and unsuccessful experiments in political development are brought to the attention of the universities. This task could begin immediately; university and government files are packed tightly with field reports, end-of-project reports, special memoranda, de-briefing tapes, evaluative studies, and other materials provided by those who have had direct experiences with university overseas contracts. The time is surely upon us when we can engage in less guessing and more systematic analysis of what it takes to have an impact overseas not merely on the process of

38. See James M. Mitchell, *Training for AID: A Ten Point Training Program* (Washington, D.C., 1961).

39. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel, *Personnel for the New Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C., 1962).

economic modernization but on the equally and perhaps more important phenomenon of political development and change.

I do not pretend that what is listed above amounts to the complete formula for effective American university participation in political development in the emerging nations. I do insist that following these steps would represent a healthy beginning. I would add in conclusion that the task is so vast, and the need for appropriate university talent so great, that it cannot be reasonably handled if the contracts awarded by the government and the foundations continue to be concentrated in those American universities that seem to me to be already committed considerably beyond their individual capacities. This problem, as well as others I have touched on, would seem to be the appropriate concern of Education and World Affairs, an organization recently created to probe in detail the topic we have explored here.

Educational Assistance, Economic Development, and United States Foreign Policy

John P. Powelson

Two types of educational assistance must be distinguished in United States policy toward less-developed countries. In the first place, there is education concerning the process of development itself: what causes economic growth to begin and to continue? I shall treat this type in the first part of the essay. My conclusion here is that United States foreign policy would best be served by increased focus on the social sciences, with exchanges of teachers and scholars in history, political science, and economics. We stress economics as a practical tool in such questions as management of public finances, inflation, and balance of payments deficits, but the social sciences ought to serve a far greater purpose. There is much misunderstanding, both at home and abroad, concerning the historical process of growth and the political institutions that evolve. It is to the interest of the United States that this misunderstanding be discussed, cultural differences explored with those who differ from us, and history put into proper perspective.

In the second part, I shall turn to technical education. Here the foreign aid program has followed the postwar trend in United States thinking toward economic development, which has successively stressed (overstressed?) capital, technical assistance, and formal education as exclusive and unique contributors to the development process. Within the past three years, we have become aware that economic development is far more than economics. We

have discovered the human being. Psychologists and sociologists are offering theories on what transforms men into creative and innovating personalities. Technical education must take account of these trends, and a few suggestions are made along these lines.

In the third part, purely statistical and informational, I outline the various educational programs in which the United States is currently engaged and their relationship to problems of economic development.

I. Education and the Process of Economic Development

Of all the components of foreign policy, educational assistance is among the most promising and the most suspect. It wields the opportunity to mold men's minds. If successful, it can lead toward proper perspectives in economic and political decisions, and can supply badly needed skills for national development. But it is also potent in the spreading of ideologies. The very fact that the minds of men are its subject and that a cold war is in progress causes the rising intellectuals of new nations to view it with caution if not alarm.

Probably the most serious dilemma, of which both our State Department and foreign governments are aware, lies in the distinction between education and propaganda. The two are integrally mixed, and separation—which can be done in degrees—is never complete. The United States Information Agency, for example, is recognized as an instrument to spread culture (propaganda?), but it cannot do so without spreading some education concerning the United States. Likewise, instructors in the most technical subjects cannot fail to display their American temperament.

Cultural penetration always has been a bone of sensitive marrow. To an extent, it is acceptable and considered desirable by the recipient country. There is an interest in learning about other nations, and the conduct of foreign policy is made all the easier if constituents understand something of these nations. Sometimes

cultural penetration is bartered—you accept mine and I'll accept yours. Beyond this point, however, it can be dangerous to the political future of government officials in countries of rising nationalism—particularly if the other country is the United States.

Consider, for example, the following editorial written by a Marxist student in Latin America:

Invariably, psychological and cultural penetration of the subjected people is part and parcel of imperialism. The large monopolies control the press and information agencies, which exist only by their bountiful income from selling advertisements and articles to the capitalists. Cultural missions of the Metropole are efficiently allied to these information agencies, and are dedicated systematically to presenting news in the manner most pleasing to imperialism. These missions are established by the government of the Metropole in order to impose the same language, customs, and peculiarities of the imperialist power. It is symptomatic of colonial and semi-colonial countries that children are given names from the Metropole. The abundance of Jacks, Tonys, etc., in Latin America testifies to the effectiveness of the psychic penetration from the north.¹

Our reluctance to mix propaganda or, more euphemistically, information with education is not only understandable but essential if we are to be welcome abroad. But I sometimes wonder if we do not bend over backward in our unwillingness to communicate to foreign students certain facts and ideas about economic growth, of which they all too often are unaware.

To avoid blatant propaganda, our economic assistance program specializes in technical education. This is dispensed not only through formal institutions, but in the form of agricultural extension, community development, in-service government training and technical assistance, instruction in public safety for police forces, and the like. In addition, we provide teacher and student exchanges and formal relationships among universities. A more ample catalogue is found in the second and third parts.

Formal studies of economics and political science are the obvious areas in which discussions of the process of economic growth might be promoted, but these too have been submerged into the

1. Editorial in the second-year law school newspaper, University of San Andrés, La Paz, Bolivia, August, 1960.

framework of technical education. We offer exchange professors in economics with the hope of building up technical competence in fields such as government finance, banking, and business management. These are important, as are all types of technical education, but I urge that the social sciences, particularly insofar as they relate to historical processes and over-all growth theories, deserve a privileged place in United States assistance to develop the curricula of foreign universities.

The opportunities available to us in the social sciences stem from misunderstanding of the process of economic development. This is not confined to less-developed countries. Those conversant with the literature are aware of the strong feeling among economists in such countries that their problems differ from the ones we experienced as the United States developed, and therefore different solutions must be sought. In our own country, there is a bias in the other direction, with the feeling that inflation, balance of payments deficits, tariffs and exchange controls, and other economic phenomena have essentially the same implications to development whether we are talking about the United States in the nineteenth century or Asia today. These issues not only should be aired in occasional public forums, but should belong to the regular curricula of economic development, bringing daily exposure to different points of view.

Courses in twentieth-century history of more-developed countries—while bordering on propaganda—nevertheless may help to clarify the aims of foreign policy. For example, a common misapprehension in less-developed countries is that the Soviet Union, within the course of a single generation, has raised itself from the level of an African nation to that of the most modern members of economic society. The truth is quite different. The growth of railroads and industry was so strong in Russia in the late nineteenth century that European historians were predicting, as far back as 1912, that at existing rates of increase Russia would be the dominant power in Europe by mid-century.² It would not be politically

2. Edmond Théry, *La transformation économique de la Russie* (Paris, 1912), preface. Cited by Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Some Fundamental Similarities between the Soviet and Capitalist Economic Systems," in Congress for Cultural Freedom, *The Soviet Economy—A Discussion* (London, 1956), p. 50.

acceptable—either at home or abroad—for us to offer courses in Russian history in universities of less-developed countries, but some of these ideas might be included in other, more general materials.

Another appropriate subject is the development of foreign economic policy in the United States. Fifty years ago this policy was what many students in less-developed countries consider it still to be—no more than the sum of private interests of American nationals abroad. We sensed no missionary zeal for economic development, nor did we care about the nature of political processes so long as other governments achieved stability, paid their debts promptly, and protected the property of American investors. It hardly needs to be explained to an American audience that times have changed. Our government now recognizes a national interest transcending the sum of private interests, which is more closely related than ever before to the aspirations of developing countries.

This new sense of national mission stems from two factors, only one of which is widely understood. The first is that the Cold War carries a need for our presence overseas, to influence new nations into the paths of "righteousness." But the second is just as important, although less well grasped. It is that a social revolution has occurred in the United States since the depression of the thirties, whose effect has been to identify in our own popular image such goals of new countries as social security, price supports and quotas for primary producers, the rights of labor to organize and bargain with employers, protection against the chicanery of stock salesmen and investors, aid to depressed areas, and the like. The identification of the United States government with the welfare of underprivileged groups at home makes it easier for the American people to understand that economic assistance and reforms can be more effective weapons in the Cold War than atomic missiles.

What is evident to us, however, is not always clear to foreigners. Often influenced by Marxism, and at least cognizant of the blatant imperialism of years past (of Europe as well as the United States), they tend to believe that the world's economic powers have not changed their objectives (defined as domination) but only their

strategy. Political independence, they proclaim, comes because the age for it has arrived, not because it suits the imperialist powers. Rather, they argue that these nations are now trying to cut their losses by resorting to economic rather than political domination, by introducing a new cultural imperialism, and by using foreign aid as a weapon. Not all scholars in less-developed countries feel this way, but enough of them do so that the problem of changing their minds becomes one of the greatest burdens United States foreign policy will have to face for many years.

Two years ago I was a visiting professor of economics at the University of San Andres in Bolivia. My class consisted of thirty-three students who had recently visited the United States as part of a cultural exchange program sponsored by the Department of State. They returned to Bolivia perplexed about the reason for the venture, why they had been chosen, and what the import of their observations was. They had earlier been convinced that the economic development of the United States was explained, *almost entirely*, by capital acquired from the labor of Negro slaves in the plantation South, and through mineral wealth sucked out of Latin American ground and turned over to their masters by starving Indian workers.

Upon arriving in the United States, they found Americans anxious to communicate their economic successes. They were shown skyscrapers, highways, and bridges such as they had never seen before. Despite explanations that these were the fruits of a stable, democratic society, they accepted them as a vulgar display of stolen wealth. They returned with the impression (which they freely conveyed to me) that the United States was not only dominated by international criminals, but that the true facts of the source of wealth had been carefully concealed from the people. The government must have a brilliant system of education, one of them remarked; for the indoctrination to be so complete.

There is a common misapprehension in the United States that it is impossible to reason with Marxist students, and that they do not welcome contact with American academic circles. Furthermore, our laws forbid us to invite students of known Communist sympathy either to come to the United States or to receive scholar-

ships financed by the government. Yet my experience with many of these students is that they are not only receptive but eager to discuss their doctrines with American professors. They want to argue their case. They also possess a curiosity about economic, constitutional, and political processes in the United States and enjoy hearing and discussing opinions that disagree with their own. They will heckle and threaten physical harm to ambassadors and other diplomats who they feel represent vested interests. But my own experience, and those of other academicians with whom I have compared notes, is that they welcome contacts with professors from unbiased universities.

The proposal (in 1960) to increase gasoline prices in Bolivia is a case where an educational program might have served to avert anti-American riots and bloodshed. Monetary stabilization has been a policy of the Bolivian government since 1956, supported by financial assistance from the United States and the International Monetary Fund. According to the stabilization agreement, the budgets of the general government and all government enterprises must be balanced, and the central bank is limited in the amount of new money it can legally create. An operations deficit in the nationalized oil company in 1959 and 1960 was clearly in violation of the stabilization agreement. The requirement for continuing financial assistance—at least by the International Monetary Fund—was an increase in gasoline prices or action in some other way to balance the oil company budget.

The issue was electrifying, because everyone recognized that gasoline prices affected the cost of transporting food. Students were loudly proclaiming that the Yankee imperialists wanted to increase their cost of living. In my own class at the university, where all but two or three of the thirty-three students consistently condemned United States foreign policy, opposition was as intense as elsewhere. But we conducted a sensible economic analysis of the problem. I did not pronounce on the merits of the price increase but asked the students to enumerate the alternatives. There were only three—let the oil company run at a loss until it used up its capital and had to restrict production, subsidize it by inflationary issues of currency, or finance it through increased taxation.

Each led to an increase in the living costs. Then it was easy to point out that rising real costs were inevitable since national product had been declining for several years. Human control could only be exercised over the manner in which they would be manifest, and many of the students agreed that a higher gasoline price was the least of the evils.

Government approval and implementation did not occur for a year. My own students were graduated in the meantime, and no one (to my knowledge) discussed the economic implications with others. When prices were increased, students rioted in the streets, anti-American epithets were shouted, and lives were lost.

Once contact with Marxist students is established through some type of formal education program, it is essential to discuss differences in cultural and historical backgrounds. This can be done as an academic matter, and the professor will not be labeled a propagandist if his approach is scientific, and if all viewpoints—his own and those of his students—are subject to the same scrutinizing analysis. History classes should treat the unfolding of the industrial revolution, the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism, and the differences between land problems in the United States and less-developed countries, so that respective attitudes toward the development process can be studied and contrasted. Marxist students are steeped in history. But history is a matter of opinion, and they have not been adequately exposed to our interpretation.

Increased formal education on the development process may help solve one of the problems we face in technical education: the frustrating apathy of host governments to programs that the United States considers vital. Public administration is an example. Most Americans believe that a sound structure of governmental authority, with precise allocation of responsibilities, a realistic tax system, adequate salaries of civil servants, and elimination of graft is essential to economic growth. We feel that public administration can be taught in schools. But our ideas are not shared in all less-developed countries, where the concept of growth, centering on capital formation, has not broadened sufficiently to encompass public administration. Education in the process of growth is needed, if only to persuade students that growth is complicated

and to indicate the breadth of technical education that is lacking.

To summarize this section of the paper, I propose that academic exchanges in the social sciences should be accorded special treatment in educational assistance programs of the United States government. It is hard to distinguish between what is a weapon in the Cold War and what is honest seeking for scientific truth. Yet I suspect that the latter—for which we would find a demand in less-developed countries if we looked for it—would turn out not to be inconsistent with the former. My personal contacts with Marxist students have been confined to several countries in Latin America, but I am privately assured by academicians from Asia, the Middle East, and even Africa, that the issues raised in this essay are equally pertinent in those continents.

II. Technical Education

It is fashionable these days to talk about the stages of economic growth. I shall comply by associating the American foreign aid program with the four stages of national thinking that have taken place since World War II. I do not refer to official guidelines set by Washington, but to a preponderance of national opinion, led by the writings of technicians, scholars, and diplomats, concerning the way in which the aid program should be administered and what its priorities should be. With time lags of varying dimensions, the official guidelines are affected by this thinking.

The first stage emphasized capital investment, and economists and educators alike evidenced the belief that capital was a cure-all to the problem of development. As late as 1953, Ragnar Nurkse wrote that "capital formation lies at the very centre of the problem of development in economically backward countries."³ Charles Kindleberger cites several authors who also support the primacy of capital in the development process.⁴

During this stage the major international financial institutions were established—the World Bank (International Bank for Re-

3. Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1953), p. 1.

4. Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Development* (New York, 1958), p. 35.

construction and Development) and the International Monetary Fund. Existing American institutions, such as the Export-Import Bank, participated in the lending process, and a new agency, the Economic Cooperation Administration, was established. The Europeans also formed their own organization for dividing and managing financial assistance.

By the late forties and early fifties, it was clear that the World Bank was really going to use the second half of its name (*International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*), and that the movement of financial resources would be toward the less-developed world. The implications for education were immediate. Instruction in business economics had not been necessary for sophisticated Europeans. It was clear, however, that loan recipients in less-developed countries had to learn to analyze projects for their engineering, economic, and marketing feasibility, to study their financial conditions and prospects, to know how to raise local capital, and to become familiar with a host of other facets of loan management.

Educational needs also relate to the over-all economy. Money managers had to know what financial resources they could create without incurring the danger of inflation, how to manage their balance of payments, what instruments of monetary and fiscal policy were at their disposal, and how the international monetary system functioned. To supply data for these problems, they needed to learn to compile statistics.

Education of this nature—no matter how widespread the need—cannot be provided on a crash basis. Students were encouraged to come to the United States to study in our business schools, but not many of these schools were aware of the problems of less-developed countries. The Department of Commerce established training programs in the elaboration of economic statistics, such as national income and balance of payments. In 1950 the World Bank and International Monetary Fund inaugurated training programs in their fields of competence: the Bank trained persons in loan analysis and the Fund in over-all monetary management and statistics. In 1956 the World Bank opened its Economic Development Institute to train high-level officials from less-developed

countries in problems of economic development and project analysis.

Without in any way casting aspersions on the august institutions I have just mentioned, let me suggest that the emphasis on capital as the "be all" of economic development closely approaches many aspects of Marxist teachings. We may differ with Marx concerning the way in which capital is acquired, but let us recognize that Marx's explanation of wealth posits capital as the sole instrument of aggrandizement. If he were to assign a significant role to human ingenuity, education, training, or skills, then his principal thesis would be voided. In my encounters with Marxist students abroad, my greatest problem has been that of communicating that economic development consists of more than capital formation.

It was not long before our official thinking caught up with our cultural tradition that economic growth depends as much, if not more, on genius as it does on capital. With the inauguration of the Truman administration there was a revulsion against the emphasis on capital. The second postwar stage dawned—that of technical assistance—during which Congress was assured that economic development would occur in a short time and with little cost. A few better seeds, the introduction of fertilizer, communication of new methods of business management, and the job would be done. It was during this era that the United Nations embarked on its expanded technical assistance program.

Technical assistance is not education in the formal sense. Nevertheless, it implies the transmission of knowledge and embraces the assumption that showing people how better to perform their job will somehow cause them to do it better. Since United States technical assistance has had a longer history in Latin America (where it began in the early forties), it was there that its implements were perfected. A major decision recently facing the Agency for International Development was whether the *servicio*, a principal device for technical assistance to Latin America, should also be applied in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The *servicio* is an organism designed for both education and implementation of programs. It is an agency sponsored jointly by the United States and the host government, operating in such fields as health, highways,

education, and agriculture. Education *servicios* build schools and provide teachers, but their essential object is to show developing countries how to build schools and structure their educational system. Their purpose is to be innovators. Once the schools are established, they are turned over to the local Ministry of Education for routine administration.

As a means of education, *servicios* are both proclaimed and condemned by foreign aid officers. Their proponents argue that Americans working side by side with their national counterparts constitute the most effective means of communicating skills. *Servicios* also are touted as instruments of accomplishment in countries where the governments are noted for their ineffectualness. Their opponents argue that in practice *servicios* have turned out to be an extra-governmental device, bypassing and failing to develop usual channels, like the ministries of education, public works, and agriculture. They say their purpose has been to get things done rapidly rather than to educate national counterparts.⁵

The decision not to employ the *servicios* in Asia and Africa probably stems not only from the superiority of the opponents' arguments but also from the feeling that technical assistance is not the magic wand it was once thought to be. Neither capital nor technical assistance alone, nor even both together, is capable of achieving steady economic growth without some additional factors.

Realization of this fact heralded the third stage in our postwar thinking—emphasis on education. The human being was finally recognized as a factor of production and a critical link in the development process. Criticizing the undue stress on capital and external resources, John Kenneth Galbraith called for a "positive approach to aid," with emphasis on education, social justice, reliable public administration, and "a clear and purposeful view of what development involves."⁶ At approximately the same time, Theodore Schultz proclaimed that investment in human capital was as

5. Richard H. Wood, "The Servicio and Other Joint Methods of Administering U.S. Technical Assistance," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, X (1962), Pt. I, p. 201.

6. John Kenneth Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIX (1961), 444.

important as (perhaps more than?) investment in physical capital. He proposed that the principal reason for changes in the capital-output ratio over time was failure to include investments in human capabilities as part of the national capital.⁷

The formation of a triumvirate—capital, technical assistance, and education—appeared to many to be the long-sought key to economic development. If the first two were insufficient, then the third would be the catalyst to set them off. Still, on the heels of this great discovery, there is the sneaking suspicion that education is not enough to release the potential of human resources. There is still a missing element, or elements, related to what Everett Hagen has called the “creative personality” and David McClelland has dubbed “*n*-ach,” or “need for achievement.”⁸

The fourth stage in our thinking, which has scarcely begun to unfold, is one of approaching the human mind in a way that transcends education. McClelland categorizes people according to their basic needs, such as affiliation (relationships with family and friends) or achievement (and recognition). Only in a society where the need for achievement is strongly felt, he argues, does development occur.

Hagen distinguishes between authoritarian and creative personalities. The former is one with little scope for curiosity and investigation. Children are taught to obey their parents unquestioningly and are discouraged from experimenting outside of a given set of norms. Authority stems from position, not from achievement, and position is inherited. When a child assumes paternal status (not necessarily when he becomes a father, but more likely when his father dies), the mantle of authority is passed to him. Since his instructions are unquestioned, they need not be reasoned or rational. The father also has his place in society, in which he in turn obeys the authority of those above him, such as his employer or the president of the republic. Societies composed of such individuals, Hagen contends, are not susceptible to economic growth.

McClelland's conclusions on the achieving society offer more

7. Theodore Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” *American Economic Review*, LI (1961), 1.

8. Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, Ill., 1962); and David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton, 1961).

hope for change through education and experimentation than does Hagen's thesis regarding the way in which societies change from authoritarian to creative. According to Hagen, the shift requires two or three generations and begins with the displacement of one group (because of discrimination against religious or racial minorities or because of disadvantages resulting from historical or economic circumstances) from its traditional position in society. The first generation, Hagen argues, will be too dazed and depressed to do more than withstand the shock of its new condition. Sons and grandsons, however, will cease to respect the authority of fathers and grandfathers, and will seek ways to prove their individual worth. In so doing, they will become creative personalities.

The difficulty with Hagen's thesis—quite apart from its validity—is that it is not very operational. It is useless to tell the officials of less-developed countries that their greatest need is for displaced grandfathers. McClelland, however, proposes that the need for achievement can very definitely be stimulated. People can be made to realize that achievement brings material rewards and even prestige (although the extent varies in different societies). Competitive instincts can be awakened.

Hagen and McClelland are sufficiently convincing to have an impact on United States educational assistance. Technical training should not cease to dispense knowledge, but should do so in such a way as to stimulate constructive inquiry on the part of the recipient. This can apply both to in-service or on-the-job training and formal education within the universities.

Let me use an illustration from the field of agriculture, for which I am indebted to Arthur Mosher of the Council on Economic and Cultural Affairs.⁹ Mosher suggests ways of inducing individual farmers to perform adaptive research and bases his thesis on the finding that within the same community in a less-developed country agricultural practices differ—some are better, some are worse. Already the stage is set for an experiment in which farmers using inferior practices will discover the superior ones. An agricultural technician may hire several farmers (without any indication that

9. Lecture at the Institute for International Development, Washington, D.C., Sept. 10, 1962.

he is supplying technical information) to perform an experiment. They examine the crops of all farmers within the community to select the five best seeds and the five worst seeds. The technician and the experimenting farmers discuss the reasons for their choice and whether they can discern any factors (other than the will of God) that explain the difference. They will then be hired to plant samples of each seed, cultivate them, and compare results. Successive experiments of this nature not only will reveal the amazing fact that some seeds are better than others but will help inculcate the spirit of investigation.

With a little imagination, the same kind of adaptive research can be applied to industry. We might borrow a page from the industrial revolution in England, where prizes were offered for inventions capable of fulfilling recognized needs. It is already the accepted practice in the development plans of several countries to offer tax rebates, licenses, cut-rate foreign exchange, and other incentives to persons willing to undertake enterprises falling within the scope of the plans. Prizes also might be offered for the development of new techniques, either on the job or within university laboratories.

Education for economic development is too often limited to dispensing knowledge of productive instruments designed for other places and other conditions. Economic thinking in less-developed countries is strongly oriented toward use of protective tariffs because it is felt there are few products in which domestic goods are able to compete with cheaper foreign imports. Within limits I subscribe to this argument but do not want to debate it here. Rather, I should like to emphasize that it is possible to adapt techniques individually to the circumstances and resources of less-developed countries. Once the less-developed countries realize this, they will find that there are many products in which they are capable of competing with faraway countries that have to transport goods for long distances.

Edward Tenenbaum, an economic consultant from Washington, tells the story of a producer of storage batteries in British Guiana who attempted to buy machinery in the United States.¹⁰ The only

10. Lecture at the Institute for International Development, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1, 1962.

machines he could obtain would manufacture one hundred or more batteries a day, whereas he wanted to produce six. By using hand methods, dipping and inserting plates individually, he found that the combination of cheap labor for himself and transportation costs for his competitors enabled him to sell at lower prices than American manufacturers. I am convinced that many similar opportunities await producers in less-developed countries, and that education—both institutional and on-the-job—ought to alert people to this fact.

It could do so in various ways. Instead of requiring students to perform experiments the results of which already are known, science courses in universities might challenge them with problems in which the solutions are not known. Courses in engineering and business economics might combine to stimulate the creation of plans for producing a given product at a predetermined ceiling cost, it being agreed that a higher price would not be acceptable.

There are innumerable ways in which imagination can be introduced into technical courses. In accounting, which is widely taught in less-developed countries, there are beginners and advanced courses in principles, courses in auditing and cost accounting, and the solution of accounting problems. Yet it is strange that some of the countries that on paper offer the most advanced accounting curricula put accounting to practical use in a most inefficient manner. I have examined the records of large, substantial companies where the accountants made gross errors in separating debits between assets and expenses or in balance sheet classifications. In countries where cost accounting is taught, I have seen miserable inventory controls and waste because of improper handling of materials. Why is it, when the tools are available, that they are not put to better use?

One answer is that the principles are derived from the experience of more-developed countries, and their application to domestic situations have never been appreciated fully. This failure may be due to lack of need achievement in McClelland's terms, or want of creative personalities in Hagen's terms. Somehow the challenge to adopt and adapt has not been perceived.

It is all too glib for me to outline a solution, but I can suggest the direction in which one may lie. Both in university courses and

in-service training, or in a combination of the two, accounting students should be made to realize that their principles are livable and applicable. Students might be assigned field trips in which they would assess accounting systems of business and seek cost-reducing innovations. I am aware of all the difficulties involved, and that businessmen may object to snooping college students, but I believe it could be tried.

To summarize the present section, I suggest that educational assistance to less-developed countries take into account the new trends in thinking on economic development. The older types of training, consonant with earlier stages of thought, must be reinforced and continued. Scholars and government officials must learn to assess projects for capital loans and to manage their financing. Technical assistance must still be provided, and formal education programs continued within traditional frameworks. But a new dimension must be added, and education must be adapted in two respects. In the first place, it must train students to think in terms of the resources and the problems at hand and not in terms of the resources and problems of the country where the textbook was written. In the second place, it must concentrate more than it has on the development of inquiring minds, on experimentation where the result is not found in the answer book, and on establishing incentives so that people will do things differently from the way they have been done before.

III. Official Activities of the United States

To outsiders not familiar with the decentralized structure of our federal government, it would appear that, in international education as in the preparation of national statistics, everybody is trying to get into the act. No less than twenty-three government agencies have programs of their own, sometimes co-ordinated with each other and sometimes independent.¹¹ The majority, however, are

11. Agency for International Development, Atomic Energy Commission, Civil Service Commission, Federal Aviation Agency, Federal Civil Defense Administration, Federal Communications Commission, Federal Power Commission, Housing

centered in four agencies—the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, and the Peace Corps. The present section will be confined to the activities of these four.

(1) *The Department of State*

The international education program of the Department of State began in 1926 with the signing in Buenos Aires of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Affairs. It subsequently was expanded by three acts of Congress: the Fulbright Act of 1946, providing for the use of foreign currencies for educational exchanges; the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, establishing a permanent, global educational exchange program; and the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, which combines into one statute the authority previously divided among several acts. It also creates the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

The Fulbright program is the best-known government activity designed to strengthen the community of scholars. It enables American students and scholars to go abroad to study and teach and foreigners to come to the United States. In 1961, 5,530 Fulbright scholars from 90 countries were affiliated with 390 colleges and universities in the United States, while some 2,247 American scholars were abroad in educational assignments in 90 countries.¹²

Special attention is paid to the development of teachers, in the conviction that the teacher shortage is a principal limiting factor in educational development abroad. In addition to the Fulbright exchange of scholars, a teacher exchange program is administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. From its inception in 1946 to 1961, 3,450 American teachers were sent

and Home Finance Agency, Library of Congress, National Science Foundation, Post Office Department, Tennessee Valley Authority, United States Information Agency, Veterans Administration, and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Treasury, and Health, Education, and Welfare.

12. Howard E. Wilson, "Education, Foreign Policy and International Relations," in Robert Blum (ed.), *Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations* (New York, 1961), pp. 3-11.

abroad, and 2,500 foreign teachers brought to the United States.¹³

Among the more informational programs of the State Department are the invitations to leaders—prominent individuals who may be expected to influence political and social developments in their countries. Travel grants for thirty to forty days are awarded to specialists such as artists, teachers, journalists, and personnel from radio and television. There is also a student leadership program. In 1960, eleven student leadership seminars were carried out with as many Latin American countries, including the one I referred to in the first part of this essay. Leaders in the United States—such as Thornton Wilder, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Carl Sandburg—have been sent abroad in select groups to discuss developments in education, science, and culture in the United States.

The Fulbright-Hays Act also authorizes “assistance in the establishment, expansion, maintenance, and operation of schools and institutions of learning abroad,” which are sponsored by American citizens or non-profit institutions. These include primarily colleges serving foreign students, most of which are in the Middle East (such as American University, Beirut; American University, Cairo; and Robert College, Istanbul). Professorial chairs to be held by Americans also have been established in universities all over the world.

(2) Agency for International Development

If technical assistance is included, then the greater part of AID's \$3 billion budget may be said to be devoted to education. However, the educational assistance program (more narrowly defined) had a budget of \$172,893,000 for grants and assistance in fiscal year 1963, of which \$64,779,000 was allocated to Africa, \$49,463,000 to Latin America, \$29,441,000 to the Near East and South Asia, and \$29,210,000 to the Far East.¹⁴ This includes direct-hire education officers and one hundred university contracts in thirty-

13. *Ibid.*

14. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Operations Appropriations*, Pt. 2. Hearings before a Subcommittee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, p. 665.

seven countries (about 40 per cent of which are in the field of education).¹⁵ Including other categories of education (e.g., in food and agriculture, transportation, financial institutions, health, government management, and the like), Congressman Otto Passman, a principal critic of the program, charged that AID plans to spend a total of \$437,600,000 educating the rest of the world.¹⁶

The proliferation of AID activities in education is difficult to summarize, and the best way of illustrating it is to outline the program in an individual country. Let us choose India, whose 1961 program consisted of the projects listed in Table I.

Table I. *Financial Summary of United States Aid to Education in India, 1961*

	Date of inception	Cost thousands of dollars	
		1961	Cumulative
Training program for secondary school teachers	1956	\$ 320	\$ 1,955
Technical education institutes	1953	178	3,767
National Program of Professional Education	1960	347	478
Rural Institutes	1957	25	294
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur	1958	111	2,201
Teacher Training in Engineering Education	1958	320	2,494
Home Science Education and Research	1955	—	1,105
<i>Totals</i>		\$1,301	\$12,294

Source: U.S. Department of State, International Cooperation Administration, Office of Educational Services, "Active Education Projects as of 30 June 1961" (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. VI A 6 (Mimeographed).

The program to upgrade secondary schools was begun by the Indian government in the early fifties. In 1956 a contract was signed with Ohio State University to help the government establish fifty-four extension training centers for teachers. After two

15. William A. Woffler, Chief of AID's Institutional Development, Near East and South Asia Division, addressing the National Association of Colleges and Universities; cited in *AID Digest* (April, 1962), p. 11.

16. See document cited in note 14, p. 693.

successful years, these centers began to emphasize the development of multipurpose high schools to supplement those concentrating on college preparation.

A technical education program was instituted to strengthen graduate, undergraduate, and research programs in eleven engineering colleges. Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan State universities have provided sixty professors to help the Indians develop staff and curricula in civil, mining, mechanical, and metallurgical engineering. Concurrently eighty-five young Indian professors were sent to the United States for graduate study.

United States missions also have joined the government of India in developing programs in home economics and rural higher education. The University of Tennessee has helped in eight home science colleges, and regional demonstration colleges are being assisted in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras. Emphasis is on vocational homemaking, teacher training, and training of specialists to work in home and industry. To combat the problem of rural young people not wanting to return home after an acquaintance with the city, eleven rural institutes have been established to offer courses in social services, agricultural extension, rural teacher education, social education, and rural engineering. Berea College is under contract to assist their establishment.

A summary of proposals for AID assistance to education in the Commonwealth of Nations and dependencies during fiscal year 1963 is provided in Table II.

(3) *United States Information Agency*

Although the United States Information Agency is best known for its propaganda efforts such as the Voice of America, one-fourth of its budget (i.e., about \$28 million) was spent directly on educational activities in 1962. These were carried out largely through binational centers, which provide libraries, reference materials, English instruction, and various cultural and educational programs.

The agency is active in several programs to promote the writing,

Table II. *Proposed AID Assistance to Education for Fiscal Year 1963 (in thousands of dollars)*
Members of Commonwealth of Nations and Dependencies

	Personnel					Contract services	Commodities	Grand Total
	School construction	U.S.	Local (teachers, etc.)	Participant training				
British Guiana	\$ 160	\$ 53	—	\$ 192	\$ 25	—	\$ 430	
British Honduras	—	5	—	173	15	\$ 2	195	
Ceylon	—	39	—	115	250	15	419	
Eastern Caribbean Islands	—	70	—	281	230	290	871	
Jamaica	174	50	—	160	30	111	525	
Ghana	1,500	617	—	105	770	90	3,082	
India	—	294	—	243	4,159	1,259	5,955	
Kenya	683	183	—	309	985	154	2,314	
Nigeria	2,533	2,191	80	1,003	8,984	612	15,403	
Federation of Rhodesia/Nyasaland	565	370	—	20	920	40	1,915	
Sierra Leone	400	276	—	85	587	254	1,602	
Tanganyika	—	40	—	50	502	35	627	
Uganda	—	75	—	20	950	170	1,215	
<i>Totals</i>	6,015	4,263	80	2,756	18,407	3,032	34,553	

Source: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Operations Appropriations*, Pt. 2. Hearings before a Subcommittee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962, pp. 666-693.

translation, and publication of books. It subsidizes American publishers to produce low-priced (usually paperback) editions that are distributed through the publishers' export departments. It also supports the writing and publication of certain books oriented toward foreign audiences and hence not commercially attractive to American publishers. This program encompasses approximately fifteen titles a year, with the agency's agreeing in advance to buy a minimum number of copies.

The agency helps foreign publishers translate and print American books. Using funds generated under Public Law 480 (foreign currencies arising from the sale of surplus United States commodities abroad), it has underwritten the translation, publication, and distribution of American college-level textbooks in many less-developed countries.

English instruction in binational centers is probably the most observable activity of the agency abroad. Instruction was given to 221,162 students in 1961. The agency also arranged numerous seminars and workshops for local English teachers, using documentary films, television films, and short wave radio instruction.

(4) *The Peace Corps*

The Peace Corps is the modern ugly duckling that turned into a swan. Principally engaged in extension, education, and social services, its significance to United States policy is increasing in several ways. In the first place, volunteers are highly motivated. They are working for an ideal, not financial reward. In the second place, they have been able to infect their counterparts in less-developed countries with enthusiasm. Peace Corps staff informally admit that the Marjorie Micheltore incident in Nigeria (where a lost postal card was published in local newspapers) was a blessing in disguise, since it demonstrated conclusively to millions of foreigners that this young American girl was not an efficiently trained CIA spy. In the third place, Peace Corps volunteers will provide the United States with an ever-increasing roster of likely personnel for its senior activities, such as the foreign aid program.

Many believe that it will contribute significantly to solving the problem of recruiting motivated people with the ability to understand other cultures and work effectively with them.

IV. Conclusion

Programs of educational assistance for economic development are closely integrated with United States foreign policy. The distinction between propaganda and education becomes more subtle and less readily recognized as the foreign policy interests of the United States become genuinely associated with the aspirations of other countries for economic development. A principal problem, however, is that of communicating this fact to students and influential citizens abroad. Visits to the United States under the leadership program, educational exchanges, and scholarships may or may not be successful in making this point. One method, which has not been adequately tried, is a special emphasis on education in the social sciences. Programs of economics, history, and political science ought to be encouraged in foreign universities not so much as tools of current economic development (although this is important, too), but as necessary in understanding the process of growth. I believe the United States has much to gain politically from increased understanding of history. The spreading of United States culture should emphasize less an exposure to arts, sciences, and economic progress in the United States (which is not always fully understood abroad), and should turn more to frank discussions of the differences in the culture and historical experience of the United States and less-developed countries.

Technical education is promoted primarily through the Agency for International Development, but also in programs of the Department of State, United States Information Agency, the Peace Corps, and numerous other government agencies. These activities ought to be expanded. In this expansion, however, special attention should be paid to the most recent philosophies of economic development. Programs should be dedicated to the development of in-

quiring minds and change-motivated individuals. The Peace Corps is particularly useful here, but not because it possesses a substantial store of knowledge. Rather, its infectious enthusiasm can contribute more toward creating a body of change-minded individuals than any other program in which we are now engaged.

African Approaches to the Development of Higher Education: A Sampling of Views of African Academics

C. Walter Howe

I. The Broader Context

Educational development always has suffered from stresses and strains. That these have been unusually acute in Africa during the past two decades is another instance of the general ferment on the continent.

Before World War II, the colonial powers brought relative order and stability to much of Africa. Change there was, in many fields, but the pattern was slow and sure. With few exceptions, the interplay of the new elements at that time with the then existing social situations produced only underlying *factors* for further mutation. In contrast, strong and open *forces* catalyzing change became part of the scene in increasing numbers and vigor only after 1942. The process is now widely familiar.

Transformations in African education followed such a course. The less formal though highly germane indigenous instruction received by African children to ready them for adulthood in their particular societal setting was first supplemented, and gradually to some degree replaced, by Western-type school systems. Operated in the initial period ordinarily by foreign religious mission groups, the systems, as they expanded horizontally and vertically, were increasingly financed and controlled by the colonial govern-

ments. They can be described therefore as educational systems patterned by the various non-African religious bodies, only slightly adapted to the respective African societies, and successively modified by the territorial governments' educational policies.

After World War II educational change neither kept pace with nor accurately reflected the new forces that pushed from below and beyond. It was some time, for example, until there was a clear recognition by most colonial authorities that educational facilities had to be decisively expanded and improved if the countries were to be prepared reasonably well for independence.¹ Before required development plans could be translated into established programs, political events telescoped dates of independence. Territorial governments found themselves "caught short," with a year or so to accomplish what at the prewar pace would have required a much longer period.

There was another difference between the nature of educational change and change in the political field. From 1945 to the present, political change in Africa has been stimulated and vitally influenced by ideas and events throughout the world. It reflects an eclectic background. But only in the very recent years have educational systems in Africa borrowed anything from systems other than those of the respective metropolitan powers, for earlier there was no similarly wide, cosmopolitan contact with the variety of ideas on education.² Most of the African countries are not yet accustomed to the eclectic approach in educational questions.³ This compounds the difficulties, already considerable, of drawing on a

1. It was even later—since 1961—that education as an investment gained wide currency as an accepted concept. For some public expressions of it, see Fred M. Hechinger, "Europe and U.S. Seek Education Blueprint for Future Growth," *New York Times*, Oct. 22, 1961, p. E7; Edwin Dale, Review of *Economic Development in Perspective*, by John Kenneth Galbraith, *New York Times Book Review*, May 20, 1962, p. 3; and Walter W. Heller, "Man, Money, and Materials," *Educational Record*, XLIV (1963), 12-16.

2. In some instances, to all intents and purposes there was as of early 1963 still no knowledge or understanding of varied educational approaches. In the case of the African countries of French expression, the French influence has been all but exclusive.

3. For an example of the eclectic approach in Iran, see "Melting Pot of Experience," *New York Times*, July 22, 1962, p. E7. The need for such an approach has been advanced by many writers. See The Editors, "American Education and West Africa," *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 48, and also other articles in the same issue, which was entitled "American Education and West Africa."

range of existing educational philosophies and methods to fashion new ones suited to each country's situation.⁴

These then are the unusual stresses and strains being experienced in African educational developments: their magnitude—the urgent need to accomplish within a short period of time what other countries have taken years to do; and their complexity—the need for new solutions that are particularly adapted to each country's requirements, yet with the requisite knowledge and skills for eclectic approaches either absent or not sufficiently developed.

It is within this context—of the earlier evolution of colonial educational systems, then the increasingly fierce pressures to expand facilities outward and upward, while at the same time adapting structures, method, and content to indigenous needs—that the more specific issues confronting African educators must be set.

Among the issues are those relating to the development of institutions of higher education. It is the intention to focus on certain of these issues, and especially to report on the views of a sampling of African academics concerning the issues. The discussion is limited to Middle Africa,⁵ and within that general area to countries where English is the major non-indigenous language.

II. The Background to the Sampling

The decision to obtain the opinions of a sample of African academics evolved from certain assumptions and convictions: (1) that the views of informed Africans on higher educational issues, as contrasted to those of informed expatriates in Africa, are in some cases perhaps not being taken sufficiently into account in

4. There does not yet appear to be a consensus on whether the process of fashioning new educational systems and philosophies for particular African countries should be accomplished by successive modifications and adaptations or by devising entire new systems to replace the old. The latter approach was favored in UNESCO, "Final Report of the Meeting of Experts on the Adaptation of General Secondary School Curriculum in Africa" (Tananarive, July 2-13, 1962), UNESCO/ED 196, Oct. 31, 1962, pp. 7, 18.

5. Middle Africa has been defined at UNESCO conferences as excluding North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic), the Portuguese territories, and the Republic of South Africa.

programs assisting development;⁶ (2) that their views are necessary, since, as a rule, well-trained, thoughtful Africans can carry out the functions of educational planning and administration better than expatriates, and in any case must do so before too long; and (3) that the problem is mainly one of identifying and contacting such actual or potential African leaders.

No ready-made substitute for a pilot survey of African views was known to be available. UNESCO sponsored the May, 1961, Addis Ababa Conference on African education, as well as the especially relevant September, 1962, Tananarive Conference on African higher education, and the reports of both include a wide range of recommendations endorsed by the African and other participants.⁷ However, although the documents of both conferences note that the development needs of individual countries will vary as the educational situations vary, the variations are rarely systematically delineated and compared.⁸ Furthermore, there is no indication of the degree of consensus supporting the numerous generalized recommendations.

Because of these considerations it was decided to obtain a sam-

6. This may be the case especially where, because of a paucity of African staff, the hierarchies of higher educational institutions have had a structural and numerical preponderance of expatriates. For examples of the high incidence of expatriate staff, see "The Staffing of Higher Education in Africa" (paper prepared under the direction of Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders for the UNESCO Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, Sept. 3-12, 1962), pp. 59-60, 65-66. Cited hereinafter as Carr-Saunders, "The Staffing of Higher Education in Africa."

7. For the Addis Ababa report, see UNESCO, *Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, 15-25 May 1961: Final Report* ([Paris, 1961]). For the Tananarive Conference, see UNESCO, *The Development of Higher Education in Africa: Report of the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa, Tananarive, 3-12 September 1962*. Cited hereinafter as UNESCO, *Report of Tananarive Conference*.

The following appeared earlier in 1963 as a pre-print of part of the final report: UNESCO, *The Development of Higher Education in Africa: Conclusions and Recommendations of the Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa (Tananarive, 3-12 September 1962)* (Paris, 1963). Cited hereinafter as UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*.

8. The following report, especially its Annexes IX and X, provides summary information on the African countries' national educational development plans and educational budgeting, but comparative data are limited: UNESCO, *Meeting of Ministers of Education of African Countries Participating in the Implementation of the Addis Ababa Plan: Final Report* ([Paris, 1962]). Cited hereinafter as UNESCO, *Report of African Ministers of Education Meeting, 1962*. The meeting was organized by UNESCO in co-operation with the United Nations' Economic Commission for Africa and was held at UNESCO House, Paris, March 26-30, 1962.

pling of Africans' views on certain issues, a number of which were the subject of the Tananarive Conference recommendations.

Eleven academics were interviewed. All were from countries where English is the major non-indigenous language of instruction. A conscious effort was made to give the sample as wide a geographic spread as possible within the Middle Africa area, and to have as many of the African universities represented as feasible. The eleven Africans were associated with ten university institutions located in the following seven countries: ⁹ Sierra Leone, 1; Ghana (2 institutions), 2; Nigeria (3 institutions), 3; Ethiopia, 1; Uganda, 2; Kenya, 1; Tanganyika, 1. The nature of the academics' associations ranged as follows: vice-chancellor or vice-principal, 4; head of department of education, 2; senior African faculty member in respective department, 2; lecturer, 2; research fellow, 1.

Of the ten Africans whose overseas educational background is known, four obtained their degrees in the United Kingdom, three obtained all their overseas degrees in the United States, and three obtained degrees from institutions both in the United States and in the United Kingdom (or Canada). Eight of the ten hold doctorate degrees, and the others have master's degrees.

The interviews with nine of the individuals were arranged in the course of the December, 1962, meetings of the First International Congress of Africanists, held at the University of Ghana.¹⁰ The discussions with the other two African academics took place early in December in countries en route to Ghana. The interviews averaged about one hour in length.

There were ten multi-part questions,¹¹ and each person had the

9. That the survey of African views was in the nature of a pilot survey should be stressed. The sample included neither senior African government officials responsible for shaping educational policy, nor Africans from countries of French expression. In addition to British Central Africa, three countries with university institutions in "English-speaking" Middle Africa were not represented because of various circumstances—mainly lack of time. And the representation was small from the countries that were covered.

10. Attendance at the congress was as an observer for the African Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education. The activities of the committee are supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. However, the sampling of African views was personally conceived, analysis of results and preparation of this paper were undertaken during short periods of leave, and the statements made and views expressed are of course the sole responsibility of the writer.

11. Helpful comments concerning the questions were provided by Professor Karl W. Bigelow, Teachers College, Columbia University.

opportunity to indicate thirty-nine answers. All are not fully reported here, but based on the total number of answers, the incidence of responses was high—87 per cent.¹²

III. Views on the Staffing Priority

Since the fall of 1961, responsible persons in the United States have been actively concerned with the over-all dimensions of the problem of staffing African university institutions.¹³ It is a matter on which major recommendations were made at the Tananarive Conference, and for which a special background study was prepared by Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders.¹⁴

Working with the Carr-Saunders' data, the Tananarive Conference concluded that the total staff requirements for Middle Africa will rise from 2,600 to 16,500 between 1961 and 1980. The number of Africans who will have to be recruited to staff higher education institutions, allowing for turnover, is estimated as follows: 1961-1965, 600; 1965-1970, 1,600; 1970-1975, 3,900; 1975-1980, 7,900—a total of 14,000.¹⁵

Some seven thousand expatriates will need to be recruited during the same period, assuming a five-year period of service, and

12. Included in the total number of answers are "not applicable" or "no opinion" replies.

Of the fifty-six answers which otherwise were not obtained, in fifty-four instances the question was not asked. Of the fifty-four, interviews with three of the eleven persons accounted for forty-five (divided 22, 15, 7). In these cases, where lack of sufficient time was the controlling factor, some of the less important questions were omitted in the interview. Answers of one sort or another actually obtained from the other eight respondents amounted to 99 per cent of those possible from them.

13. For American programs assisting in staffing educational institutions in Africa as of the fall of 1962, see Africa Liaison Committee, American Council on Education, *Inventory of American Aid to Education in Africa* (Washington, D.C., 1962), pp. 46-57.

14. Carr-Saunders, "The Staffing of Higher Education in Africa." The study was supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to the Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, London. Material for Carr-Saunders concerning the United States was prepared under the direction of Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet, and financial support for this work was made available from the same source to the Africa Liaison Committee of the American Council on Education.

A 26-page summary of the study has since appeared in pamphlet form—A. M. Carr-Saunders, *Staffing African Universities* (London, 1963).

15. UNESCO, *Report of Tananarive Conference*, p. 30.

proportionately more if the average length of assignment is less (as will likely be the case). The greatest increase in expatriate staff will be called for during the first decade. With the rise in African staff indicated above, according to the projections, the ratio of expatriates will fall to 5 per cent by 1980 from 90 per cent in 1961.¹⁶

These then are the estimated dimensions of the problem. That the Tananarive Conference assigned to it a high priority is clear. Although stressing the difficulty of ordering priorities, in the section on forms of international co-operation, the conference report accorded the first priority to staffing.¹⁷

The interviews with the eleven African academics in December, 1962, indicated fairly clear support of this Tananarive recommendation in replies to two questions.

The initial question in the interview, purposely very general and open-ended, was as follows: What are the two aspects of higher education in your country which most urgently need attention, either through change or through expansion of present plans and practices? Nine persons replied. Of the total of eighteen answers, a plurality of five cited staffing needs. Two of these indicated staffing in general; three referred to the training of African staff in particular. (The other thirteen replies advocated attention be given to: technical and/or science education, four; revision of the educational system and/or curriculum, three; financing, two; and other, four.)

The second question and the replies to it were as follows:

QUESTION

The Tananarive Conference report indicates that the priorities for higher educational development should be in the following order: ¹⁸

First—staffing of higher education institutions (by Africans and expatriates)

16. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 67–68.

18. The report of the conference does not spell out the order of priorities as clearly as they are listed in the above question. However, they may be inferred from the report; see *ibid.*, pp. 67–68, 80.

Second—overseas scholarships (in general) ¹⁹

Third—expansion of facilities in Africa (libraries, buildings, etc.)

Do you agree this is the desirable order of priorities for your country? If not, how would you order the priorities?

REPLIES

	<u>Staffing</u>	<u>Overseas scholarships</u>	<u>Expansion of facilities</u>
First priority	6	0	5
Second priority	4	2	4
Third priority	0	8	2
Total replies	10	10	11
No reply ²⁰	1	1	—
	11	11	11

Because of the diversity of the sample and of the higher education situations in the countries represented, the prominence given to staffing as a priority need in relation to others is considered significant.²¹

A subsequent question dealt with aspects of the staffing problem. The question and answers were as follows:

QUESTION

In increasing staff for higher education institutions in your country, which of the following three ways should be given top priority?

- (a) Provision of expatriate staff.
- (b) Training of African staff abroad (in graduate study).
- (c) Training of African staff in Africa.

19. The report of the conference included in the staffing priority "training facilities for African staff abroad" (as well as for African staff in Africa, and together with the provision of expatriate personnel). See *ibid.*, p. 67. Because of this, persons interviewed were told that the staffing priority mentioned above included training of African staff abroad and thus overseas scholarships for this purpose, and that the overseas scholarships priority in contrast referred to scholarships in general.

20. The individual indicated by the "no reply" stated his first priority preference as expansion of facilities but said the order for the other two priorities would depend on a study of his country's needs.

21. Although there was some correlation between, on the one hand, the known shortage or relative sufficiency of staff or facilities of the university institutions represented and, on the other hand, the respondents' first and second priority preferences for staff or facilities, the correlation was not a conclusive one.

	REPLIES		
	<i>Expatriate staff</i>	<i>Training African staff Abroad</i>	<i>In Africa</i>
First priority	0	7	4
Second priority	5	2	2
Third priority	4	1	4
Total replies	9	10	10
No reply	2	1	1
	11	11	11

From these views of African academics, it is evident that staffing is considered to be the most crucial need, but that the training of African staff, especially abroad, should be considered of higher priority than the provision of expatriate staff.

This latter is a not unexpected answer from an African sample of whatever composition. However it does not, in the writer's view, lessen the urgency of measures to provide expatriate staff. It only says, in effect, that programs providing assistance for graduate training of qualified Africans who plan to join the staff of university institutions should be given top priority assistance over any other programs. The numbers of such Africans will be small for some time, and the cost of assisting in their graduate training will therefore not bulk large. Although funds in Africa and abroad are of course not limitless, there should and must still be sufficient resources available—or which can be marshaled—to provide the critically needed help in the way of expatriate staff during the next decade.

In this connection, the Tananarive Conference recommended that, since the recruitment of expatriate staff will “present one of the greatest difficulties,” effective recruitment machinery in the form of national agencies in the countries in a position to help should be created where they do not exist.²²

Subsequently, the official United States observer delegation to the conference strongly advocated that such a recruiting agency

22. UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*, p. 18.

be brought into being here,²³ and discussions with this end in view bore fruit in 1963.²⁴

IV. Overseas Scholarships

The issue of overseas scholarships for African students is a volatile one, with a long and controversial history. Probably it would be advisable to omit any discussion of it, since its complexities and ramifications cannot be adequately treated. Yet as already indicated, the Tananarive Conference advanced certain recommendations with respect to this question, and the persons interviewed in December, 1962, were asked their views on several aspects of it. Rather than pass over these results and thus leave out a crucial element in the total picture, they are presented, but in summary form only.

As reported in the earlier section on staffing needs, the eleven African academics accorded a decidedly low priority to overseas scholarships in general. This contrasted to successively higher priorities for expansion of facilities and for staffing of university institutions. However, assistance to enable prospective African staff to pursue graduate study and training abroad was given top priority.

Graduate study scholarships generally were decisively favored over those for undergraduate study, as were scholarships for degree as contrasted to non-degree students. There was an appreciable sentiment that the number of Africans studying overseas would *not* have to rise by 1975 to double the present figure, as predicted at Tananarive for Middle Africa.²⁵ However, it should

23. See the report on the conference, made by members of the delegation at the annual meeting of the African Studies Association in Washington in October, 1962, as carried in the *African Studies Bulletin*, V (1962), 13-18. The United States delegation was headed by Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet, president emeritus of the University of Rochester and chairman of the American Council on Education's Africa Liaison Committee. The other four members were officials of the Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the U.S. Office of Education.

24. A central recruiting facility called Overseas Educational Service was set up in the United States in 1963.

25. Figures for projected student enrolments within and outside of Middle Africa are provided at the beginning of the next section of this essay.

be noted in connection with this response that the sample included no persons from countries without university institutions, where overseas study can be expected necessarily to figure prominently.

All eleven of the persons interviewed considered that overseas scholarships should be tied *very* closely to manpower needs;²⁶ and all felt that their countries' higher education institutions should be given a clear first choice of students, although almost half of them qualified this in one way or another. Regarding desirable machinery to award overseas scholarships, answers were diverse, but almost half of the respondents advocated that representatives of foreign scholarship programs be on whatever national boards existed.

V. Factors in Growth of Higher Education Enrolments

The report of the Tananarive Conference anticipates greatly increased enrolments of Middle Africa students in the next two decades as follows:²⁷

<i>Year</i>	<i>Study within Middle Africa</i>	<i>Study outside Middle Africa</i>
1962	18,000	13,000
1965	28,000	18,000
1970	56,000	24,000
1975	115,000	29,000
1980	247,000	27,000

The eleven African academics were asked their views on some of the conference recommendations relating to the enrolment targets. One recommendation was that efforts should be concentrated on furthering development of existing university institutions, rather than establishing new ones, and that no more than the

26. A seminar on the role of education in economic development, held at the University of Ghana, felt that only as a last resort should government use its powers to direct students to unpopular courses according to manpower needs. The problem could "best be met by improved publicity, the judicious use of economic incentives and the planned use of scholarships." See "Reports of Conferences," *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 99-100. For some citations concerning the manpower concept, see n. 35.

27. UNESCO, *Report of Tananarive Conference*, pp. 21-23.

thirty-two existing or planned institutions in Middle Africa should be developed up to 1980.²⁸ With reference to the situation in the respondents' own countries, eight agreed, two of these with exceptions, and three did not agree with the recommendation. Perhaps surprisingly, two of the latter, plus one of those who agreed "with exceptions," were associated with the newer universities in Nigeria.²⁹

With another of the Tananarive recommendations—that the enrolment goal for each university should be five thousand as a minimum³⁰—nine of the eleven persons agreed.

Eight of the nine respondents agreed that the output from all post-secondary institutions should be in the proportion of three non-degree students to one degree student.³¹ And all of the ten persons who were queried favored the recommendation that 60 per cent of students in such institutions should be enrolled in scientific and technological courses, the other 40 per cent in arts courses.³² All seven who were asked indicated the 60 per cent

28. UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*, pp. 24–25.

29. Regarding the Tananarive recommendation as it applied to Middle Africa as a whole, the only three persons who were asked their views came from three separate countries, and all indicated disagreement. They felt there would probably be a need for more university institutions, and one respondent who was at Tananarive said he did not consider this was a conference recommendation but rather merely a counting up. These opinions, and others known to exist outside the sample, would incline one to characterize the attempt to hold development to thirty-two institutions as wishful thinking, and perhaps not even truly reflective of African views at Tananarive. It seems certain that it will not be long before the unrealistic ceiling figure is breached, since, for example, the African intention to have one in Northern Rhodesia has been announced, and plans for a third university institution in the Congo (at Stanleyville) call for classes to begin in the fall of 1963. This is not to say that higher education facilities, particularly in specialized fields, should be duplicated before a real need for additions is proven. It is to say, however, that a number of Middle African countries now without a university college will want one. And several of these countries will be in a position to justify the need for one, especially given the lead time required for planning and for translating plans into facilities capable of handling appreciable enrolments. This might also be the case as regards certain countries that find a need for an institution in addition to those already in existence or planned in their respective countries.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

31. UNESCO, *Report of Tananarive Conference*, p. 23.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Frederick Harbison has stressed that in Nigeria technical and scientific education needs to be given the highest priority. See "Human Resources and Economic Development in Nigeria," in Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (eds.), *The Nigerian Political Scene* (Durham, N.C., 1962), p. 210. That there are lessons to be learned in this respect from the experience in India is clear. See "U.N. Cites High Jobless Rate Among Educated Asian Youth," *Washington Post*, March 18, 1963, p. A15.

referred to should also have a good proportion of non-scientific-technical education.

At another point in the interviews several queries were posed with reference to the general Tananarive conclusion that to provide qualified manpower there had to be a rapid growth in enrolments. The first query was what the respondents would recommend to facilitate this growth in their countries. Five persons answered this open-ended question by saying secondary school facilities needed to be expanded, and one mentioned this as a second recommendation. Two persons called first for a revision of the educational structure to meet African needs, and one mentioned this as a second recommendation.³³ Provision of more scholarships to attend local universities was mentioned either first or second by three respondents, all from Nigeria. There were two mentions of the need to increase African university facilities, together with other miscellaneous recommendations. Evidence suggests that the diversity of these replies reflects the varying situations in the different countries, with only the need to expand secondary facilities standing out.

Asked whether their countries' university entrance requirements, and the school examinations on which they are based, should be reviewed or not,³⁴ seven persons advocated changes in one or more of these respects and four of the seven were associated with institutions still having a special relationship with a British university. Three of the four who advocated no change were with institutions having no such special relationship. The obvious inference would seem to be that despite the recognized advantages deriving from a special relationship, especially its guarantee of standards and therefore the international currency of the degrees,

33. Two of these three respondents were associated with institutions which still had a special relationship with a British university.

34. The Tananarive Conference recommended this to facilitate access to universities of potentially good students. UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*, p. 21. In the one limited attempt at comparison of national plans for educational development made in the document, UNESCO, *Report of African Ministers of Education Meeting*, 1962, it was concluded that secondary education was "shaping itself with an even keener consciousness of university entrance requirements," and therefore along lines which did not evidence an awareness of the need for secondary education which was more varied and thus would meet a country's need for different levels and types of manpower. See the *Report's* Annex IX, p. 142.

it has inhibited changes considered desirable by African academics. But because the persons interviewed who were associated with this type of institution were not asked whether they would choose to end the special relationship or forego changes, the relative value of the special relationship in their eyes cannot be assessed. It is of some interest, however, that the Ashby Commission recommended against special relationships, suggesting instead "sponsorship from well-established universities."³⁵

The last two questions were directed more specifically to alternative university entrance requirements and to the closely related issue of the future role of Form VI in the educational system. Before indicating the responses, an explanation of the British educational structure used in all respondents' countries but one (Ethiopia) must be provided, together with some background on the issues.

With some variations,³⁶ plus the need at times to repeat a year or two, African students aiming for the British-type, three-year university course have to complete successfully a fourteen-year primary and secondary school course. The first twelve years of the study are divided differently in the various countries of the respondents.³⁷ But before going on to the last two years, a student must take a School Certificate examination and obtain a Pass in five (or six) subjects, including English language, with a Credit

35. Federation of Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Education, *Investment in Education: The Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria* (Lagos, 1960), p. 26. Cited hereinafter as Nigeria, *Investment in Education*. This report, and the commission which prepared it, was a trailblazer for Africa. Sir Eric Ashby was the chairman, and the other members were Nigerian, British, and American. The work of the commission was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Chapter I of Part II of this report was on "High-Level Manpower for Nigeria's Future." Written by Frederick Harbison, it sets forth the theory of the necessary relationship between the manpower needs of Nigeria and plans for educational development. Since then the concept has received wide support in educational planning in Africa. See the discussion of education and manpower in Guy Hunter, *The New Societies of Tropical Africa* (London, 1962), pp. 237-271, and especially p. 247. For a broader world view, see W. Willard Wirtz, "Manpower Policies in a World of Change," *Educational Record*, XLIV (1963), 7-11.

36. Ghana in particular.

37. Examples of the different divisions between primary "Standards" and secondary "Forms" for these twelve years are 6-6 and 7-5; where an intermediate level is interposed, examples are 4-4-4 and 6-2-4. See Helen Kitchen (ed.), *The Educated African: A Country by Country Survey of Educational Development in Africa* (New York, 1962), pp. 130, 147, 162, 334, 336, 338-339, 372-373, 389-390.

in two (or one) of them.³⁸ These examinations are conducted in collaboration with the University of Cambridge. The equivalent British external examination is that for the General Certificate of Education (G.C.E.) set at the Ordinary—or O—level.

A student therefore must have successfully completed his studies and the School Certificate examination at the O level, after some twelve years or so of primary and secondary schooling, before he is eligible to enter the last two years of secondary school.³⁹ These last two years are most commonly referred to as Form VI.⁴⁰ Before a student can enter the university from Form VI, he must have successfully completed the (Cambridge) Higher School Certificate examination, or the G.C.E. set at the Advanced—or A—level.

How can a standard of equivalency be worked out between, on the one hand, the British system in Africa of some twelve years to O level, two more to A level, and three at the university to obtain a bachelor's degree; and on the other hand, the American system of twelve years of schooling prior to a four-year college or university course leading to a bachelor's degree? There is no simple or complete answer.

Some British educators argue that a Cambridge School Certificate (O level) is equivalent to a good record in the best American high school, each having required twelve years; that it follows that a Higher School Certificate (A level) is equal to successful completion of the first two years in a good American college;⁴¹ and that therefore at the end of a further three years at a British-type university, a student's bachelor's degree is in effect the same as an American bachelor's degree at a good college plus one year,

38. Nigeria, *Investment in Education*, Appendix I, p. 127. See also "Tanganyika: A Guide to the Academic Placement of Students from Tanganyika in Educational Institutions in the U.S.A.," *World Education Series* (prepared for the Council on Evaluation of Foreign Student Credentials [Washington], 1961), pp. 1, 8-9. Cited hereinafter as "Tanganyika," *World Education Series*, 1961.

39. It should be stressed that the requirement is not that a student spend twelve years in school before passing on to Form VI. It is that he successfully complete the O level examination. Some students may cover the twelve-year schooling in less time, some may take more.

40. Also frequently written as "Sixth Form."

41. This view is not accepted by American institutions, which at the most will consider advanced placement. See "Tanganyika," *World Education Series*, 1961, pp. 2-3.

that is, the same as the American master's degree. Most Americans, and some British, maintain that an American bachelor's degree, certainly one from a leading institution, ranks as high as a bachelor's degree from a British-oriented institution; that it is obtained in sixteen years of schooling in lieu of the British seventeen years, thereby indicating one year "wasted" under the British-type system; and that an American master's degree from a leading university in fact represents superior attainment over certain British master's degrees, such as those from Oxford and Cambridge, where the requirements are notably minimal.⁴²

The clue to part of the answer is provided in the above discussion: it depends upon the quality of the institution in the United States. Some produce bachelor's degrees which are recognized as equal to the seventeen-year British-type bachelor's. Some—perhaps many—American institutions do not, but the fact that they do not does not debase the value of the quality bachelor's degrees in the eyes of knowledgeable educators here and abroad.⁴³ Further, although the variation is smaller relative to that in the United States, degrees from all British universities are also not alike; they are not accorded equivalent currency internationally or in the United Kingdom.⁴⁴

A similar variable which makes comparisons of American- and British-oriented degrees difficult is the British "honours courses," which set higher standards than the general degree course.⁴⁵ But this variable also is present, and developing, in the United States,

42. For clarification concerning the varying values of master's degrees from different British institutions, and for general guidelines dealing with the equivalency problem, the writer is indebted to William H. Strain, secretary of the Council on Evaluation of Foreign Student Credentials, for material made available with his personal communication of April 9, 1963. This material on the United Kingdom was published in 1963 by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, as part of the *World Education Series*.

43. Robert W. Morris, "Education in the United States," *The Educational Record*, XLIII (1962), 278. The article is the substance of an address given at the University of Cambridge, the alma mater of the author, who is an inspector of schools in England and Wales and at the time of publication was serving as co-head of the Curriculum Study Group set up by the Ministry of Education.

44. The "Oxbridge" universities are regarded as generally superior to the newer "Redbrick" universities, but as regards the training of scientists some of the latter institutions are in the lead. Elspeth Huxley, "Report from Redbrick," *Punch*, CCXLIII (1962), 897.

45. One leading British educator has decried the mimicry in African universities of the emphasis on honors degrees, which with its narrow specialization has been carried to excess in the United Kingdom in his view. Sir Eric Ashby, *Patterns of Universities in Non-European Societies* (London, 1961), p. 20. A

where such special courses are available for those students who fulfil the stiffer requirements.

There exists one additional related difference, though again it is a matter of degree. The British-type university education has been traditionally much more specialized (starting even at Form VI⁴⁶) than the American, which has provided its undergraduates with a more general education,⁴⁷ specialization not taking sharp form until the last two years of college and actually only proceeding in considerable depth at the graduate level.⁴⁸

This American concept of a more general education, plus its open-door policy which permits large numbers of high school graduates to obtain further education in junior colleges and community colleges affiliated with higher level institutions, thus invigorating both,⁴⁹ is considered by some thoughtful persons to be

shorter version of this pamphlet is available in Sir Eric Ashby, "Wind of Change" in *African Higher Education*, *Africa Report*, VII (1962), 5-6, 23. See also John Rosselli, "Rickover's Thesis Is Debatable in Britain," *Washington Post*, Sept. 9, 1962, p. E4. Rosselli writes on educational subjects for the *Manchester Guardian*, of which he is deputy London editor. He holds degrees from Swarthmore College and Cambridge University.

46. The head of the Inspectorate of the British Ministry of Education told the British Association for the Advancement of Science that Form VI specialization in the United Kingdom was "shocking" and the approach was "uneducational." The audience was reported as appearing stunned. *New York Times*, Aug. 31, 1962, p. 4.

The case for general education in East Africa has been made in a collection of fourteen talks delivered under the aegis of the Institute of Education, Makerere University College. See C. (sic: A.) Babs Fafunwa, review of *What Is a Man: A Symposium from Makerere*, ed. Eric Lucas, *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 151.

47. One of the most incisive recent discussions of the differences between the European (British) and American systems of higher education is provided in Frank Bowles, "Access to Education—A Global View," *College Board Review*, No. 48 (1962), pp. 7-15.

48. One observer has concluded that the American and British educational approaches are both changing, and in such a way that the respective trends regarding honors courses and specialization are "converging toward what is common ground." Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 278. See also Rosselli, *op. cit.*; Fred M. Hechinger, "Harvard Weighs Course Revision," *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1962, p. 41; "Universities: Rejected One Quarter," *The Economist*, Dec. 1, 1962, p. 897; and "Specialized Study Defended by Pusey," *New York Times*, June 11, 1963, p. 25.

Francis Keppel, U.S. Commissioner of Education, formerly dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Education, a member of the Ashby Commission and of the Provisional Council of Northern Nigeria's Ahmadu Bello University, had this to say on British-American equivalency: "I have no doubt that the British scientific and mathematical education brings a young man faster and deeper into his subject. But when you come to the end of the Ph.D. route, I think they come out the same." Marjorie Hunter, "U.S. Education Chief Backs Rickover's Plea for Scholastic Standards," *New York Times*, April 8, 1963, p. 21.

49. Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 274-278. For a clear description of California's system, see Fred M. Hechinger, "Educationally, State Lives in Future," *New York Times Western Edition*, Jan. 3, 1963, p. 25.

more in tune with the needs of developing African nations.⁵⁰ Sir Eric Ashby has cited land-grant colleges and state universities in the United States as "one of the very few major innovations in the patterns of higher education. . . . indubitably still in the family of universities. . . . still in the mainstream of European tradition."⁵¹ Others stress that the American higher education approach is more adaptive, designed to cater to and profit from the diversity and varying potentialities of individuals⁵² and "to keep large numbers traveling for considerable distance" with selection "progressive and cumulative."⁵³

To turn now to the views of the eleven African academics on certain of the issues raised above, the following question was posed:

QUESTION

Would you favor university college entry at O level, with a four-year course; at M level,⁵⁴ with a three-year course; or at O level, with a five-year course?

50. It has been reported that many of the Tananarive recommendations seemed to point in directions more familiar to American higher education than European, apparently because of a response to African national needs comparable to those of the United States during its developing years. Karl W. Bigelow, "The Tananarive Conference," *Africa Report*, VII (1962), 13. See also UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*, p. 22; UNESCO, *Report of African Ministers of Education Meeting*, 1962, pp. 16, 26; and S. L. Hockey, "Reflections after Visiting the U.S.A.," *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 67-68.

51. Ashby, *op. cit.*, p. 5. See also Nigeria, *Investment in Education*, p. 22.

"The body of custom, convention, and 'reputable' standards exercises such an oppressive effect on creative minds that new developments in a field often originate outside the area of respectable practice. . . . The land-grant colleges, possibly the most impressive innovation in the history of American higher education, did not spring from the inner circle of higher education as it then existed." John W. Gardner, "Renewal in Societies and Men," *Annual Report, Carnegie Corporation of New York*, 1962 (New York [1963]), p. 5.

52. Bigelow, *op. cit.*; Morris, *op. cit.*, p. 274; Henry Steele Commager, "The Emancipation of the College," *Pomona College Bulletin*, LX (1963), 9-21; Charles A. McCoy, "Mounting Crisis in British Education," *AAUP Bulletin*, XLVIII (1962), 268-269.

53. Homer D. Babbidge *et al.*, "Reflections on Educational Issues and Developments in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland" (Washington, D.C.: Africa Liaison Committee, American Council on Education, Aug. 1, 1962), p. 19. The memorandum is a working paper presenting the views of the five-man committee group which, led by the chairman, Dr. C. W. de Kiewiet, visited the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in April, 1962. It discusses on pp. 17-19 the question of British and American standards.

54. M level (Matriculation) is O plus one year. No respondent favored this, which is the University of South Africa's requirement.

REPLIES

No—retain A plus 3	5
Yes—O plus 4	4
Yes—O plus 2 plus 3 ⁵⁵	<u>2</u>
	11

Of the five persons favoring retention of the A plus three years entrance level, three are known to have obtained their degrees from British universities, one obtained degrees from British and American universities, and one is believed to have obtained his degree from a British-related university. Of the four respondents favoring O level plus four years, all had obtained advanced degrees in the United States and at least two also had obtained other degrees from British or Canadian institutions.

Since the future role of Form VI schools is inextricably bound with the level of university entrance, the African academics' views regarding these schools were asked in the following terms:

QUESTION

Should they be kept, and expanded; should they be separated from Form I-IV schools; or should they be abandoned, with work incorporated into the university college?

REPLIES

Retain Form VI schools	1
Retain Form VI schools and expand	5
Abandon Form VI schools	4
Do not have Form VI schools, and do not wish to establish	<u>1</u>
	11

Of the six respondents who advocated retaining Form VI, almost all had obtained their degrees only at British-oriented institutions.⁵⁶ Of the four who favored abandoning Form VI, all had obtained advanced degrees in the United States.

55. The two years in the last category referred, in the case of one respondent, to junior colleges associated with the university.

56. The argument for Form VI as the proper preparation for university study is well presented in the Ashby Commission report: Nigeria, *Investment in Education*, pp. 12-13, 73-79. For more recent Nigerian consideration of this issue, and the view that Form VI work should be organized in separate junior colleges, see J. A. Majasan, letter to the editors, *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 103.

The results for the above two questions indicate a fairly close correlation between types of response and place of higher education. It would appear that, whereas the preference of those African academics who had not been exposed to more than the British system in Africa or elsewhere was for no basic change, those who had studied under both American and British systems—including those in Africa—favored a change.

Because of the effect of the specialized nature of Form VI studies on the degree of specialization at the university level (and vice versa), the sample of Africans was asked whether, if Form VI should be maintained, there should be any revision of curriculum. Of the nine opinions expressed, one person said "no" if Form VI could not be abandoned; and all other eight said "yes." Four of those eight volunteered comments stressing greater applicability to African needs and situations,⁵⁷ and three advocated broader and less specialized Form VI curricula.⁵⁸

The findings bearing on factors affecting the growth of higher education enrolments can now be summarized. A majority of the respondents agreed that development efforts in their countries up to 1980 should be concentrated on existing university institutions instead of additions. But there were some significant dissents, and from this and outside evidence the Tananarive recommendation to limit establishment of other Middle Africa institutions appears

57. This was advocated at the Tananarive Conference. See UNESCO, *Tananarive Conclusions and Recommendations*, pp. 21, 23-24. There, curriculum adaptation is stressed also for the university courses. The latter point has likewise been made, and sharply, in Ashby, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21. It would seem that a compatriot of his held otherwise, that modifications had been extensive under the special relationship system—Sir A. M. Carr-Saunders, *New Universities Overseas* (London, 1961), pp. 128-130. On the other hand, the president of the East African Academy of Sciences has attributed the problem to the existence of the special relationships and has maintained that "the sooner these . . . are abandoned, the better." N. C. Otieno, "Current Problems in the Education of an African Scientist" (paper read at the First International Congress of Africanists, Dec. 11-18, 1962, University of Ghana), p. 6. Another speaker at the congress meetings who called for drastic review of the curriculum was A. Babs Fafunwa, "African Education and Social Dynamics," p. 2. The view that new American science courses are made to order for the less-advanced nations, but university entrance requirements there will militate against adoption of them, is presented in Hockey, *op. cit.* p. 67; and in "Physics without Assertions: The P.S.S.C. Course," *Times Educational Supplement*, Dec. 14, 1962, p. 788. For the experience in one African country, see J. H. Gay, "Modern Mathematics—A Liberian Approach," *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 59-61.

58. There was no correlation between respondents' differing reasons for curricula revisions and their place of academic training.

to be both unrealistic as well as perhaps unrepresentative of much influential *African* opinion.⁵⁹

A good majority agreed that a minimum university institution enrolment of five thousand was a sensible goal. Similar or even more decisive approval was expressed of two other Tananarive recommendations—that the output of all post-secondary institutions should be in the proportion of three non-degree students to one degree student; and that 60 per cent of such students should be enrolled in scientific and technological courses and 40 per cent in arts courses, with the 60 per cent being given a good proportion of non-scientific-technical education.

Views on ways to expand African university enrolments were diverse, reflecting varying African situations, with only one recommended course of action standing out—expansion of secondary school facilities. A definite majority favored changes in the university entrance requirements and/or the examination on which they are based; and it is perhaps significant that the minority of four who advocated no change came from institutions that had no special relationship with British universities.

A good plurality of respondents favored retention of the A level entrance plus three university years, whereas an appreciable minority favored O level entry plus four years. Correlation with respondents' own university backgrounds indicated an interesting split, with those educated solely at British-oriented institutions favoring the former, those from American institutions the latter. The same general distribution of replies and the same correlation with source of degrees was evident in the answers where a majority favored retaining the two-year Form VI secondary schools, and an appreciable minority advocated abandoning them. However, a decisive majority felt the Form VI curricula required revision, either to meet African needs or to lessen specialization.

59. Specifically open to question is the statement referring to this Tananarive recommendation as an "outstanding and far-reaching agreement. . . . hailed by all present" made by a UNESCO Department of Education official. See William H. Welling, "The Tananarive Conference on the Development of Higher Education in Africa," *UNESCO Chronicle*, VIII (1962), 386.

VI. Teachers for Secondary Schools

In the preceding discussion, it was mentioned that of the ways suggested for expanding university enrolments the only recommended course of action which stood out was expansion of secondary school facilities. Shortage of teachers at this level has long been recognized as a major impediment to secondary school expansion, and the answers to several questions posed concerning the problem will be summarized.

Ten out of ten respondents indicated that the shortage of secondary school teachers represented a crucial bottleneck and agreed an increase in teachers should be assigned the highest priority. There was less decisive consensus on the desirable incentives to augment the supply of African teachers, but the weight of opinion leaned definitely toward salaries, fringe benefits, and promotion provisions comparable to regular civil service personnel and toward payment of teachers' salaries during graduate training. There was only a minority in favor of special overseas scholarships for prospective secondary school teachers.

A plurality of respondents, who had obtained degrees in the United States, or from American- and British-oriented institutions, felt a bachelor of education university course was desirable. The other replies were varied, according to different countries' situations, as was the case with the answers to the question whether university college training of teachers should be stepped up.

The nine persons with whom the matter was discussed indicated priority should be given to training African secondary school teachers over providing expatriates. And in ways of recruiting expatriate teachers, the order of preference was, first, for the Teachers for East Africa type of program; second, for the private contract, direct hire approach; and third, for these two approaches plus supply by the Peace Corps.⁶⁰

60. For a balanced appraisal of the Peace Corps teachers in the country where their training has probably been best planned and executed, see I. Espie, "The Peace Corps in Nigeria," *West African Journal of Education*, VI (1962), 53-55.

VII. University Relationships with Other Bodies

Nine of the persons interviewed were asked what the relationship, if any, should be between university institutions in their countries and (a) other post-secondary institutions and (b) national research councils. In both cases there was strong sentiment that these relationships should be close, and about half of the replies included suggestions for the nature or structure of the relationship.

VIII. Priorities for Different Educational-Level Development

There was opportunity at the end of nine of the eleven interviews to ask what the priorities should be in the respondents' countries for expansion of present educational facilities at the following levels: primary, secondary, university college, other post-secondary.

The replies produced no marked consensus, thus reflecting varied needs of the respondents' countries and evidently personal views to some extent. The general preference, considering the different first, second, third, and fourth priority orderings, was in favor of secondary education expansion, followed by primary, other post-secondary, and university-level expansion. One point stands out, however. *None* of the nine accorded first priority to expansion of present university college facilities. The replies speak well for the breadth and balance of view of the respondent sample, composed as it was of African academics who, as anyone else, understandably feel a vested interest in the greatest possible advancement of the institutions with which they are associated.⁶¹

61. The answers to this question, and in general to the other questions, indicate that the African academics were not unaware of what was financially feasible, and that individually their conceptions of priorities for meeting educational needs were in fact defined fairly clearly in their minds. The conclusion to be drawn is that

This is perhaps a fitting note on which to end the main presentation of the study's findings.

IX. Conclusions

The more significant conclusions are summarized below:

1. The stresses and strains experienced by African educational development, due to the magnitude and complexity of the problem, have been unusually acute.

2. There has been a gap in our knowledge; we should know more about the thinking of certain actual and potential African education leaders on higher education development issues. This small pilot-type survey represents a start, but more systematic studies—with broader samplings—are in order if Americans wish to respond effectively in their programs of assistance.

3. The staffing of African universities is considered the most crucial higher education priority, and within this, training of African staff abroad.

4. Overseas scholarships for Africans for courses of study not available locally should be very closely tied to the particular manpower needs of each African country.

5. Change in university entrance requirements and/or the examinations on which they are based and change in Form VI curriculum were fairly decisively supported by the sample of African academics as ways to expand university enrolments better to meet manpower needs. However, there was not even a plurality in favor of specific alternatives to existing entrance levels, or in favor of change in the role of Form VI. It appears that education at solely British-oriented institutions is quite closely correlated with a lesser advocacy of change, whereas African academics educated at both British-oriented and American institutions exhibit a greater conviction in favor of change.

6. The shortage of secondary school teachers represents a criti-

contrary to the opinions of some observers, there are Africans in responsible positions who know what they want for their countries and whose judgments are commendably realistic.

cal bottleneck in expanding this level of education to increase the flow of students into the university colleges. The problem warrants top priority programs, especially to increase the supply of African secondary school teachers.

7. African universities' relationships with other post-secondary institutions and with national research councils should be close.

8. As with a number of other issues, views on the appropriate order of priorities for expansion of facilities at the different educational levels reflect the varied needs of the countries, but facilities at one or more of the levels other than the highest are considered to deserve preferential attention.

British and French Education in Africa: A Critical Appraisal

L. Gray Cowan

I. The Colonial Educational Systems

Prerequisite to any evaluation of the educational legacy left by both Britain and France in West Africa must be an examination of the objectives underlying the educational systems that they introduced into their colonies. In contrasting the two theories of colonial administration in Africa, it is a commonplace to point out that the British theory was based on an eventual aim of self-government and the French upon the ultimate aim of assimilation to metropolitan France. But, as Brewster Smith has quite correctly pointed out,¹ the usual distinction between the aims of autonomy and assimilation in the two systems breaks down at the level of secondary school and higher education. There is no doubt that at these levels, the educational structures were faithful replicas of the curricula and institutions existing in each mother country, although the French system was much more thorough in its total transfer of French culture. This is, of course, hardly surprising; whatever may have been the theoretical objectives of colonial policy, the two systems attempted to give the Africans that body of knowledge, both technical and humanistic, which the European powers believed was responsible for their advancement toward a higher civilization. In the initial stages of colonialism, one could not expect the Western European powers to pay attention to the problem of the adaptation of Western educational systems to the

1. See above, p. 64.

African countries. They were, after all, not seeking to create an African educational system, but rather to bring to Africa the systems they knew best—their own. Their goals were to raise the living standards of the African and to bring him into contact with the modern world; to do this, Western education was needed immediately.

Despite the fact that both the British and French higher educational systems in the West African colonies manifested similar general objectives and large elements of assimilationist policy, the two systems remained clearly distinct regarding the ultimate relationship of the colonies to the mother countries. The theme, sometimes explicit, but always implicit, of eventual self-government runs through the history of British educational policy in West Africa. One of the major goals of the educational system was to create a group of African civil servants who could operate an administration, albeit along the lines of the British model, and at the same time be concerned with adapting and changing African society to the new requirements of modern technological life. Even as early as 1925, in a colonial office memorandum on educational policy, the point was made that education should aim at the conservation of African society and its adaptation to the modern world insofar as this was possible. The emphasis was on bringing about change in African society not by uprooting tradition but by encouraging the co-operation of the community itself, which would, under the proper guidance, initiate change leading to a modern social and economic structure. The emphasis was on the new inspiration that would result from the education of an African leadership that possessed the training and the various skills necessary for self-government.

Ultimately, however, the theoretical conceptions of the educational process in British Africa, exemplary though they were, ran head on into the same difficulties encountered by their administrative policy of indirect rule. At one end of the governmental structure, the educational system was designed to produce an educated elite that would form the core of an autonomous national administration. At the other end, a deliberate effort was made on the local government level to avoid creating such an educated elite

since this would have the effect of undermining the authority of the traditional chiefs who formed the basis of the native authority system. It was clearly contradictory to attempt to construct at one level of government a modern administration based on educational achievement and at the same time try to preserve at another level the traditional rulers, who saw in the young educated class the greatest threat to indigenous authority. Education became in itself a political force that could not be confined in its effects to only one part of the colonial administration. As Helen Kitchen points out, eventually "full acceptance of the political results that education had wrought came only when these new Africans, with their determination to change the whole structure of both tribal and colonial authority, had become too powerful a genie to put back in the bottle."² The new African leadership was well aware that Western education was producing a fundamental cultural change, whether or not this was the intention of the colonial educational system. Nationalism and the growth of the desire for independence were the real fruits of the colonial educational legacy.

In its political objectives, French educational theory and practice in the colonies did not suffer from the dichotomy that existed in English-speaking Africa. From its inception at the beginning of the twentieth century, French colonial educational policy never lost sight of the ultimate goal: the creation of a political and professional elite of a very high intellectual quality that would be identified as closely as possible with the French cultural image. The system established in French West Africa by Governor General Roume in 1903 survived until 1944, with only minor modifications. For the handful of students who were permitted to become part of the educational system, the program was a replica of that in France. The fact that the French system might not always be suitable to African conditions was regarded as largely irrelevant; the goal was to create a French-African elite who would adapt African societies to the French model.

2. Helen Kitchen (ed.), *The Educated African* (New York, 1962), pp. 4-5. For additional literature on this topic, see George H. T. Kimble, *Tropical Africa*, Vol. II (New York, 1960); Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa* (Stanford, 1960), chap. xviii; and Sir Eric Ashby, "Wind of Change" in African Higher Education, *Africa Report*, VII (1962), 5-6.

Subsidiary to the goal of creating a French-speaking African elite who would be the governing class was, of course, the spread of mass education and the consequent improvement of mass standards of living. In practice, however, mass education was no more possible in French-speaking Africa than it was in English-speaking Africa. The social structure of colonial society, limited financial resources, and poor population concentration prevented the spread in both areas of free, compulsory primary instruction. The emphasis throughout the system was on maintaining standards equivalent to those in France in the teaching of French language and culture. To do this properly required the use of considerable numbers of expatriate teachers and, unlike the British system, no teaching in the vernacular. In consequence, the level of instruction in French for the few who were able to benefit from the system was on the whole higher than the level of English instruction in British Africa. Since mass education by expatriates would have been prohibitively costly, the decision was made to sacrifice quantity to quality.

By 1944, it was evident that the maintenance of these artificially high standards seriously impeded the production of technically trained African administrative cadres. At the Brazzaville Conference in that year, the question that was to plague the French educational system until the period of independence was raised: should the emphasis be shifted from a selective secondary school system and an even more rigidly selective higher educational system to one that placed more emphasis on primary education and greater numbers in the secondary schools, even at the cost of somewhat lower standards? In the post-World War II era, there was general agreement among French colonial educational administrators that a much wider emphasis on primary schools was necessary. But the practical problems of extending the primary school system and continued adherence to the concept of creating a highly educated elite produced less than the desired upswing in the provision of primary schools. No attempt was ever made to introduce the vernacular in primary school instruction. It was argued that French was the only suitable vehicle for imparting the necessary knowledge of French culture, that there were too many ver-

vernaculars, and that it would be too expensive to train staff and to print books in these languages. Moreover, the vernaculars were unsuitable for technical training, and only a thorough knowledge of French would permit the primary school student to continue with secondary or higher education.

In view of French assimilationist theory, it is not surprising that little attempt was made in French Africa to adapt the educational curriculum at any level to African needs and conditions. In defense of both the British and French administrators in the educational systems, however, it should be added that the educated African was the strongest proponent of retaining the European curriculum. Any adaptation of the school curricula to meet African needs or requirements was regarded by the African as a sign that he was not capable of learning what the European learned and a further indication of his subordination as a colonial subject. Although the African student may have resented learning "our ancestors, the Gauls, had blue eyes and fair hair," he wanted, nevertheless, to be reassured that the quality of education he was receiving was identical with that of the metropolitan Frenchman whose culture he was absorbing.

The question of the maintenance of standards became confused in both systems with the need for identification with a European curriculum. As a result, in the establishment of both secondary and higher education curricula, the relevance of the African tradition to educational needs was never raised as a question for serious discussion. Instead, the colonial administration concentrated on producing as close a duplicate of Cambridge or Paris as was possible within the African territories.

In both systems heavy emphasis was placed on the literary and humanistic content of the curriculum rather than on technical and vocational subjects that, in the face of the pressing need for industrial development in Africa, would have opened the door to new careers for many Africans. Africans saw in education the way to successful emulation of the Europeans they knew best—those who worked in the colonial administration. The role of the educated European, as the Africans saw it, was to supervise the less educated in their work. It followed then that the achievement of

education meant release from the necessity of manual labor; by extension, the technical tasks of the engineer and the surveyor were placed in the same category. The African observed only too clearly that the status of the European technician in the colonial social hierarchy was lower than that of the administrator who worked with his head, not his hands. The emphasis in the curricula on the humanistic subjects, which produced lawyers and some teachers, was approved by the African, but it neglected the production of technically trained manpower necessary for the economic progress that was expected to follow independence.

For a period of nearly forty years, the French educational system in Africa sought to produce an educated elite that would be a bridge between the colonial administration and the uneducated mass of Africans. This had, for the newly independent states of French Africa, both positive and negative consequences. There is no doubt that the spread of nationalism in French-speaking Africa was made easier because the political leaders in the eight territories of French West Africa and the four territories of French Equatorial Africa had a common educational background, at least at the secondary school level, and consequently a common cultural background and political vocabulary. Because secondary education was available at relatively few centers, many of the present generation of French African leaders were school-fellows together, particularly at the famous William Ponty school near Dakar. Friendships made during their school years permitted the leaders of the different French territories to join in the common political cause of nationalism more easily than was the case in Nigeria.

The negative result of the French emphasis on an educated elite was that it created an intellectual class that very rapidly lost touch with the mass of the people—a touch which is only today being regained. So successful was the French program of educational assimilation that the African it produced often felt much closer culturally and spiritually to the French colonial administrator than he did to his own people. A member of this educated elite felt that his place was not in a bush village, but in the administration at the territorial capital. Here his contacts were with the metropolitan Frenchman himself, or with his educated fellow civil

servants. Consequently, the system produced precisely the reverse of its intended objective. The members of the educated elite took refuge in the towns; they were not a bridge but a barrier between the administration and the people.

French educational policy was designed to draw all those who benefited from educational opportunities closer to France. The curricula and standards of education were those of France throughout all of French-speaking Africa. Centralized educational control and more clearly defined goals resulted in more uniform standards than were found in the pragmatic educational policies of the British colonies, which were shaped in large part by the financial capabilities of the individual colonial administrations. Decentralized educational control in the British colonies, even to the point of creating local educational authorities, meant that although the standards might not always be uniform there was a greater sense of local autonomy in educational policy and a sense of indirect guidance, not direct management, by the colonial administration. The uniformity of assimilationist educational policy imposed by the French has had, as Immanuel Wallerstein points out, an important bearing on post-independence French-speaking Africa.³ The reaction of French-speaking Africans has been a much greater assertion of *négritude* than that by English-speaking Africans, laying stress on those aspects of the cultural background which differentiate and distinguish Africans from Europeans. The respect shown in English-speaking Africa for traditional African culture, resulting from the concept of indirect rule, lessened the need of the intellectuals to demonstrate a genuine break with the culture of the former colonial power.

Because both educational systems were so far divorced at the higher levels from the daily life of the African, all too frequently the goal in seeking education was not cultural enrichment but economic advancement. Achievement of the baccalaureate or of the Sixth Form Certificate opened the door to higher education or to positions of prestige within the administration. The content of the curriculum prescribed for the achievement of these distinctions was often little understood and little appreciated, and the

3. *Africa, The Politics of Independence* (New York, 1961), pp. 63 ff.

psychology of learning by memory and by rote in order to pass examinations rather than for comprehension was deeply ingrained in generations of young African students. The colonial educational systems broke sharply with traditional African methods of education, which primarily emphasized oral tradition and the imparting of knowledge by demonstration. As one commentator recently has pointed out:

Western education was thought of as something altogether different. It owed much of its prestige and its attraction to the fact that it dealt with subjects which were strange and new and foreign and which didn't have much application to everyday life. In many subjects the classroom method was as far removed from the traditional methods as possible and the emphasis both in subject matter and educational method, partly by choice and partly by accident, was such as to associate education with literacy, with the accuracy of factual knowledge and with an understanding of the abstract and the remote.⁴

Today, the new methods of curriculum development and teaching being created by the education departments of the African governments show strong emphasis on oral practice and on the practical application of the learning process to everyday African needs.

Limitations both of finance and personnel led the colonial powers to establish educational facilities first and most frequently in those colonies where there was the greatest concentration of population and where the African demand for education was strongest. Since the majority of the early schools were established under missionary auspices, they were created first among those African peoples who were most receptive to the concomitant evangelistic work of the missions. Over the years, the work of these mission schools was supported by the colonial administrations. As a result, the Moslem areas in both French- and English-speaking Africa, because they were relatively untouched by the work of the missions, lagged far behind the coastal areas in educational achievement. The imbalance in the rate of education thus created raises serious political problems for countries such as Nigeria, where the Moslems in the North resent the rapid economic progress of the South. For this reason, *inter alia*, Chad, Upper Volta, and Niger

4. *West Africa*, Feb. 9, 1963, p. 155.

have not reached the same stage of development as the coastal countries in French-speaking Africa and likewise have tended to react against the economic advantages that more widespread education has given to the coastal areas.

If there were a regional imbalance in the spread of education in West Africa in the past, there has emerged in recent years an even more serious imbalance between the slow rate of economic development and the rapid progress of education at the primary school level. The "school leavers" problem, as it is known in West Africa, provides one of the most serious threats to political and social stability faced by the new African states. In Nigeria and to some extent in Ghana, where this problem is most acute in the English-speaking countries, signs of unrest stemming from the dissatisfaction of the school leavers already have appeared. In part the school leavers problem is one of overproduction in relation to demand. The evident need for a broader educational base prompted a great deal of emphasis in the years immediately preceding independence on the training of primary school pupils to assume junior posts in an expanding civil service and future industrial and commercial jobs. In taking this course the regional governments were, of course, also responding to the pressing demands of Nigerians for more education. Facilities at the primary school level were increased by building new schools in all three regions of Nigeria. Although somewhat less expansion took place at the secondary level, it became necessary to call on outside organizations such as the Afro-Anglo-American Program, the Peace Corps, and the African-American Institute to supply the needed teaching personnel for the new secondary schools and to replace the Nigerian teachers lured away by more lucrative and prestigious posts in government.

Unfortunately, from the point of view of the primary school leaver, the needs of the civil service at the junior levels were filled more rapidly than anticipated. Government, on the other hand, did not have sufficiently comprehensive plans for industrial development nor the available capital to create the industrial jobs that the school leavers could fill. Even if more jobs had been available, there were too few trade schools in which the necessary technical

skills for industry could be acquired, and industry itself provided little opportunity for on-the-job training. As a result, the primary school leaver was faced with the alternative of returning to agriculture in his home village or of seeking help from members of his extended family who had settled in the city and who might be able to find a job for him.

The first of these alternatives was rejected out of hand by the vast majority; the psychology borne of the prestige value attaching to education during the colonial period carried over into independence. For many of the school leavers, to have returned to their villages would have been an admission of defeat. Instead, they preferred to go to the cities where, despite the precarious existence they might have to lead, they nevertheless were in closer proximity to the kind of opportunity that they felt their education entitled them. Since many of them exist on the charity of relatives, they are embittered by the feeling that the government has not lived up to the promises of independence. Today these young men constitute a dissatisfied element in Nigerian society that is increasingly responsive to the enticements of a radical leadership which promises them that they will, in the new society to be created by the overturn of the present government, be able to achieve the social importance and the economic security to which their education entitles them. A few are beginning to realize that they must create new opportunities for themselves without depending on government assistance, and a small minority have indicated, particularly in Eastern Nigeria, that they are prepared to return to the land provided they are given training in specialized agricultural techniques that give promise of providing them with a reasonably rapid rise in living standard.

The problem of the school leavers is most severe in southern Nigeria and in Ghana; Northern Nigeria and most of the French-speaking territories have not yet reached the point where the surplus of primary school graduates is acute. An exception to this generalization is Dahomey, where relatively little industrialization has taken place in comparison to the neighboring countries and where four-fifths of the population still depend on agriculture for a living. Government service provides the only outlet for the young

man with even a minimum degree of education. During the period of French colonial rule, Dahomey was an exporter of talent for the government services of the seven other territories of French West Africa. Since independence, Dahomeans have been replaced in the other territories by citizens of the new countries seeking positions in their own civil service. The trained Dahomeans have returned home and have been added to the continuing flow of young men coming from the secondary schools. No further opportunities exist in the Dahomean government service, since almost 80 per cent of the national budget is already consumed in government salaries.

The Dahomean school leavers are faced with an even more serious problem than those of Nigeria. The resources of the country give little promise of any large-scale development of industrial opportunities. The obvious solution in Dahomey, as elsewhere in Africa, is to try to persuade the young men to return to agriculture as a means of livelihood and to train the children now in school in such a way that farming or the work of the artisan is regarded as having sufficient prestige in the community to make the occupations attractive. The French and British educational systems taught, by implication, that to have education was to be among those who ruled; it will take a generation or more to eradicate from the minds of the young Africans the conception that education in and of itself entitles the individual to distinctive treatment within the society. Thus far, the government of Dahomey has been singularly unsuccessful in its attempts to convince young men that it is possible to earn a reasonable living on the land. Technically trained artisans in Dahomey and elsewhere in French-speaking Africa refuse to pursue their trades in the village but move to the urban areas in the hope of eventual employment in government in an administrative capacity.

The failure of the colonial educational systems in both British- and French-speaking Africa to create respect within the community for technical training was perhaps their most serious shortcoming. In the circumstances of the colonial relationship, this failure is perhaps understandable but one that will nevertheless have far-reaching consequences for the new African states. Until,

and unless, their governments can create new opportunities in industry and new incentives in agriculture, the plight of the unwanted school leavers will continue to grow more desperate.

It is possible to foresee today in West Africa the onset of the even graver problem of the unemployed secondary school or university graduate, which has been so common in India over the past few years. Interviewing members of the graduating class at a Nigerian university on a recent visit there, I was impressed by the pessimism in their evaluation of career opportunities. They saw many of the roads to positions in government and the liberal professions closed to them, and, at the same time, were aware that the number of positions in industry lagged behind the supply of graduates. As elsewhere in the world, secondary school teaching apparently held little enticement for them, except as a temporary position while looking for a more lucrative post in government or in politics. The independent governments of Africa are just now learning the bitter lesson that the colonial administrations were never required to teach. Regardless of popular demand, educational planning must be part and parcel of the over-all plan for economic development and for the rational use of manpower. The colonial administrations were successful in creating an educated elite that would replace them upon their departure, but they failed to lay the foundations for the economic structure into which mass education could be integrated. There is no doubt that in the African states today skilled and semi-skilled manpower is needed, but this need must be seen in relation to a realistic rate of industrial progress. Without this, education, instead of being a stabilizing force in Africa, may be a force creating a long period of chronic instability.

II. Changes in the Educational Systems Since Independence

In most West African countries, the new governments were aware, at independence, of the deficiencies as well as the advantages of the colonial educational systems. Many of the problems

already had been indicated by officials of the colonial education administration long before independence. As early as 1954, for example, an education officer, J. R. Bunting, had pointed out that public opinion must be educated and helped to understand that our sole aim is not to produce generation after generation of Cambridge Certificate holders who believe that possession of this Certificate entitles them to think that the world owes them a living.⁵ The educational systems in both French- and English-speaking Africa were short of teachers, both in quality and in quantity. In part, this was a result of the lack of facilities for the preparation of teachers, but even the existing facilities were not fully utilized, since many of their products left the teaching profession for other posts. In Ghana, for example, over 4,800 teachers left the profession in the period 1951-1962. African officials of the ministries of education realized that many African primary school teachers were not properly qualified for the positions they held. Even as late as 1959, only 680 of the 22,000 members of the teaching profession had university degrees; in 1962, it was said that the members of the Peace Corps teaching in the secondary schools made up almost 50 per cent of the secondary school teachers holding university degrees.

Although it is easy to emphasize the failures of the colonial educational systems, their accomplishments were by no means inconsiderable. In Nigeria, by the time the British administration departed in 1960, some two and one-half million Nigerian children were accommodated in 17,000 primary schools. In 550 secondary and vocational schools, 90,000 students were being taught, with 22,000 teachers being trained in 300 teacher-training centers. In higher education, 1,250 students were enrolled at the University in Ibadan, and another 1,025 were in the three branches of the Nigerian College of Arts, Science, and Technology. Although comparable totals for the French-speaking countries were somewhat lower, French expenditures on education after 1956, particularly through FIDES (Fonds d'Investissement et de Développement Economique et Social), amounted annually to a very substantial

5. "Tradition and Innovation in Secondary Education," *West African Journal of Education*, V (1961), 43.

part of the French contribution to the budgets of each of the territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa. The success of the colonial educational services in developing a sound foundation for the African educational system in the light of the limited budgets was frequently minimized by the independent governments which were forced to yield to the popular pressures for the immediate expansion of the educational structure.

To meet public demand, the new governments began to devote large portions of their income to education and turned the full attention of the available educational specialists to the problems of curriculum revision and to the spread of educational opportunities. In Nigeria, a six-year educational plan of development was devised, following the Ashby Commission Report, in which some \$81,800,000 was to be spent during the life of the plan.⁶ Three-fifths of the federal expenditure on education was earmarked for higher education, including assistance to the University of Ibadan, establishment of a new University of Lagos, and in the case of the regional governments, expansion of existing higher education facilities. In its planning, however, the Nigerian government has shown signs that it is aware that insofar as possible, educational planning must be tied to the determination of Nigeria's future manpower needs. Similar plans have been made in Ghana and in the French-speaking countries, several of which have allocated educational expenditures in line with the results of manpower surveys.

A start has been made in Ghana and Nigeria on curriculum revision that will place special emphasis on the training of technical manpower: engineers, scientists, and economists. At the lower levels, the curriculum is being adapted to African needs and background through the adoption of textbooks and subject matter specifically designed for the needs of children growing up in an African society. New teaching methods have been eagerly sought particularly in the fields of higher education that deal with technological specialization. An attempt has been made to break away from the British university structure with the adaptation in

6. *Investment in Education, The Report of the Commission on Post-School Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria* (Lagos, 1960).

the new University of Nigeria at Nsukka of the American land-grant college system. The ultimate success of this type of adaptation is still unknown, but the greater flexibility in the courses made possible under the Nsukka system has not in itself resulted in any serious lowering of academic standards. Similar plans have been advanced for the adaptation of the engineering curricula which have hitherto been based on the British example to contemporary Nigerian needs. The governments have been particularly anxious to make available to engineering students the advances in theory and technique that have not yet become part of the British engineering education.

The changes both in the style of student living and in the curricula have not been made in the Nigerian universities without objections, both from the student body and the expatriate and Nigerian faculty. The introduction of the somewhat less comfortable American-style dormitories rather than the overelaborate accommodations and services originally offered to Nigerian and Ghanaian students in the British-modeled universities has been particularly resented, but the governments have not hesitated to make clear their determination to lower individual student costs in order to be able to provide opportunities for greater numbers.

It has been even more difficult to make changes in the educational system at all levels in the French-speaking countries than in Ghana or Nigeria. A larger percentage of the teaching staff at the secondary and university levels in French Africa has remained French. The metropolitan teachers have bitterly resented the introduction of teaching methods or subject matter that in any way differentiates the African secondary schools from those in metropolitan France. The universities in French-speaking Africa have not only continued to adhere to French curricula but are, in fact, entirely managed by the Ministry of Education in France, which contributes substantially to their operating budgets, and selects faculty members and pays their salaries. There appears to have been virtually no effort on the part of French-speaking universities to break off the relationship with the metropolitan educational system, a contrast to the English-speaking West African univer-

sities that have been given the power to grant degrees in their own right.

Under these circumstances, then, it is not surprising that the only major changes in a French-oriented educational system have taken place in Guinea, where French assistance to, and influence upon, the educational structure ceased abruptly in September, 1958. At independence the leaders of the Guinean political party were faced with the immediate task of preventing a total breakdown in education after the departure of the metropolitan French teachers. Since the process of Africanization of the teaching corps in Guinea would be slow, immediate assistance was sought from abroad to fill in the gap. Teachers from the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and a few from France who were in sympathy with the aims of the PDG (*Parti Democratique de Guinée*) were immediately recruited. Many of these teachers will remain in Guinea for some years, since it cannot be expected that the secondary schools will be entirely staffed by Guineans within the immediate future. The wholesale introduction of non-French expatriate teachers, who, although competent in subject matter were not always completely fluent in French, and the promotion of unqualified primary school teachers to fill vacant secondary school teaching positions caused one of the most serious reactions to the authority of the party that Guinea has witnessed since independence. Leaders of the Teachers Union, who resented the status given to these unqualified teachers, strongly criticized the actions of the party. In November, 1961, the leaders of the Union were accused of plotting against the life of the president and against the security of the state; several were arrested and others fled the country. Within a few weeks, the Teachers Union had been severely disciplined by the party and had declared its renewed allegiance to the party goals. However, the reaction of the teachers illustrated to the party how deeply ingrained were the habits established in the teaching profession during the colonial administration. The government has since proceeded somewhat more slowly with educational reorganization.

The government's aims were to adapt the entire educational system to African needs and to the African cultural background. This adaptation involved the inclusion in the curriculum of a form of modern humanism, as it was called, which would substitute universal history, literature broadly envisaged, and science for the classical humanist tradition, which was the basis of French education. In practical terms, this meant the adoption of textbooks dealing with African history written by Africans, often with a Marxist overtone, the introduction of the works of contemporary French African writers into literature courses, and the adoption of English and Arabic as the two primary foreign languages to be taught in the schools. The objectives of the educational system were to inculcate a sense of national and party loyalty into the Guinean students as well as to fit them for modern life. To this end, special classes were introduced in the schools and taught by higher civil servants and leaders of the party. They included such subjects as the role of the PDG in Guinean life, the structure of Guinean government and administration, the place of the trade unions and the youth groups within the party, and problems in national economic and foreign policy.

Since, by the end of 1961, existing schools could accommodate only 33 per cent of the school-age population, the party decreed that in order to speed mass education the number of years spent in the educational cycle would be sharply reduced in comparison with that under the French system. Plans for universal literacy were established, and adult education centers operated by the local party committees with members of the party youth groups as instructors were opened. To facilitate literacy in the largely non-French speaking rural population, efforts have been made to reduce the predominant vernacular languages, Foulah, Soussou, and Malinké, to a Latin script. No higher educational facilities existed in Guinea during the period of French administration, but after independence plans were prepared for a higher technical institute to be built largely with Russian assistance. One commentator summed up the new Guinean educational goals in these words:

The West will now cease to be the center of the world, and Asia will be given a privileged place. The great revolutions of the twentieth century, Soviet and Chinese, prudently skated over in the old programs, will receive the full attention which they deserve and priority will be given to the story of the civilizations of Negro Africa.⁷

Up to the present time, the Guinean educational planners have, probably inevitably, fallen short of their goals. The new plans were evolved too quickly and often without sufficient forethought, and a period of years will be required to iron out the pedagogical problems they have created. Recruitment of foreign secondary school teachers has lagged, and the progress of the students has been impeded by the forced closing of schools for temporary periods due to lack of staff. The morale of the teachers has been lowered by a failure of administrative support, inefficiency and confusion at the ministry level, and the too frequent reorganization of teaching assignments. Doubts have been expressed about the maintenance of standards, since Guinean examinations have now been substituted for those of the French state system. There are indications that the results of the examinations in the first years of operation of the new system have been somewhat disappointing. Despite these initial problems, however, the Guinean experiment is being watched anxiously by the governments of other French-speaking African states, and if it shows signs of succeeding in the forthcoming years, it may be expected that other states will seek to adapt the Guinean model to their own needs. To do so successfully, however, will require the same kind of control over all levels of society that the PDG in Guinea now exercises. It is questionable whether the parties in other states will be able to create the same degree of enthusiasm for educational experimentation that has thus far been evident in Guinea.

The other countries which were part of French West Africa have made substantial changes in their educational curricula since independence, but none has undertaken so radical a revision of the educational structure. The major curriculum changes intro-

7. David Mendessi Diop, "About the Educational Reform in Guinea," *Presence Africaine*, No. 29, English No. 1 (1960), p. 34.

duced in the Ivory Coast involve the Africanization of the courses in geography and history. French remains the medium of instruction at all levels, although greater emphasis is being placed on the teaching of English, particularly conversational English. New and very effective textbooks making use of illustrations from African life, but written largely by expatriates, are being used at the primary school level.

Deviation from the French curriculum has been more difficult in secondary and higher education in the Ivory Coast, since the large majority of secondary school teachers is from metropolitan France. Except for twenty-five Peace Corps volunteers, who are engaged as secondary school teachers, the staff of the *lycées* and other secondary institutions is detached from the French educational service but is, in fact, remunerated by France under terms of the technical assistance agreement with the Ivory Coast. The new university at Abidjan, which is getting under way very slowly, will conform largely to the French pattern, as does the university at Dakar; the major change will be to attach the schools of engineering to the university, an innovation representing a departure from the customary French form of independent technical institutions.

The chief center of higher learning in former French West Africa is the University of Dakar, which began with the establishment of a medical school in 1918. Today, the university includes most of the normal faculties to be found in a French university. Over the protests of President Senghor, Dakar University remains completely under French financial and administrative control. The Senegalese government has been concerned with the education of the rural masses, and classes are being organized in elementary literacy under the aegis of the Animation Rurale.⁸ Despite the long contact with French education, it is an indication of the emphasis placed by the colonial administration on the education of an elite that even as late as 1960 only 10 per cent of the population of Senegal over the age of forty could read and write. As is the case in other West African countries, the Senegalese government is having great difficulty in persuading those trained as teachers to

8. Animation Rurale is an adult education program for rural areas.

remain in the profession—so much so that it was recently announced by the Ministry of Education that an additional 20 per cent in salary would be paid to teachers who turned down offers of civil service posts to remain in the schools.

III. Conclusion

For the relatively small number of Africans who enjoyed the opportunity of education, the advantages of the colonial educational systems were very real. Since they duplicated in curriculum and standards at the higher levels the metropolitan educational structures, they produced a leadership cadre perfectly capable of taking over the administration of government at independence. As Mr. T. O. S. Benson, the Nigerian Minister of Information put it:

We have no fear that the trouble which has overwhelmed our neighbors in the Congo will be repeated in our country. . . . Britain recognized long ago that if you are going to hand over power, you must ensure that those receiving it understand their responsibilities and are trained to assume them.⁹

In training their successors, the administrations of British and French Africa were eminently successful. But in concentrating on producing only the leaders, the colonial administrators conceived the needs of independence far too narrowly. The base of the educational pyramid was much too small, with illiteracy rates unjustifiably large in view of the fifty or more years of colonial rule.¹⁰ Budgetary limitations are only a partial excuse; the funds allocated for the overelaborate university plants might better have been used to expand the foundations of the educational edifice. I am not suggesting here that either the British or French colonial administrations should have gone (even had they been so inclined)

9. Quoted in Kitchen, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

10. It should be added, of course, that strenuous efforts were made in Nigeria, particularly by the autonomous regional governments, to broaden this base after 1955, with the introduction in the Eastern and Western regions of universal primary education. In 1960 there were 1,126,000 children in the Western Region in primary schools. Universal primary education caused, in fact, a serious imbalance in the educational structure in a very short time: by 1960, 76 per cent of the Western Region and 67 per cent of the Eastern Region education budgets were being spent on primary schooling.

to the opposite extreme demonstrated by Belgian educational policy, which devoted the educational budget almost exclusively to primary school training. There is, however, a course midway between the ends of the educational spectrum; unfortunately, neither the British, the French, nor the Belgians ever found this proper mean.

The authoritarian structure of the colonial administrations tended to implant the notion in the African student that education and the right to rule were automatically synonymous. The lack of mass education only served to reinforce the impression of the alliance between education and power. The early political parties originating in the educated elite frequently failed in their appeal because they advocated, almost unconsciously, rule by an educated oligarchy that could dispense with the support of the uneducated mass. The leadership of the successful nationalist parties in Ghana and southern Nigeria was able to overcome the conception of an educated oligarchy by introducing into its ranks men who had not enjoyed the advantages of education but who retained their identification with the mass. The connection between education and authority, born of the colonial experience, has by no means disappeared completely, as the continuing opposition within the university at Legon to the Convention People's Party in Ghana indicates. The nationalist leaders now emphasize that a balanced post-independence development demands mass education so that the masses may not only be made part of the development process but may also understand some of the problems faced by the new government in producing the concrete results they expect from independence.

The herculean efforts of the African governments to expand mass education at the lower levels has raised questions as to the maintenance at the higher levels of the standards so deeply cherished by the present generation of African leaders. But outside critics of the present changes in the educational systems must guard against the tendency to confuse changing standards with lowered standards. Africanization of the curriculum, the adoption of American or other foreign teaching methods, particularly in technical subjects, need not have any detrimental effect on stand-

ards. But for the coming generations of African students entering the educational system, these changes, based upon the sound, if restricted, foundations of colonial education, will make African education ultimately the greatest value to the developing societies of these new countries.

The Role of Education in the Political and Economic Development of Southeast Asia¹

T. H. Silcock

I. Political and Economic Development

First we must clear up a point of terminology. Economic development is clearly a normative concept. We have in view certain objectives such as growth in gross national product per capita, steady growth without large accelerations or decelerations, or a defined rate of growth in national income, and we study the conditions which facilitate or prevent the accomplishment of these objectives. This normative approach is healthy, for in economics we are studying systems of ends and means, and it is not sensible to pretend that we are unconcerned about success or failure,² as we can be about the mating habits of the frog. Political scientists also study things that people do deliberately, but political goals are so diverse that it is much more difficult to define some objective and describe movement toward it as development. It is not

1. Even within the former British colonies of Southeast Asia, education is so complex and has changed so much during the recent phase of nation-building and economic recovery that an attempt to describe the whole area would be impracticable. Malaya has been used as a basis for treatment of some of the common problems of the area, with indications of important differences. The term "Malaya" is here used to refer to the former Federation of Malaya. The term "Malayan" is used to denote a citizen of Malaya, of whatever race. The term "Malay" is used as a cultural and racial term to denote a Muslim who follows Malay custom and habitually uses the Malay language. This is in accord with local usage.

2. It is of course possible to avoid this problem if we can draw a rigid line between means and ends or pretend that we are treating rationality as merely a working hypothesis. This makes it possible to achieve rigor in suitably defined models but does not make economics a science.

uncommon to treat political development as if it were a simple unfolding—the creation of one moment out of the previous one by the interaction of many different purposive efforts, which can and must be viewed critically in relation to the environment, but which cannot be judged by any common criterion or set of criteria.

The aim of this essay is interpretation and judgment, not scientific rigor. Both economic and political development can be judged by different norms, and some of the consequences of inconsistent objectives will be considered; but essentially we shall try to describe and suggest in terms of these accepted goals.

Economically underdeveloped countries³ are so called because they suffer from certain disabilities that their peoples and governments wish to remove. National incomes are low and often very unequally distributed. In Southeast Asian countries, it is a major policy objective to increase national income, if possible, more rapidly than the population is increasing and with greater equality in distribution.⁴ It is obvious that education has a role to play in achieving all these objectives and that in Southeast Asia it is playing this role less well than it might.

In dealing with political development we are plainly concerned with common objectives, but these are difficult to define. Some countries are not yet self-governing; others are new to self-government and need external aid to help them fulfil the essential roles of government. Neither they nor the assisting countries want to continue this external aid, and one policy objective is to eliminate this aid.

In an economic sense, education is a commodity that meets both consumption and investment needs of individuals. There are many indirect subsidies for education—the educated may teach partly from a commitment to educational values; those who pay teachers can influence the next generation through them; cultural and religious groups, and also autonomous universities, often subsidize

3. The increasingly fashionable term "developing countries" should not be used, as it carries a *suggestio falsi*. We might, alternatively, accommodate susceptibilities without falsification by translating the current German term, and calling them "development countries."

4. The author has discussed development aims more fully in T. H. Silcock (ed.), *Readings in Malayan Economics* (Singapore, 1961), I, iv–vii; and T. H. Silcock, *The Commonwealth Economy in Southeast Asia* (Durham, N.C., 1959), chap. v.

education for their own purposes of selection, influence, and training. The state itself both subsidizes and creates demand, often by compulsion. It can do this for political ends, but it may also have an economic objective. Usually the yield from education in terms of national income is high, because individual owners of capital can benefit only from such education as can be given to their own children.

As a form of investment, education diffuses skills and lowers the real income to be derived from any particular skill, but increases the general productivity of labor. Yields on privately financed education will tend to adjust themselves as between different skills (due allowance being made for risk) until they become proportional to costs, except where a particular skill is either demanded or supplied beyond this economic point for non-economic reasons. If the government's aim is to maximize gross national product, it will try to make the yield in income of every marginal unit of investment in education equal, after making due allowance for risks of failure. This normally will mean that it has to subsidize education in order to offset differences of income and also to adjust subsidies to offset non-economic preferences (e.g., the alleged preference of Asian students for a literary education even where more practical types of education would yield more, or the alleged preference of teachers for giving such education). An independent government will favor the development of local skills, while the bias of the colonial one was toward importing them from the ruling country, if this were not too expensive. In addition to this change of emphasis, an independent government also will be interested in policies to manipulate education in favor of a higher national income. It may, however, have political objectives that conflict with such economic objectives.

Generally speaking, the process of economic development will involve (among other things) reduction of the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture.⁵ This involves simultaneously increasing the yield per man in agriculture to provide a surplus and providing opportunities outside agriculture so that the higher

5. H. W. Singer, "The Concept of Balanced Growth in Economic Development—Theory and Practice," *Malayan Economic Review*, III (1958), 1-13.

incomes will not cause unemployment. Commonly, urban and industrial development is capital intensive (uses a relatively high proportion of physical capital), and it is natural for available private capital to be employed in urban and industrial areas. Improving rural productivity is mainly a matter of new skills or research and education. But it is not natural for education to be directed to rural areas. Unsubsidized education will be limited because rural areas are poor and the dispersion of population makes rural education costly.⁶ Moreover, appropriate education in rural areas will demand more prior research into rural ways of life and into conditions of soil, climate, and so forth. Subsidies also will be demanded in the towns, where the desire for change is keener and more articulate. Yet rural education is necessary, both to accelerate the removal of surplus population and to raise productivity so that the surplus population can be fed better than before. This is perhaps the field in which proper machinery for subsidizing research and education is most necessary.⁷

Turning to political development, self-government within the modern system of nation-states certainly requires a self to govern. Accordingly, where there are plural societies with sharply differentiated cultures, some effort to diminish their differences is plainly desirable. Many of these new states are still aspirants to nationhood rather than nations and some of their minorities command international sympathy. Governments' chances of international aid for measures which are harsh to minorities or seriously prejudice economic development are thus limited; yet if these states are to be independent the choice whether they want such aid must rest with their own governments. Government and nation

6. Rural *schools* are not necessarily more expensive than urban ones per pupil taught, but this reflects poor quality and is a result of weak effective demand.

7. Less research is needed to facilitate a movement out of the rural areas than to improve rural productivity. Some social research is needed to insure that it is not only the young and generally efficient who move but those whose real earning power would benefit most by moving, and also to prevent maladjustment and unemployment among those who do move. These are relatively simple problems. The improvement of rural productivity clearly needs more research both into social customs and into agricultural possibilities. A high proportion of the education must be education of adults, and neither content nor method can be standardized very much. See "Some Aspects of Extension Work" in UNESCO, *Social Research and Problems of Rural Development in Southeast Asia*, Technology and Society Series (Paris, 1963).

do not yet coincide, but most of the time the international community has no alternative but to accept (with reservations) the myth that they do.

It is difficult for underdeveloped states to secure acceptance elsewhere for their national objectives, and their attempts to foster national unity through education are likely to seem unnecessary abroad. Yet these attempts are often the only alternatives to conflict and bloodshed. The more disharmony there is to overcome, the more intervention must be accepted. This results from leaving it to largely artificial national states to harmonize conflicting cultural claims. When we think internationally we tend to expect a permissive attitude by governments to education. The international community, which is our natural standard of reference, has neither doubtful boundaries nor responsibilities for action. Our own national states can take an underlying consensus for granted. A mental confusion of the two frames of reference tends to make all preoccupation with cultural adjustments within national boundaries seem more petty and trivial than it actually is in our present world situation.

Education is an important instrument of political development, but we must recognize that the educational process as a whole is never an activity of government alone. Those who hold political power can use it to limit certain kinds of education and encourage other kinds. The greater the required modifications of the culture in the direction of uniformity, the more will certain kinds of educational activities have to be restricted and others subsidized. Yet in several Southeast Asian countries, the minimum change required for political viability is quite considerable, and neither finance nor political power are unlimited.⁸ All the willing co-operation available will usually be needed to achieve maximum results. The several different groups—religious, cultural, economic, and racial—that influence education all interact with one another.⁹ The gov-

8. The limits to the political power of governments in the Southeast Asian area are partly administrative, partly territorial (much of the country is exceptionally difficult to control against determined opposition), and partly external (many of the minorities can obtain outside support if pushed too hard). Of course some of the educational activities of governments can build up or undermine their power in the long run.

9. This aspect is stressed particularly in two reports on Chinese education: Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Mission to Study the Education of Chinese in*

ernment, if it is to create a nation, needs to find methods of harmonizing these different groups, rather than a blueprint for a national culture.

II. Colonial Educational Policy

In the British areas of Southeast Asia, one of the major influences on education, until quite recent times, has been the pathological fear of producing unemployed clerks and intellectuals.¹⁰ Even at the beginning of the twentieth century, when virtually none of the local population had even the equivalent of a normal English secondary school education, fear of the educated native leaving the soil was being expressed.¹¹ It was argued that Malaya was not an industrial country and that opportunities for employment were mainly on the land, that the ambition of every Asian with any intelligence was to keep his hands and clothes clean and dress like a European, and that the number of posts in which this was possible was very limited.¹²

The phrases used are revealing. Clearly the desire of Asians to imitate Europeans was resented, and their competition was feared. They had their place in the scheme of things, which while not explicitly subordinate was vaguely indicated in terms of the economy and of the alleged unwillingness of Asians to use their education in furthering progre

In fact, the desire of Asians for clerkships was not at all irrational. The Asian trained in a trade school or apprenticeship scheme commanded much less of a premium above the earnings of an unskilled man than did the clerk. A Chinese carpenter or mason

Malaya (W. P. Fenn and T. Y. Wu) (Kuala Lumpur, 1951); and Singapore, *Report of the All-Party Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education* (Singapore, 1956).

10. E.g., Federated Malay States, *Annual Report, 1901*. Letter of Transmittal by Sir Frank Swettenham, high commissioner: "It is perhaps not altogether to be deplored that youthful Malaya is not yet in the grip of that education epidemic which has already laid hold of India with such pathetic results."

11. E.g., Perak, *Administration Report, 1900*. Col. R. F. S. Walker, acting resident: "The only thing to fear is that the young Native will desert cultivation for the, to him, more tempting life of a clerk."

12. L. A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London, 1942), p. 352.

trained by traditional methods was a fairly adequate substitute; and although the lack of carpenters and others with Western-style training was deplored, there was not in fact the effective demand for them that there was for clerks. The administration reports refer to many schemes for furthering technical education, even before 1900, most of which failed for lack of applicants.¹³ Plainly no attention was paid to creating an adequate demand for such training by concentrating on fields where the yield to the individual matched that in other fields of education open to him. There were many possibilities, as became apparent later. Broadly, what was necessary was to initiate training that would either substantially reduce costs or make new types of economic activity possible. The most obvious field for the former was in substituting Asian for European labor. For the latter there were possibilities both in import replacement and in export promotion, either of which would have involved some transformation of the economy. Technical education for these goals might create a market for itself by initiating successful competition with foreign products, but more often supplementary steps would be needed to secure a market.¹⁴

There was continuing concern about expanding Malay production of rice or vegetables for the local market;¹⁵ but rice was a subsistence crop, bringing in a cash return totally inadequate to compete with the other crops available¹⁶ unless a radical increase in productivity could be secured with greatly increased land per man.¹⁷ Vegetables were produced by Chinese¹⁸ using highly productive, though hygienically risky, methods with which the Malays had little hope of competing.

13. Federated Malay States, *Administration Report*, 1900. W. H. Treacher, acting resident general, summarizes a technical education report by Mr. Voules, federal inspector of schools.

14. E.g., tariff protection for import replacement, or assistance through provision of power and other facilities; see, Federation of Malaya, *Industrial Development Working Party Report* (Kuala Lumpur, 1957).

15. Federated Malay States, *Administration Report*, 1902. W. H. Treacher, resident general, Section 68; Federated Malay States, *Rice Cultivation Committee Report* (1931); Federation of Malaya, *Rice Production Committee Report* (1953).

16. P. T. Bauer, "Some Aspects of the Malayan Rubber Slump," *Silcock, Readings . . .*, II, iii.

17. Federation of Malaya, *Rice Committee Final Report* (1956).

18. An early account of this cultivation is given in H. J. Simpson and Lau Sing Nam, "Chinese Market Gardening," *Malayan Agricultural Journal*, XXII (1933), 119-124.

The aim of educational policy was allegedly practical and related to the needs of the economy, but it was actually concerned with such pseudo-moral attitudes as teaching the educated Asian a respect for the dignity of manual labor.¹⁹

The fear of Asian competition led to an attempt to produce moral attitudes favorable to European interests, which was naturally resented; yet the automatic response in education was not enough. The economy needed active government measures to foster new economic skills; the training of professionals to take over from the Europeans was going on by spontaneous imitation, though it should not have been discouraged. The stimulation needed, however, was research into new economic possibilities and intervention to foster them. The industries that would use the new skills had not yet been developed, and it was useless to provide practical education that did not meet the needs of those who received it.

An example of what could be done may be taken from two institutions established to meet particular objectives of the government itself. The Agricultural College at Serdang was not intended as a part of the general educational system;²⁰ it was set up to train agricultural assistants at two course levels—one reasonably scientific, based on an English-language education, and lasting three years; the other using modern methods based on scientific research but not giving any depth of understanding, requiring only a limited vernacular education, and lasting one year. Both of these courses attracted some outside students not going into government service. The former became trained conductors on rubber estates, replacing the European assistant managers, but only after acute depression in the rubber industry enforced drastic economies. The latter were mainly sons of farmers with large holdings, who returned to improve them. These developments were incidental. It is apparent that some pressure on estates to offset the cultural barrier to non-Europeans in management positions and some deliberate inducement to small and medium farmers could have greatly expanded

19. D. D. Chelliah, *A Short History of the Educational Policy of the Straits Settlements* (Kuala Lumpur, 1947), pp. 78–79; Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 351–353.

20. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

this work. The school itself naturally sought such expansion but was not able to carry it far because its finances and organization were designed for a special function.

The Kuala Lumpur Technical College was in an analogous position. It existed primarily to train technicians for such government departments as public works and posts and telegraphs.²¹ Later it was transferred to the education department and trained some technicians for employment in private firms.

By contrast we may refer to the experience of the Sultan Idris Teachers' Training College established in 1922 at Tanjong Malim,²² which took pupils from the Malay schools and trained them to be teachers. There was a good deal of emphasis on teaching them to run school gardens and classes in rural crafts. The aim, quite explicitly, was not so much to improve the level of agriculture as to encourage the more educated Malays of the future to remain on the land.²³ Keeping the Malays in the villages, however, worsened their relative economic position in the next generation.

III. Prewar Structure of Education

This background has to be borne in mind when we consider the actual structure of education that developed in the years immediately preceding World War II. The school system that developed in Malaya at this stage had five different divisions. First, there was the government system of free primary education in the Malay language only.²⁴ Races other than Malays could in theory send their children to Malay schools, but few did so. Education to the Chinese and Indians was chiefly a key to economic advancement or else a means of preserving their own culture, and Malay educa-

21. Chelliah, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

22. Ho Seng Ong, *Education for Unity in Malaya* (Penang, 1952), p. 49; Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

23. In fairness it must be emphasized that this policy was much more successful than any previous one in persuading Malay peasants to send their sons to school. There also was considerable emphasis on Malay translations of English texts, which began to produce some suitable teaching and reading matter for Malay schools and incidentally helped to develop Malay journalism.

24. This system is described in the sources previously cited by Mills, Chelliah, and Ho, and also more analytically in the Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Commission on Malay Education* (L. Barnes, Chairman) (Kuala Lumpur, 1951).

tion did neither. The Chinese community itself provided the second main division of Malayan education—the Chinese primary and secondary schools.²⁵ These were financed and organized mainly by clans in the towns and village committees in the country.²⁶ The inspiration came mainly from the Chinese national revolution. Secret society organization had long flourished among the Southeast Asian Chinese, and adequate sanctions existed to insure that Chinese contributed according to their means.²⁷ Teachers had to be recruited mainly from China; their conditions were precarious, and in self-protection (as well as from conviction) they often involved themselves in local politics, making the schools centers of Chinese nationalism. The government frequently had to close down such schools. After 1923 those that accepted certain conditions were subsidized on a very trivial scale, for the sake of some control over their curriculum.²⁸ The third division of vernacular education comprised the Indian schools, which were principally estate schools. Under the Labour Code, in the drafting of which pressure from the Indian government agent played some part;²⁹ estates employing Indian labor were, in effect, required to provide schools in their own language for their laborers' children.

The fourth division was English education given by Christian missionary organizations, which had taken the main initiative in establishing English education in Malaya.³⁰ Their primary aim was religious, and they were naturally interested in trying to provide a type of education that would be demanded and would influence

25. Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Mission to Study the Education of Chinese in Malaya*, *op. cit.*

26. A more detailed account of the sources of finance and types of management is given in Singapore, *Report of the All-Party Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education*, *op. cit.* See also V. W. W. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, 1948).

27. Reliable evidence of secret society pressure cannot be given, but it may be presumed to have been at least a background influence. There is known to have been close association between the clan associations and secret societies. Intimidation was certainly used in other fund-collecting with a political slant among the Chinese, e.g., relief funds for the war against Japan.

28. Chelliah, *op. cit.*, p. 83; Mills, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-348.

29. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 227; N. Parmer, *Colonial Labor Policy and Administration* (New York, 1960), p. 73. See also Federated Malay States, *The Labour Code* (Kuala Lumpur, 1923).

30. Both Chelliah and Ho were teachers in mission schools when their studies were written, and some allowance should perhaps be made for vocational enthusiasm, but the evidence they give is considerable.

future leaders. They were much more willing than the government to provide the kind of education that would produce not only the clerks but the professional men. Furthermore, they were very willing to work for recognized qualifications, and largely through their efforts pupils took overseas examinations at progressively higher levels.

Finally, the government English schools also worked for overseas tests of scholastic attainment: first the Cambridge Lower, then the School Certificate, and then the Higher Certificate. There was certainly no firmly held policy of spreading English education and little sense of an objective to be attained. The English schoolmasters were frequently moved from school to school and had little chance or inducement to innovate. Both the out-of-school activities and the curriculum tended to be modeled on British schools of an earlier generation.³¹

These five divisions were largely self-contained. Some of the mission schools had been Anglo-Chinese, especially in earlier decades, with facilities for teaching in both Chinese and English. Although that name survived in many schools, most of them had become, by the thirties, merely English schools, usually teaching Chinese only as a subject. While attending English schools, many of the Chinese children were required by their parents to study Chinese in evening classes. A few of the mission schools made special arrangements for pupils from Chinese schools who were either very talented or otherwise useful to the work of the church, but these were exceptions.

The pupils from Indian estate schools were strongly discouraged from studying English or entering English schools. It was against government policy to facilitate their leaving the estates. The aim was a resident labor force, not competitors with the Malay aristocracy. There was, however, a system of link classes by which pupils from Malay schools could enter the English school system since there was no secondary education in Malay. Selected pupils were given intensive teaching in English at the end of their Malay

31. Teaching *methods* of course had to be adapted to cope with a multilingual group of children with no common language. Most of the primary school lessons, and many later ones also, were in effect direct-method lessons in the use of accurate, grammatical English.

schooling to enable them to enter the corresponding age group in an English school. Selection, however, bore little relation to ability. It was not based on any standardized system operating throughout Malaya. The influential local family, if it wished its children to be selected, could exert a good deal of pressure; and many of the peasants were unwilling to allow their sons to leave the village for secondary education in a town. Moreover, access to secondary schools was most uneven as between different districts.

The Malay and Indian education systems generally discouraged movement away from the parental district and style of living.³² Chinese primary education was of relatively little use economically except in the handling of money, but it helped to preserve a Chinese cultural and political orientation. Chinese secondary education gave access to clerical and managerial positions in Chinese commerce (and later industry) in the Southeast Asian region. Until 1949 it also gave access to Chinese universities in which professional qualifications could be acquired, though most of these could not be used in Malaya.

English education provided direct access to positions in the clerical service; but it also provided access, even before World War II, to many types of supplementary training in subordinate positions. Firms trained their better clerks for junior executive posts, especially where a knowledge of local dialects was an advantage. But they normally excluded them—mainly by cultural barriers and by mistrust—from the senior executive positions.³³

The educational system described above was that of the federated and unfederated Malay States. The essential features covered in this essay also applied elsewhere in British Southeast Asia, but something must be said about the main differences between Malaya and the other British territories. In all of the territories there was a multi-racial society with some difference in educational practice, depending on race, outside the government English-education system. In all, the English-educated were despised

32. The factors limiting Malay access to secondary and higher education are discussed in the Barnes Report on Malay Education, cited in note 24; and also in the *Report of the Commission on University Education in Malaya* (Sir A. Carr-Saunders, Chairman) (Kuala Lumpur, 1948).

33. This point is discussed more fully by the author in *The Commonwealth Economy* . . . , *op. cit.*

for their alleged addiction to book-learning and neglect of physical work; and in all, Christian missions were allowed and given some assistance, though with different access to people of different races and religions. Finally, the result in all of the territories was a suspicious attitude toward any difference in standards (as measured by the tests of academic attainment) between the local English schools and England. These are perhaps the essentials, but in many respects the patterns were different.

In Burma the difference in races was partly due to the importation of Indians but mainly to the lack of racial homogeneity in the territories formerly ruled by the Burmese. There was much less emphasis on vernacular education, though a halfhearted attempt was made to improve and use the indigenous system of monastic education.³⁴ Burma was ruled throughout the greater part of the British period as part of India, and the legacy of the East India Company and Macaulay's famous minute led to a much greater emphasis on English education. The Burmese suffered, however, because the much longer tradition of English education in India gave Indians an advantage in competition for clerical and administrative positions. This created different problems when independence was achieved, for while most of the non-Malays in Malaya stayed, a very substantial proportion of the Indians in executive positions in Burma left.

In Singapore the main difference from the Malayan pattern was the much greater predominance of Chinese and the comparative absence of a rural economy. There were relatively few Tamil schools, for there was very little Tamil estate labor. A relatively high proportion of the Indian children went to English-medium schools. Malay schools were similar to those in Malaya (except that English was taught in them earlier), but fewer in number simply because there were relatively fewer Malays. Both the Chinese-language and the English-language school systems were better developed, with more emphasis on secondary education. In addition, private schools run for profit, teaching mainly English

34. J. S. Furnivall, *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia* (New York, 1943), chap. iv.

and commercial subjects, were fairly common in Singapore but hardly significant in Malaya.

In Sarawak and North Borneo education was still poorly developed before World War II. Sarawak was a little better than North Borneo³⁵ in that a vernacular system of Malay education had been developed under the Brookes, and the Malays formed the intellectual aristocracy (such as it was) of the country. There was a system of Chinese schools rather similar to the primary system in Malaya. Different Christian missions were encouraged to educate the non-Muslim native tribes. The rajah allotted different areas to different religions, with curious effects on the subsequent spiritual development of Sarawak. Missionaries also ran English schools in the principal towns, mainly for the Chinese, but were not encouraged to carry education very far, nor to create an English-speaking elite to rival the Malays in the government service. North Borneo education, before the British North Borneo Company turned its administration over to the colonial office, was extremely rudimentary, though there were Chinese schools run by the Chinese and a few mission schools assisted by the government. The government conducted only a few schools in Malay, using teachers recruited from Malaya.

IV. Postwar Developments in the Educational System

By the end of World War II, the long-run policy in all the British territories had changed radically. The aim of introducing a system of democratic self-government—though not immediately accepted for all territories—rapidly became a dominant influence in British policy. This might have been expected to change educational policy in two distinct ways.

Politically the approach of self-government might be expected to lead to a change in both the form and the content of education:

35. Information about education in Sarawak is given by E. W. Woodhead, *Report Upon Financing of Education in Sarawak* (Kuching, 1954).

the form being modified in the direction of lessening racial tensions and increasing the sense of nationhood; the content in the direction of increasing emphasis on political and social subjects.

Economically the emphasis on national economic development could be expected to focus attention on the growth of local supplies of the different factors of production. In colonial times the economic development of the area was seen as something coming in mainly from the outside—something to be promoted and at the same time controlled, with wider political objectives in view. Local populations needed to be protected against some of the effects of economic development; their composition could be modified in the interest of greater revenue. Local boundaries were mere administrative conveniences within a wider economy that was being developed. The prospect of self-government could be expected to change all this. The local entrepreneur, whether public or private, would become the focus of attention; economic growth within a national boundary would become an objective of policy; and a distinction would be drawn between incomes accruing to those (in some sense) domiciled within the national boundaries and other incomes.

In some measure these changes have taken place. Consideration of the detail in the education system (mainly in Malaya) may help to elucidate the interaction between nationalism and economic and political development.

One area of change, with both political and economic implications, is the language of education. Nearly all the nationalist leaders were educated in English and used English in working out the compromises on which national political institutions were built. The demand from parents and students for education in English was still very strong. Attempts were made, both in Malaya and in Singapore, immediately after World War II, to introduce a system of primary education in each child's own mother tongue, but these attempts were frustrated by the demand (mainly on economic grounds) for education in English. The Carr-Saunders Commission on University Education in Malaya,³⁶ which recommended university education in English in 1948, was enthusiastically ac-

36. See report cited in note 32, col. 229.

cepted. Sarawak and North Borneo have strongly resisted any attempt in the new Malaysian Federation to overthrow the plans previously worked out for education in English.³⁷

By 1957, however, it was already too late in Malaya to consider English as a possible unifying educational medium for the different races. The opportunity to spread English education so widely that it would become the means to Malayan unity was effectively lost in the decades between the two world wars, the decades in which this was achieved in the Philippines and in which a similar demand for English education could have been developed in Malaya. Only a small elite was educated in English at that time, for reasons indicated above. This elite, in Malaya no less than elsewhere, initiated the pressure for independence by mobilizing public opinion against its own exclusion from public appointments. The real driving force that promotes independence may be increasing popular awareness that a better standard of living is possible, and hence increasing willingness to accept change; but the first change that is desired is the replacement of the Europeans in positions of authority, and it is the English-educated who desire and initiate this change, with increasing popular support.

The English-educated Malays could capture power only by coming to terms with the Chinese. Having a majority of the electorate, as well as a greater participation in the British system of government, they had superior bargaining power and they realized that emphasis on English education would favor the urban non-Malays. They could not, however, press for a completely Malay system of education without alienating the essential minimum of Chinese support. As a result, a mixed system with gradual pressure toward Malay as a national language was introduced.

During the period between World War II and the achievement of independence in 1957, the national policy toward language in education was worked out by a series of commissions, with successive adjustments of outlook. At the same time, considerable

37. United Kingdom Colonial Office, North Borneo and Sarawak, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak* (Lord Cobbold, Chairman), Cmnd. 1794 (1962).

efforts were made to meet the existing demand for education in English as well as in the other languages.

The essential landmarks in the development of educational language policy were the Barnes Report in 1951,³⁸ the Fenn-Wu Report,³⁹ the Report of the Central Education Committee,⁴⁰ and the legislation introduced by Dato Abdul Razak, Minister of Education.⁴¹

The commission under the chairmanship of Leonard Barnes was supposed to report on Malay education but found itself unable to do so without reflections on the position of the Malays as a community handicapped educationally in their own country. The emphasis on Malay rather than English as a unifying force can be traced to the Barnes Report. The Fenn-Wu Report, dealing with Chinese education, emphasized the impossibility of laying down any blueprint for cultural integration and the need to build on elements in existing cultures that could promote closer relationships between the different communities.

The Central Committee on Education worked on these two reports to produce a compromise, and the legislation largely followed this, though the administrative details were in some respects more favorable to the Malay point of view. Malay is to be the national language, and the national school envisaged in the Barnes Report is to be the norm. But considerable concessions are made to those desiring to educate their children through another language. This can be done not only in private schools at the parents' own expense, but also—where the numbers requiring it are sufficient—at government expense. In the national-type schools where this is done, a prescribed curriculum is being introduced, and committees are at work coordinating syllabuses for the different language streams. The aim appears to be to foster unity partly through the national language (but working through in-

38. Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Commission on Malay Education* (Kuala Lumpur, 1951).

39. Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Mission to Study the Education of Chinese in Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur, 1951).

40. Federation of Malaya, Central Advisory Committee on Education, *Report on the Barnes Report and the Fenn Wu Report* (Kuala Lumpur, 1951).

41. Federation of Malaya, *Report of the Education Committee* (Dato Abdul Razak, Chairman) (Kuala Lumpur, 1956); Federation of Malaya, *Education Ordinance, 1957* (Kuala Lumpur, 1957).

ducements rather than compulsion) and partly through common syllabuses in government-financed schools.

During the years in which a language policy was being worked out, considerable expansion of the school population was undertaken, in response to the enormous expansion in the number of children and the increasing awareness of educational needs which World War II had brought. In the primary schools, the number of children expanded in ten years to almost three times the prewar level. In secondary schools, the main emphasis, until nearly the end of the period, was on English-language teaching. The political demand for a Malay secondary education was not yet effective. Among the Malays the competition for places in the new University of Malaya stimulated a great demand for English education, while the non-Malays continued to demand it on economic grounds. Two teachers' training colleges, exclusively for Malayan students, were set up in the United Kingdom, and in addition new training colleges teaching in English were established in Malaya itself.

In Singapore the development followed a different course. Here the problem, ever since World War II, has been what to do about the privately run schools teaching in Chinese.⁴² Singapore is a predominantly Chinese city with probably only a minority of its citizens owing their loyalty mainly to Malaya. Yet anyone who has to govern Singapore soon realizes that its fortunes are bound up with Malaya if it is not to remain a colony. By itself Singapore is a port without a hinterland, an industrial area without a market, and a city without a water supply. This conflict between the orientation of its citizens and the facts of its economic life have dominated educational policy during the period.

Before World War II the comparative lack of English education and the prosperity of the Chinese community resulted in the establishment of many Chinese schools. After World War II the spread of Communist influence in these schools was seen as a threat both by the British and by the English-educated Chinese merchants and professional men who were associated with them

42. Singapore, *Report of the All Party Committee of the Legislative Assembly on Chinese Education*, *op. cit.*

in the Legislative Council and Assembly. The ten-year Neilson Plan (mainly a plan for vernacular education) was replaced by the five-year Frisby Emergency Plan to expand English education.⁴³

There can be little doubt that if the British government had shown, in the generation before World War II, the sense of urgency in expanding English education that was shown in both Malaya and Singapore during the decade before independence, Malaya would have become ultimately an English-speaking country, at least in the sense in which this has happened in the Philippines. This would certainly have smoothed the path toward national unity and diminished the conflict between national unity and economic progress; but it is unreasonable to judge policy in an era when a Malayan nation was not a British aim by the criteria of national development.

The concentration of effort on English education after World War II may have checked the growth of Chinese schools, but it created a mood of discontent in those that already existed. The Chinese-educated were much more politically conscious than the English-educated, partly because of this frustration. They also enjoyed more influence among the uneducated (mainly Chinese) working class. The English-educated outnumbered the Chinese-educated, but not sufficiently to offset these advantages. It soon became apparent that political power would pass to the Chinese-educated.

This is the basis of the present educational policy of the Singapore government, a government favoring Malayan nationalism but relying heavily on Chinese-educated party workers for its support. This policy accepts Malay as the national language but not as the main medium of instruction in schools.⁴⁴ National unity is sought, as in Malaya, mainly by trying to introduce a common content of education in the different language streams, which are all treated as equal. The aim is to provide education, right up to the university degree level, in all four languages.

Language problems in the other territories can be touched on

43. Colony of Singapore, *Education Reports*, 1951 and 1952 (Singapore, 1951, 1952).

44. People's Action Party, *The Tasks Ahead, Part II* (Singapore, 1959), pp. 1-5.

more briefly.⁴⁵ In Burma the more rapid switch from English to Burmese as the language of the schools was the result not of any greater preparation, by training of teachers before independence, nor of any greater adaptability of the Burmese language to the needs of modern life, but of the revolutionary and violent achievement of independence. The change from English to the language of the dominant local race has not in fact fostered national unity, and it has certainly lowered technical standards in education. This has at all times been realized by the English-educated politicians who adopted the policy; but none of them could afford to be on the less anti-colonial side on any issue. A high proportion of Burma's leading intellectuals have been lost, and its problem of creating an elite greatly aggravated by these changes.

In Sarawak the postwar period has been one of rather unwilling change by the colonial government toward a policy of general English-language education. The cession of the country by the Brooke family to the British Colonial Office produced a preoccupation with the problems of racial integration as a preparation for self-government and a conviction that this could best be achieved through local government.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, local government financing starved the rural schools of funds until 1956, while privately financed Chinese education expanded.⁴⁷ The introduction of a national system of education in English was seen, both by the government and by the Iban and other local races in Sarawak, as a means of countering too great a Chinese advantage. It is doubtful whether English could have become an adequate unifying medium in Sarawak without more vigorous campaign to spread it.

Economically the disadvantages of a rapid switch by a small country to national-language education are obvious. Any small country clearly needs many scholars who can use international languages to keep up with technical publications, and this is particularly important where no national scientific tradition exists.

45. University language problems are not considered here. They have been reviewed by the author in "Language Problems in Southeast Asian Universities," *Vestes* (Sydney), V (1962), 3-12.

46. This problem is discussed more fully in T. H. Silcock, *Fiscal Survey of Sarawak* (Kuching, 1956), chap. x.

47. See E. W. Woodhead, *op. cit.*

Political pressures may thus cause technical losses, but there are some compensating gains. In a colonial society too high a proportion of internal commerce and of technical training at lower educational levels tends to be done in a foreign language, not because of pressure from the government but because most employers are foreigners. This is certainly wasteful of educational effort and skill. Yet the level at which a more widely used language should become the medium is unlikely to be decided on rational economic grounds. It is not normally recognized that this problem has an economic basis that depends on the size of the population that habitually speaks the national language.

In Malaya the national language happens to be the language of the economically handicapped rural people. This makes its wider use an important instrument for improving rural conditions, both by increasing the supply of rural research and extension workers and by facilitating movement out of agriculture. The advantage is, however, peculiar to Malaya. In many economically underdeveloped countries, including Sarawak and North Borneo, the languages of those rural people who most need help have no chance of becoming national languages or post-primary media of instruction.

Turning from the language to the content of education, we already have seen that efforts have been made, both in Malaya and in Singapore, to co-ordinate syllabuses and relate them to Malaya. However, there has been surprisingly little change in the political content of education. No detailed study of textbooks and syllabuses from this point of view has yet been published, but, apart from some increased orientation toward Malaya in history and geography texts, the preparation for political responsibility has been slight.

The shift in economic emphasis has been greater, though there has been little systematic planning. The problem has certainly not been considered, in Malaya, in terms of manpower or supplies of factors of production,⁴⁸ even though a gesture toward this approach has been made in the second five-year plan.⁴⁹

48. A manpower survey is at present (1963) under way.

49. Federation of Malaya, *Second Five Year Plan, 1961-65* (Kuala Lumpur, 1961), chap ii, sec. iii.

The growth of Malayan nationalism should imply some recognition of the need to increase the supply of skilled people domiciled in Malaya. This could be done in the short run by training those already at work either on the job or by public or private schemes of adult education; longer-term changes could be brought about by expanding technical education in schools and colleges.

The prospect of independence resulted in some increase in training, both in Malaya and abroad, for skilled posts. Pressure on foreign firms to employ Malaysians was comparatively mild—a few speeches by politicians and a little pressure on the holders of Pioneer Industry certificates—but many firms trained local staff members for executive positions. Generally, however, they were unable to find qualified Malays among their own staff and unwilling either to bring in inexperienced ones from outside or to appoint non-Malays and lose most of the political insurance that local appointments were intended to give.

There is indeed some hesitation in official training policy because of the apparent conflict between two different aims. For the political aim of nation-building, it is necessary to increase Malay participation in economic life; for economic progress it is necessary to substitute Malaysians, of any race, for foreigners in the skilled positions and to raise the general level of skill. Because of past weaknesses in education of Malays (particularly secondary education) and because Malay electoral supremacy and political fears generate a strong demand for Malay civil servants, police, and army officers, there are very few educated Malays available for commercial and industrial training. As a result, there is little pressure in favor of substituting Malaysians for Europeans in existing European businesses, and very little support for Malaysian businesses (mainly owned by Chinese and other non-Malay Malaysians) against their foreign rivals.

The conflict of policies is in fact largely illusory. The main measures needed to improve the economic position of Malays are, first, improvement of rural research and education to raise the productivity and bargaining power of the bulk of the Malay population, and second, a change in the character of Malaysian Chinese business to enable it simultaneously to employ more Malays and com-

pete with foreign business. The former could be done mainly within the public sector, where Malays will be recruited in any case for political reasons; the latter should use the abundant supplies of English-educated Chinese who cannot be accommodated in government service. The apparent conflict arises not from real policy needs but from the balance of political forces: Malay political power leading to pressure for more Malays in business and relative lack of support for improvements in non-Malay business, even where these would in the long run benefit Malays.

A national apprenticeship scheme is being gradually extended, with foreign aid, to increase the supply of skilled artisans.⁵⁰ The procedure is to operate by industries and states. When enough firms can be found to undertake training of apprentices with enough facilities for supplementary instruction in a given trade in any one state, the government has the power to require that skilled posts in this trade shall in the future be filled by those who have undergone an apprenticeship. The fact that most of the suitable firms are European tends at present, in the absence of Malay secondary education, to link this scheme with the English-language educational system.

The adult education movement has mainly concerned itself with literacy, English language, and later national language classes. While the movement remained independent in its organization, but partly government-financed, there were numerous attempts by local associations to start vocational classes, which would have attracted additional students. These were opposed by the colonial government, apparently on the ground that there was no reason for any official subsidy to private vocational, but only to private cultural, education. This was based on the analogy of the role of independent adult education in the United Kingdom, an analogy already out of date in the postwar period.

Unfortunately, this analogy left a legacy of neglect of this field after the government itself took over adult education work. No system of part-time vocational education has developed for individuals wishing to improve their skills, apart from those as-

50. Federation of Malaya, Labour Department, *Annual Report, 1960* (Kuala Lumpur, 1960).

sociated with the National Productivity Centre, which operates training within industry.

An attempt also is being made to set up a system of rural continuation schools. Development is hampered mainly by the difficulty of supplying teachers, but partly also by controversy over policy. These schools can provide either an extension of general education or special training for more efficient rural life. Generally, the demand is for the former, which is also easier to supply, but there is the usual anxiety about encouraging a drift away from the rural areas.

It is perhaps not usually recognized how much transfer from the country to the towns is desirable on economic grounds⁵¹—the disparity in earnings is still very considerable, and would be eased by greater competition for urban work and more land per capita in the country—but the political dangers of such a transfer are only too obvious. Increasing racial friction as Malays compete with Chinese in towns and increasing alienation of the Malay vote are threats which the Alliance government must take seriously.

Space does not permit similar detailed discussion of the economic content of education in other former British colonies in Southeast Asia. In all of them the prospect or achievement of independence has produced some shift toward the deliberate training of local skills, but this has not been a dominant influence. As in the language medium, so in the economic content, pressures of particular interests on the educational system have been at least as important as objectives of national development—tension between the rival school systems in Singapore, student politics in Rangoon, racial balance in Sarawak.

Recognition of the comparatively limited role of deliberate goals of national policy in the actual design of education need not discourage attempts to apply systematic economic and political analysis; but it can properly induce caution in going beyond limited canons of criticism.

We may conclude by considering two questions in relation to

51. A careful forecast of the demographic aspects of this transfer has been made by J. C. Caldwell in T. H. Silcock and E. K. Fisk (eds.), *The Political Economy of Independent Malaya* (Canberra, 1963), chap. 3.

educational policy in Southeast Asia, both of which have a bearing on other economically underdeveloped countries. What inducements are available in using education as a means to national unity? And what economic advantages can be secured by partially insulating the national market for skills?

V. Education and National Unity

The governments in both Malaya and Singapore have been driven by the force of events to abandon attempts to seek a uniform educational policy that will command electoral support and then impose it. Their resources are quite inadequate. They have been forced to take the existing education system and find key points where they can offer inducements to change. Neither the Malayan government nor that of Singapore has much sympathy either for Christian missions or for the exclusively Chinese schools. Yet neither has been able to substitute a wholly national system of its own choice. Unrealistic pressure in this direction would not merely have cost more in educational losses than these governments could accept but might have hampered national unity rather than promoted it.

This raises a number of general points that are worth considering. The achievement of political power certainly makes it possible for a government to close any schools that it does not want, to appoint and pay its own teachers, and by an inspection system and other discipline to impose a centralized policy. The fact that this is known to be possible affects politics in countries trying to build a national identity and may lead to charges of weakness that can force a government to damage its own interests. This has certainly been a factor for both the Alliance and the People's Action party in losing some support from those who broadly accept their respective aims. But factors related to the cost to be incurred may have a strong influence on policy and organization, and costs may rise steeply for the relatively small changes that are attempted.

The cost of an educational program depends partly on the costs of teachers' salaries and on administration. In Malaya, as in most

economically underdeveloped countries, educated people are relatively scarce and expensive. Moreover, the population is growing rapidly so that children make up a high proportion of the total. The proportion of the whole educated population engaged in teaching needs to be abnormally high. If teaching becomes unpopular, the cost in salaries and administration can be very high. The need to secure co-operation from teachers in mission and Chinese schools has been an important influence on policy.

In Singapore much of the great increase in educational expenditure since 1956 has been due to the need to give Chinese school teachers greatly increased salaries and other benefits to secure their co-operation in a centralized system. There was some reduction in the salaries in the English schools, but this created so many difficulties in carrying out the expanded policy that the cuts had to be restored.

A dictatorial policy involving strong pressures against any strong cultural or religious group probably would have disastrous consequences for national unity. Weaker pressures merely drive potential teachers away. There is, therefore, in most of these countries, a marked advantage in working through inducements. The aim here must be to seek key points where the use of relatively limited resources will generate changes in the direction of national unity.

Relatively limited grants to private schools can make them anxious to retain the grant by conforming to curriculum standards, if these involve no conflict with the schools' own aims. Examinations and promotion policy for teachers also can create inducements. Recognition of qualifications for posts in government service also can have an effect on many who will never secure entry.

There can be little doubt that in language policy these pressures have had a considerable effect in improving other races' knowledge of the Malay language. The most controversial measure has been the use of Malay as the medium of examination even for schools teaching in other languages. This may perhaps have been done prematurely, giving an impression of racial discrimination rather than inducement; but it is in line with the general policy of using competitive ambition as a unifying factor.

Similar effects might be produced in stimulating an awareness of Malaya and its problems and needs, if similar efforts are devoted to producing teaching material. Suitable talent for producing such material may exist, but the institutions for encouraging it need to be built up and given resources. Imaginative public competitions and generous grants to successful competitors might well achieve more than attempts to build up public agencies producing local textbooks.

We turn next to the general problem of promoting economic development by insulating the market for local skills. There can be little doubt that Japan has been helped in recent years by its linguistic isolation, which has enabled it to retain good scientists and technicians at low salaries that would not have sufficed to retain men of similar caliber in, say, Australia or South America. At an earlier stage, however, this isolation was felt as a handicap. Are the conditions in Southeast Asia (or in other economically underdeveloped countries today) such that some deliberate insulation is desirable?

It must be emphasized that at this point we are trying to focus attention on education as an instrument of economic development. One of the motives for fostering education is that it can accelerate this. A national government is interested in promoting economic development within one country. Education, however, is subsidized indirectly by many agencies that have objectives of their own. Christian and other missions wish to improve the mental powers, economic influence, and cultural standing of their converts and to have an inducement for conversion. International foundations wish to foster learning as well as to improve living standards in economically underdeveloped countries. Foreign universities wish to promote the spread of research and learning. A poor country will wish to use these subsidies to foster its own economic development, which means that it has to give some attention to the national boundary, to the effect of its policy on promoting the flow of skills across it, and to the efficiency of the educational processes within its borders. The objective is the most rapid growth of national income. We already have seen that this is an objective unlikely to be pursued with complete logical rigor, and there is prob-

ably therefore little advantage in working out highly elaborate models. But it may be worthwhile to draw attention to the relations between the different elements in the transfer and development of skills.

In an economically underdeveloped country the productivity of labor is low and general standards of living are low. The marginal product of both capital and training tends to be very high because they are scarce, but the extent to which they can be applied tends to be limited by the availability of other scarce factors such as public works and local education, which depend on the holders of political power. If these factors can be provided on a large scale, an inflow of both capital and training will follow because high earnings are possible. If we could assume that the rate of growth of local capital and local skill was independent of this inflow, or positively correlated with it, all that would be needed would be to provide the conditions for it to occur. In fact, the inflow of foreign capital and skills can influence the supply of local capital and skills either adversely or favorably, and by modifying techniques it also can influence their effectiveness adversely or favorably.

Only skills need to be discussed here. Training of local skills tends at first to be expensive, partly because teachers and equipment are scarce and partly because methods of teaching are imitated from other countries and consequently use teachers and equipment extravagantly. The raw material—an uneducated population—is available in vast quantities.

In terms of comparative statics, this economic analysis would tend to suggest that free import of skills would always be desirable. It would both reduce directly the lack of local skills and help to make training cheaper by making teachers less scarce. Such static analysis, however, is oversimplified, and ignores the crucial problems of discontinuous change. Both methods of production and methods of teaching can become rigid, with institutions accustomed to foreign supplies of the higher skills and local supplies of unskilled labor. Selective controls over immigration may be necessary to produce changes and ultimately secure economies of scale.

Business institutions in Malaya were developed with imported

European officers occupying definite ranks and positions of responsibility. Schools, and later colleges, were similarly accustomed to importing teachers for posts at certain levels. Since importing staff was difficult, an important feature of organization was the provision of conditions that would attract foreign staff. This tended to give the staff strong bargaining power; consequently, the form of organization became difficult to change by any process of gradual substitution as local skills were trained.

Strong pressure will be needed before firms will adapt their structure to available supplies of local skill. Moreover, the methods of training had been fitted into existing patterns; the schools, for example, could train their pupils to be clerks or they could, hopefully, train them for posts originally designed to attract and use Europeans. Even if the latter training were successful, and even if a few Malaysians managed to fill such posts, resources were being wasted in reproducing unnecessary cultural traits, language skills, and social characteristics. The business organizations themselves needed to change.

Similarly, in the school system itself, the overseas teachers' needs had become dominant. Instead of accepting the fact that much less was known about the Malayan environment, and therefore a relatively higher proportion of time should be spent in developing techniques of finding out, the school system was modeled on that of England or China so that it could use the available English or Chinese teachers. Students studied the English or Chinese environment because textbooks adapted to such systems of education relate to these countries.

It is, however, easier to criticize this orientation to immigrant skills than to suggest appropriate changes now. A small country like Malaya cannot rapidly develop new technologies. Both the institutional structure and the system of education will need some change to adapt them to resources available in Malaya, but neither can be adjusted so far as to create an isolated system. The availability or absence of European migrants will affect the structure of firms, since major changes in structure, involving substitution of local workers for Europeans, will be more likely if Europeans are not available.

Some attention also may have to be paid to a possible reverse flow. So long as salaries for local skills correspond approximately to their market value this is not a serious problem. But there may be strong reasons for preventing them from doing so. The yield from investing in education in a poor country may be very high. If supplies of skilled labor can be increased up to the point at which yields from investing in education approximately correspond to those from investing in equipment, the yield from both may be sufficient to generate rapid economic growth. For a fairly long period, however—perhaps half a century—this may mean incomes for educated people tied to a low general standard of living, which would give the educated an inducement to move elsewhere.

High international mobility is an advantage so long as the disadvantages of the underdeveloped country in producing skills outweigh its advantages. Its lack of teachers, small scale of operations, shortage of books, and so forth are competitive disadvantages. Its low basic standard of living is a competitive advantage. If education is expanded much more rapidly than material capital, outflow of skill and brains may hamper the fall in relative earnings of the educated that is necessary for flexibility and rapid growth. Examples of the Singapore government's suspending work in the polytechnic for London qualifications and the Federation of Malaya's deploring the outflow of its ablest educated non-Malays to Singapore through the local university are instances of casual, not very well co-ordinated, attention to the problem of outflow as well as inflow.

The economic problems here are complex and merit much fuller attention than they have received. Complementarities between different types of training, some of which are appropriate and others inappropriate to a small country, may cause trouble. Designing an educational pattern which will discourage the outflow of accountants and managers—e.g., by teaching in Malay—may make it much more costly to train a few actuaries abroad.

Influences that foster international mobility may hamper internal flexibility in conditions where the latter is more important for growth. The influence of professional associations appears

sometimes to have been perverse. During the period of inward mobility the rules (e.g., of the British General Medical Council) tend to hamper methods of using qualified people, whether in practice or in training, that could save lives. Later they tend to cause internal rigidity, and later still—when the appropriate patterns of use of professional skill have become fairly similar in rich and poor countries—they engender perverse migrations.

Within the economically underdeveloped countries themselves, similar problems arise in planning rural education. Because of high costs and rural poverty, such education must be subsidized from wealthier areas. Reducing mobility may in some conditions increase the flexibility of local methods and prevent all the advantage accruing to those who migrate to towns. There are, however, important differences between this problem and the last. Transfer of public funds is easier, restriction of mobility more difficult, and above all there is less likelihood of a difference between private and social advantage, because there is no national feeling for the one area, so that a loss of revenue to the rural areas is not regarded as harmful in itself.

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